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Abstract
Corruption is widely considered to have adverse e¤ects on economic devel-
opment through its negative impact on the volume and quality of public
investment and the e¢ ciency of government services. Conversely, many of
these macro variables are determinants of corruption. However, there are
few studies of this two-way interaction at the macro level. This thesis aims
to extend the current literature on corruption and development by explicit
investigation of two diverse channels through which corruption and economic
development interact, namely womens share in politics and pollution. For
each variable, the thesis presents a theoretical model in which corruption and
economic development are determined endogenously in a dynamic general
equilibrium framework. We have four main results. First, female bureau-
crats commit fewer corrupt acts than male bureaucrats because they have
lower incentives to be corrupt. Second, corruption a¤ects pollution directly
by reducing pollution abatement resources and indirectly through its impact
on development. As pollution and development appear to have an inverse
U-shaped relationship, the total e¤ect of corruption on pollution depends on
the economys level of income. Third, we conrm a simultaneous relationship
between corruption and development. Fourth, for su¢ ciently low income lev-
els, corruption and poverty may be permanent features of the economy. In
addition to the two theoretical models, the thesis also presents an empirical
investigation of the causal e¤ect of womens share in parliament on corrup-
tion using panel data and gender quotas as instruments for womens share in
parliament. Our results overturn the consensus since we nd no causal e¤ect
of womens share in parliament on corruption, except in a particular case of
Africa with reserved seats quotas.
ix
Introduction
A signicant number of econometric studies have shown that corruption -
dened as the abuse of authority by public servants for their own private
gains - hinders economic development through various channels. It has also
been argued that corruption may increase allocative e¢ ciency by speeding
up bureaucratic procedures and introducing competition for (scarce) govern-
ment resources (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Lui, 1985). Despite these
arguments, the evidence shows that the harmful e¤ects of corruption on de-
velopment cannot be ignored. Specically, corruption constrains economic
development by reducing total investment (Mauro, 1995), increasing inequal-
ity (Gupta et al., 2002), reducing the quality of public investment (Tanzi and
Davoodi, 1997), reducing foreign direct investment (Wei, 2000), and lowering
the e¢ ciency of government services and the quality of public healthcare pro-
vision (Gupta et al., 2001). Moreover, there is evidence of reverse causality.
For example, corruption may be caused by inequality (You and Khagram,
2005), policy distortions (Ades and Tella, 1997), and/or low levels of de-
velopment (Treisman, 2007). The objective of this thesis is to extend the
current literature on corruption and development by explicitly investigating
two new channels through which corruption and economic development may
interact, namely womens share in politics and pollution. The thesis com-
prises three independent but related chapters. For each channel, the thesis
presents a theoretical model in which corruption and economic development
are determined endogenously in a dynamic general equilibrium framework.
In addition, the thesis investigates empirically the causal e¤ect of womens
share in parliament on corruption using panel data and gender quotas as
instruments for womens share in parliament. To the best of our knowledge,
these three investigations have not been conducted previously.
The rst chapter presents a theoretical analysis of gender inequality, bu-
reaucratic corruption and economic development. The main concern of this
chapter is the relationship between womens share in the public sector and
corruption. There has been much evidence based on the aggregate indices of
corruption showing a negative relationship between womens share in parlia-
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ment and bureaucratic malfeasance (e.g., Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al.,
2001; Michailova and Melnykovska, 2009; Treisman, 2007; Samimi and Hos-
seinmardi, 2011; Jha and Sarangi, 2015; Esarey and Chirillo, 2013). Nonethe-
less, evidence on the existence of gender di¤erences in moral attitudes towards
corruption has been mixed. On the one hand, some studies nd evidence for
gender e¤ects (e.g., Torgler and Valev, 2010; Michailova and Melnykovska,
2009; Rivas, 2013; Swamy et al., 2001). Some studies, on the other hand,
nd no such gender di¤erences (e.g., Gërxhani, 2007; Alhassan-Alolo, 2007).
These contradicting results raise doubts concerning the e¤ectiveness of in-
creasing womens share in the public sector in reducing corruption. Up to
now, there have been very limited theoretical investigations to understand the
links between gender and corruption. This chapter aims to ll the gap in the
literature by exploring the e¤ect of womens share in the government on cor-
ruption without assuming gender di¤erences in corrupt attitudes. The analy-
sis is based on evidence showing that women are more wage-discriminated
against in the private sector than in the public sector (e.g., Barón and Cobb-
Clark, 2010; Panizza and Qiang, 2005; Chatterji et al., 2007; Fuller, 2005;
Glinskaya and Lokshin, 2007; Daoud and Shanti, 2012; Hou, 1993). Thus,
female bureaucrats have a lower outside option and consequently face higher
costs of corruption than male bureaucrats. The model predicts that increas-
ing the share of female bureaucrats is likely to lower corruption if the public
sector is a more gender-equal employer than the private sector. The model
also predicts a negative relationship between corruption and development.
The second chapter explores the interactions between pollution, bureau-
cratic corruption and economic development in a dynamic general equilibrium
framework. Some studies nd that corruption a¤ects pollution both directly
and indirectly (e.g., Welsch, 2004; Cole, 2007). Corruption has a positive
direct e¤ect on pollution by decreasing the strictness of environmental reg-
ulation (see Damania et al., 2003; Fredriksson et al., 2004; López and and
Mitra, 2000; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2006; Zugravu et al., 2008; Leitão, 2010)
and/or the e¤ectiveness of environmental regulation (see Biswas et al., 2012;
Lippe, 1999; Callister, 1999; Ivanova, 2011). Corruption a¤ects pollution in-
directly through its impact on economic development. Given a substantial
amount of evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship between pollution and
development - often referred to as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC)
- (e.g., Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Selden and Song, 1994; Leitão, 2010;
Shak, 1994; Cole et al., 1997; Panayotou, 1993, 1997; Carson et al., 1997;
Hettige et al., 1992), this indirect e¤ect can be positive or negative, depend-
ing on the economys level of development. The indirect e¤ect of corruption
on pollution is negative when the economys income is below the income level
at the turning point of the EKC; it is positive when the economys income
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is above the income level at the turning point of the EKC. The total e¤ect
of corruption on pollution is therefore signicantly determined by the econ-
omys level of development. Our model predicts that reducing corruption is
more likely to be benecial in lowering pollution when the economy is more
developed. Our model also shows a negative relationship between corruption
and development.
The third chapter presents an empirical investigation of the causal e¤ect
of womens share in parliament on corruption. The investigation is motivated
by much evidence showing a negative correlation between the variables. This
evidence, however, relies heavily on single period cross-country studies us-
ing ordinary least squares (OLS). Therefore, they are prone to biases arising
from unobserved heterogeneity, reverse causality and other sources of the
endogeneity of womens share in parliament. These potential biases raise
doubts regarding the causal interpretation of the studies of womens share
in politics and corruption. This chapter aims to establish causality by: (i)
exploiting panel data from 133 countries for the period 1984 to 2013 using
a xed e¤ects model; and (ii) instrumenting womens share in parliaments
using quotas, in the form of party quotas, legislative quotas and reserved
seats quotas in two stage least squares (TSLS) regressions. The former al-
lows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries and over
time; the latter allows us to isolate the exogenous variation in the womens
share in parliament variable. We will also analyse subsamples to investi-
gate regional heterogeneity. Our full sample regressions show no statistically
signicant correlation between womens share in parliament and corruption.
Our regional sample regressions, particularly using reserved seats quotas as
instruments, nd a negative e¤ect of womens share in parliament which
is statistically and quantitatively signicant in Africa. No such conclusive
ndings are found in other regions.
3
Chapter 1
Gender Inequality, Corruption
and Economic Development: A
Theoretical Investigation
Abstract
This chapter presents a theoretical investigation of the e¤ect of corrup-
tion on economic development when women are discriminated against
in the labour market. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equi-
librium model in which capital accumulation drives economic devel-
opment. The government appoints bureaucrats to administer public
policy. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats
to embezzle public funds. In the event of detection and the resulting
dismissal, the private sector serves as the bureaucratsoutside option.
Our main results can be summarised as follows: (1) female bureau-
crats commit fewer corrupt acts than male bureaucrats as they have
lower incentives to be corrupt; (2) there is a simultaneous causality
between corruption and development; (3) corruption and poverty may
be permanent features of the economy; (4) a policy to increase fe-
male participation in the public sector potentially reduces corruption,
fosters development and alleviates poverty.
1.1 Introduction
In spite of the e¤orts of governments and multilateral institutions to ght
corruption and reduce gender inequality, there still seems to be a long road
ahead. In particular in developing economies the incidence of corruption and
the extent of gender inequality are considerably greater than in advanced
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economies. Hence, governments have to be creative in designing and propos-
ing innovative policies. In this chapter we seek to contribute to this task
by explaining why a policy of increasing female participation in the gov-
ernment may be an e¤ective anti-corruption policy that simultaneously may
contribute to reduce gender inequality and foster economic development.
Our theory is based on the seminal studies by Dollar et al. (2001) and
Swamy et al. (2001) that investigate the link between female participation
in the government and corruption. They nd that increasing female partic-
ipation in the government reduces corruption. These papers use aggregate
corruption and governance indices at country level. Evidence reported by
such studies will be referred to as macro-evidence. Despite some critics
suggesting that the relationship found in Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy
et al. (2001) might be spurious (e.g., Branisa and Ziegler, 2011; Sung, 2003),
a large number of other studies provide strong support for these two seminal
papers.1 However, how can we explain this? Can we condently say that
women are more honest than men? Is it possible that values may be gender
specic? There are other types of studies on gender and corruption that
shed some light on these questions.2 These studies use individual-level data
to measure attitudes towards corruption and incidence of corruption. Such
data are gathered from surveys, interviews, experiments and case studies.
Results reported by these studies will be referred to as micro-evidence. Not
surprisingly, there is no consensus. Moreover, the evidence of gender dif-
ferences in moral attitudes towards corruption seems to be inconclusive. In
other words, we cannot condently argue that women are intrinsically more
honest than men.
Our chapter provides an economic explanation for the observed negative
correlation between female participation in the government and corruption,
without relying on the existence of gender di¤erences in moral attitudes to-
wards corruption. Our theory rests on the idea that the private sector serves
as an outside option for dismissed bureaucrats. As women are more wage-
discriminated against in the private sector than in the public sector, female
bureaucrats have a lower value of outside option than their male counterparts.
Consequently, female bureaucrats have lower incentives to be corrupt than
male bureaucrats. There is ample evidence of wage discrimination against
women in both the public and private sectors. Moreover, in a wide range of
countries, there is evidence that women are less wage-discriminated against
in the public sector than in the private sector (e.g., Barón and Cobb-Clark,
2010; Arulampalam et al., 2007; Panizza and Qiang, 2005; Chatterji et al.,
1We discuss this evidence in detail below.
2We discuss this evidence in detail below.
5
2007; Daoud and Shanti, 2012; Fuller, 2005; Gunderson, 1979; Mueller, 1998;
Glinskaya and Lokshin, 2007; Hou, 1993; Freeman, 1987; Smith, 1976; Aslam
and Kingdon, 2009; Kolberg, 1991; Gornick and Jacobs, 1998).3 The World
Bank (2012) has also recently reported the same ndings in a wide range of
countries. In addition, other studies nd that corruption is negatively asso-
ciated with the public-private sector wage ratio (e.g., Goel and Rich, 1989;
Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001).
We establish our results within a dynamic general equilibrium framework
where corruption and development are determined jointly and endogenously
as the outcomes of the individualsdecision given the structure of the econ-
omy. A key feature of our model is the existence of multiple development
regimes and multiple (history-dependent) equilibria, including a poverty trap.
The existence of a poverty trap in our chapter is consistent with some ob-
servations that corruption and poverty may coexist as permanent instead of
transient features of the economy (e.g., Bardhan, 1997; Sah, 2007). It has also
been illustrated in many papers on the theoretical investigation of corrup-
tion and development (e.g., Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2011; Blackburn,
2012; Blackburn et al., 2006). To the best of our knowledge, our chapter is
the rst to present an analysis of the links between female participation in
the public sector, corruption, and economic development.
Our chapter seeks to contribute in the design and formulation of anti-
corruption and gender policies. As pointed out by Goetz (2007, p. 103):
Investing in the myth of womens incorruptible nature instead of investi-
gating the reasons for that behaviour will postpone the institutional reform
necessary for a transformation of public institutions in the interest of gender
and social equity.
1.1.1 The Empirical Debate on the Link between Gen-
der and Corruption
Does Increasing Female Proportion in the Government Reduce
Corruption?
Motivated by earlier studies which demonstrate that women are more self-
less or ethical than men (e.g., Eagly and Crowley, 1986; Eckel and Grossman,
1998; Glover and Bumpus, 1997; Goertzel, 1983; Ones and Viswesvaran, 1998;
3Although part of the gender wage gap can be explained by workers and job character-
istic di¤erences, a signicant proportion of the gender gap in wage is still unexplainable;
this unexplained gap has normally been interpreted as a result of discrimination (World
Bank, 2012).
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Reiss and Mitra, 1998), Dollar et al. (2001) investigate if increasing womens
participation in the government reduces corruption. Their study reveals a
strong and statistically signicant negative association between female par-
ticipation in the government and corruption. Moreover, Swamy et al. (2001)
nd that corruption is not only negatively correlated with female partici-
pation in the government but also with female participation in the labour
market.
Other macro-studies have, however, provide evidence that the relation-
ship found in Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) could be spurious.
For instance, Sung (2003) demonstrates that the relationship between fe-
male participation in the government and corruption loses signicance when
measures of liberal democracy are controlled for. Sung (2003) also criticises
Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) for relying on micro-evidence
(that is, women are less tolerant of corruption than men) to propose a macro-
hypothesis (that is, increasing female participation in the government lowers
corruption). Sung (2003) argues that although increasing female partici-
pation in the public sector is a just goal in itself, it may not be by itself
an e¤ective tool to reduce corruption. Moreover, by arguing that both fe-
male participation in the government and corruption are dependent on lib-
eral democracy, he claims that he has found a macro-level explanation to a
macro-level problem. Therefore, Sung (2003) argues for a fairer system
thesis instead of a fairer sex claim. However, a later study by Treisman
(2007) challenges this liberal democracy argument. Treisman (2007) nds a
quite robust negative correlation between female participation in politics and
corruption after controlling for measures of liberal democracy.
Additionally, an analysis of developing countries by Branisa and Ziegler
(2011) supports neither Sung (2003) nor Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy
et al. (2001). Branisa and Ziegler (2011) investigate if there is any association
between social institutions related to gender inequality and corruption. Their
analysis shows that there is a higher corruption in societies that limit womens
freedom from participating in social life, after controlling for democracy and
female representation in parliament and in business. Therefore, policy to
combat corruption may need more than democratic reforms and increasing
female representation in political and economic life. In contrast, a recent
study by Esarey and Chirillo (2013) nds macro-evidence of the interaction
between democracy and female participation in the government in relation
to corruption. Specically, they nd that the negative correlation between
female participation in the government and corruption is more signicant in
democratic states than in autocratic states.
Next, other analyses of developing countries (Samimi and Hosseinmardi,
2011) and of transition countries (Michailova and Melnykovska, 2009) also
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provide further supporting macro-evidence for Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy
et al. (2001). In addition, Michailova and Melnykovska (2009) nd an un-
explainable positive but insignicant relationship between corruption and
womens share of legislators and managers. Their analysis also reveals that
whether or not their ndings support the fairer system thesis by Sung
(2003) depends largely on which corruption index is used.
Furthermore, there are some micro-studies generating supporting evi-
dence for Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001). For example, based on
data from national survey in Mexico, Wängnerud (2010) nds that the Mex-
ican states with more women elected tend to display lower corruption than
the Mexican states with fewer women elected. This is supported by another
survey-based study of Mexico by Grimes and Wängnerud (2012) reporting
that female presence in the government lowers the bribe-paying incidence.
Nevertheless, Vijayalakshmi (2008) nds no signicant relationship between
female participation in the government and corruption in her micro-study of
local government in India.
All in all, taking into account the weight of existing evidence, there ap-
pears to be a considerable support for the proposition that increasing female
participation in the government reduces corruption.
Why Are Women Less Corrupt than Men?
Given a lot of evidence of the negative correlation between female proportion
in the government and corruption, there have been many studies conducted
in the attempt to explain why women are less corrupt than men. This type of
investigation is important as they will result in di¤erent policy implications.
Some studies nd evidence of gender di¤erences in moral attitudes towards
or in perceptions of corruption while others nd no such evidence. Thus,
there are di¤erent theories being o¤ered to explain why women are less cor-
rupt than men. These explanations include psychology/biology/experiential
realities, opportunity/network, corrupt incentive, culture, risk aversion, re-
sistance towards corruption, institutional context and gender dynamic. We
will elaborate these explanations together with the relevant studies below.
Tolerance for/Attitudes Towards Corruption Swamy et al. (2001)
complement their macro-study with a micro-study and nd evidence that
women are less likely to approve corrupt behaviour than men. Thus, they
propose that tolerance for corruption di¤ers across gender. Nevertheless,
Swamy et al. (2001) recognise the di¢ culties in empirically identifying the
sources of gender di¤erential in behaviour. As such, they refuse to take a
stand on whether these gender di¤erences arise as a result of nature (biology)
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or nurture (socialisation). They, however, suggest that gender di¤erences in
tolerance for corruption will be stable, at least in the medium term, regardless
of the narrowing gender inequality in the societal position and the labour
force participation. If interpreted causally, this nding suggests that policy
initiatives designed to increase female participation in economic and political
life will lower corruption.
Other micro-studies also nd evidence of gender di¤erences in attitudes
towards corruption (e.g., Torgler and Valev, 2010; Michailova andMelnykovska,
2009; Rivas, 2013). Moreover, Torgler and Valev (2010) report that men are
more likely to approve corruption and tax evasion than women; this e¤ect
remains robust even after proxies for opportunities such as education, em-
ployment status and income have been included. As such, they are in favour
of the theory by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990, p. 554) that attributes gen-
der di¤erences to fundamental di¤erences at the cognitive, emotional and
behavioural levels due to biological, psychological, and experiential realities.
Michailova and Melnykovska (2009) and Rivas (2013) also adopt a similar
explanation for their ndings.
Opportunity/Network On the contrary, Gërxhani (2007) excludes gen-
der di¤erences in tax morale as an explanation for gender di¤erences in tax
evasion. Gërxhani (2007) aims to come out with a structural explanation of
gender di¤erences in tax evasion by using a new institutional economics the-
ory as a starting point. Within this framework, institutions are seen as rules
of the gamewhich are devices made by humans which constrain and guide
human interaction in the society (North, 1990, p. 3-4). By adopting this
framework, Gërxhani (2007) tests the hypothesis that predatory behaviours
like corruption and tax evasion in changing economies occur due to the ten-
sion between changing formal institutions (e.g., laws and regulations) and the
persisting informal institutions (e.g., cultural norms of behaviour and tradi-
tions) (see Feige, 1997). By using households survey data from Albania, she
tests the hypothesis that men evade taxes more often than women because
they experience a larger conict between formal and informal institutions.
Nevertheless, her analysis reveals that women experience larger conict be-
tween formal and informal institutions. In addition, Gërxhani (2007) nds
no statistically signicant gender di¤erences in perceptions of the informal
institutions.
As an alternative explanation, she suggests that the female concentration
in the state-sector employment and the male concentration in the private
sector in Albania translate into gender di¤erences in tax evasion. This is
because the state sector which is o¢ cial and regulated provides fewer op-
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portunities to evade taxes as compared to the private sector (which includes
underground economy). Moreover, Gërxhani (2007) states that women in
transition economies may be drawn to the state sector due to the lower gen-
der discrimination in the public sector compared with that in the private
sector. In order to gain further understanding of gender di¤erences in tax
evasion behaviour, she suggests looking into the reason behind these gender
di¤erences in the sector concentration and modelling this sector choice si-
multaneously with the tax evasion decision. Another explanation proposed
by Gërxhani (2007) is that men may have better access to corrupt networks
than women.
Similarly, Alhassan-Alolo (2007) nds a lack of signicant gender dif-
ferences in attitudes towards corruption in a micro-study of Ghana. She
concludes based on her results that when men and women are exposed to
similar opportunities and networks that support corrupt behaviour, they
show no signicant di¤erences in their attitudes toward corruption. In such
situations, a policy to increase female representation in the public domain
based on their superior morality will not be e¤ective.
On a similar note, Goetz (2007) suggests that women may be less corrupt
than men as they have limited opportunities for corruption due to the re-
stricted access to the male-dominated public o¢ ce; this will change as there
are more women entering the public o¢ ce. Goetz (2007) illustrates the fe-
male exclusion from the public o¢ ce by using examples from South Asia
on the recruitment and the treatment of women in the political parties and
the state bureaucracies. In addition, based on case studies of India, Goetz
(2007) concludes that women may be more likely to engage in corrupt acts
when the opportunities for corruption arise in a socially acceptable environ-
ment; that is, the environment with a larger number of female colleagues to
cooperate with or of female clients to interact with. Mocan (2008) further il-
lustrates how gender shapes opportunities for corruption. By analysing data
from face-to-face and telephone interviews, Mocan (2008) nds that men are
asked for a bribe more frequently than women. This is because men gener-
ally participate more in the labour market and are therefore more exposed
to government o¢ cials.
Furthermore, Esarey and Chirillo (2013) point out that in autocracies
where personal network is important to gain entry, the recruited women may
have gained entry to the same personal network as mens. Consequently,
women have the same opportunities to be as corrupt as men in autocracies.
The same is not true in democracies where a majority vote share is needed
to gain entry into the existing political networks. If men already dominate
these networks, the elected women form a minority in these networks and thus
have fewer opportunities for corruption than men. In such a case, recruiting
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women into the government only has a short-term e¤ect on corruption; rm
female integration into these political networks will equalise the opportunities
for corruption across gender.
Risk Aversion An experiment by Schulze and Frank (2003) shows that
women are less corrupt than men due to their higher risk aversion and not
because of their superiority in honesty and cooperativeness. Another ex-
periment conducted by Armantier and Boly (2010) also reveals that women
respond to monitoring and punishment more than men. This risk aversion
explanation is however not supported by Rivas (2013) who has ruled out
risk aversion di¤erences as an explanatory variable after controlling for risk
aversion di¤erences in her experiment.
Resistance towards Corruption Another experiment by Lambsdor¤and
Frank (2011) interestingly nds that women are more resistant towards cor-
ruption than men because women are more inclined to behave opportunisti-
cally by cheating the bribers than to reciprocate.
Culture Based on experiments conducted in four countries: Australia, In-
dia, Indonesia and Singapore, Alatas et al. (2009) nd no signicant gender
di¤erences in attitudes towards corruption except in Australia. As a result,
they conclude that gender di¤erences in corruption may be specic to the
countrys culture. The nding in Australia is consistent with the earlier nd-
ings of Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) who use data mostly from
Western countries (Alatas et al., 2009). In addition, due to an unexplain-
able positive but insignicant relationship between corruption and womens
share of legislators and managers found in their study, Michailova and Mel-
nykovska (2009) suggest that gender di¤erences found in the previous studies
may partly be related to culture.
Institutional Context Esarey and Chirillo (2013) nd that the gender
gap in tolerance of bribes is wider in the democratic states than in the au-
tocratic states. Therefore, Esarey and Chirillo (2013) conclude that the
relationship between gender and corruption varies by institutional context.
They propose that hiring more women in the public sector would be more
benecial if it is accompanied by other e¤orts to promote gender equality in
other respects. Esarey and Chirillo (2013) explain their ndings in terms of
higher risks for women to engage in corruption due to the gender discrimina-
tion against them. As a consequent of this systematic gender discrimination,
women are expected to have a higher moral standard than men; women may
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therefore face stricter detection and/or harsher punishment if they do not
comply with that kind of standard. Esarey and Chirillo (2013) argue that
such pressure is more relevant in democracies where corruption is stigmatised
and of little or no existence in autocracies where corruption characterises a
normal operation. This theory is consistent with the ndings of Alhassan-
Alolo (2007).
Moreover, Esarey and Chirillo (2013) provide an alternative interpreta-
tion for their ndings. They suggest that a states degree of institutionalised
gender discrimination may be connected with its democracy level. If gender
discrimination presumably limits womens ability to accomplish changes in
the government, female participation will reduce corruption only in the states
with low discrimination (that is, democracies) where they can e¤ect changes
in the government. This theory receives support from Vijayalakshmi (2008)
who maintains that gender structures in political institutions is important in
explaining the gender-corruption link; that is, how much power women can
exercise through elective positions.
Corrupt Incentive In contrast with Sung (2003), Wängnerud (2010) ar-
gues that her nding at the subnational level in Mexico implies that gender
perspective is more relevant in explaining the relationship between female
participation in the government and corruption than the liberal democracy
explanation. Specically, Wängnerud (2010) o¤ers a rationality perspective
in explaining the connection between gender and corruption. In Mexico,
female politicians commonly have a background in social movements (Ro-
dríguez, 2003). These social movements often act as a monitoring guardian
for public sector corruption in most societies (Grimes, 2008). Thus, engag-
ing in corruption is more risky for women than it is for men as it may de-
stroy their opportunities to obtain support in future elections. Consequently,
women choose to engage in corruption less often than men as they have lower
incentives to be corrupt when weighing the costs and benets of corruption.
Wängnerud (2010) also highlights that corruption requires a mutual under-
standing between all parties involved which may be easier to establish if the
parties belong to the same gender group.
Group Dynamic Another interesting micro-evidence of gender-corruption
link is provided by Mukherjee and Gokcekus (2004). By analysing survey
responses, they nd that male and female public o¢ cials have a similar per-
ception of corruption. Moreover, they discover that corruption decreases as
the female proportion in the organisation increases, as long as women are
the minority in the organisation; increasing the proportion of women in the
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organisation above 70% increases corruption. Therefore, corruption may be
more related to the group dynamic than to gender itself; gender equality
in an organisation seems to minimise corruption (Mukherjee and Gokcekus,
2004). This nding provides empirical support for a theoretical model by
Echazu (2010) which we describe next.
1.1.2 Theoretical Literature on Gender and Corrup-
tion
To date, there is only one formal theoretical investigation of the relationship
between gender and corruption and the e¤ect of increasing female participa-
tion in the government on corruption. The model is developed by Echazu
(2010) using a partial equilibrium model within a microeconomic framework.
There are two important assumptions that the model relies on: (i) no intrin-
sic di¤erences in moral values across gender; and (ii) the presence of gender
empathy. In this model, gender empathy leads the honest prosecutor to put
less e¤ort in investigating the corrupt regulator if they belong to the same
gender group. Consequently, a corrupt regulator will have a lower proba-
bility of being detected and hence, lower costs of corruption if his/her case
is reviewed by a prosecutor of the same gender. These lower costs of cor-
ruption translate into more corrupt behaviours even in the absence of any
intrinsic moral di¤erences. Thus, the model concludes that given two govern-
ment agencies (prosecution and regulation), increasing female participation
in one agency reduces corruption as long as the other agency is dominated
by males. On the other hand, increasing female participation in one agency
increases corruption if the other agency is female-dominated. This outcome
is achieved by agents from each gender group rationally weighing the bene-
ts and costs of corruption while taking gender empathy into consideration.
To sum up, the model o¤ers an explanation which is based on the group
dynamic (see Mukherjee and Gokcekus, 2004) and the cost-benet analysis
(see Wängnerud, 2010) instead of moral di¤erences.
Our model di¤ers from Echazus (2010) in which we employ a dynamic
general equilibrium model in a macroeconomic framework. As a result, our
model is able to illustrate the links between gender inequality, corruption
and economic development in a single unied model. Unlike Echazu (2010),
we do not assume gender empathy. Nevertheless, our model is similar to
hers in which we assume no intrinsic gender di¤erences in moral values. We
also apply cost-benet analysis to compare gender di¤erences in incentives
to be corrupt. In our model, female bureaucrats are less corrupt than men
due to the following assumptions: (i) the private sector serves as an out-
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side option for the dismissed corrupt bureaucrat; (ii) female bureaucrats
have a lower outside option than their male counterparts as they are more
wage-discriminated against in the private sector than in the public sector.
Therefore, female bureaucrats choose to be more honest than men even in
the absence of both intrinsic moral di¤erences and gender empathy.
1.1.3 Outline of the Chapter
Our objectives in this chapter are twofold: (i) to resolve the conict between
the micro and macro-evidence on the gender-corruption nexus by showing
how increasing female participation in the public sector may result in lower
corruption, without assuming gender di¤erences in moral attitudes towards
corruption; and (ii) to explore the dynamic general equilibrium interactions
between female participation in the public sector, corruption and economic
development. For this purpose, we develop a model that describes an econ-
omy in which the government delegates the authority to administer public
policy to public servants. The public servants are responsible to use the avail-
able public funds for the provision of productive public goods and services.
As a result, public servants have the opportunity to be corrupt by embezzling
public funds. The e¤ect of corruption is to reduce the provision of produc-
tive public goods and services resulting in a reduction in total savings and
thus capital accumulation in the economy. At the same time, as the capital
accumulates, female bureaucrats have smaller incentives to be corrupt and
there is a critical (threshold) of capital above which female corruption disap-
pears. This two-way causality between corruption and development leads to
the possibility of multiple (history-dependent) equilibria, including a poverty
trap equilibrium. The model is used to analyse gender di¤erences in incen-
tives to be corrupt and the potential of increasing female participation in the
public sector to help an economy escape from a corruption-induced poverty
trap. Our approach is consistent with many theoretical studies on the link
between corruption and development (e.g., Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio,
2007, 2011; Blackburn and Sarmah, 2008; Blackburn, 2012; Blackburn et al.,
2006, 2010).
The remainder of this chapter will be organised as follows. In the next
section we present and discuss the model, and in the last section we conclude.
1.2 The Model
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0; :::;1. We consider an economy
inhabited by two-period-lived agents belonging to overlapping generations
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of dynastic families. Population is constant and equal to x: Half of the
population are male (denoted by m) and the other half are female (denoted
by f). Formally, x = xm + xfand xm = xf . The size of the skilled labour
force in this economy is denoted by n and not all agents are skilled, that
is, n  x where n = nm + nf . Skilled agents are homogenous in terms of
productivity and they can work either in the private sector or in the public
sector. The private sector is divided into two sectors: modern and traditional.
Firms in the modern sector hire labour from skilled agents and rent capital
from all agents. Modern sector workers are denoted by h = hm + hf . There
is also a xed number of unskilled agents denoted by l = lm + lf who work
for rms in the traditional sector. Public sector hires labour from skilled
agents to administer public funds. Public sector workers or bureaucrats are
denoted by b = bm+bf . All agents are risk neutral, working only when young
and consuming only when old. Given this setting, we can express the total
population, x, as follows:
x  n+ l  h+ b+ l (1.1)
The government o¤ers a limited number of positions b  n whereas the
modern sector is willing to hire an unlimited number of workers. Each skilled
agent has a preference regarding the sector they would like to work in. If they
work in their preferred sector, they derive an additional utility; otherwise no
additional utility is derived. We assume that male and female agents derive
the same additional utility from working in their preferred sector. Hence,
skilled agents with a preference for public service will obtain an additional
utility of b if they work in the public sector, and 0 if they work for a private
rm. Similarly, skilled agents with a preference for the private sector will
obtain an additional utility of h if they work in the modern sector and 0 if
they work in the public sector. Adding a parameter restriction on h, skilled
agents with a preference for the private sector will e¤ectively choose to work
in the modern sector. Specically, when deciding which sector to work, agents
take the public-private wage di¤erential and the additional utility derived
from working in their preferred sector. In principal, the value of h should
compensate for the wage di¤erential (if any) to induce skilled agents with a
preference for the private sector to choose working for a rm in the modern
sector. Consequently, only skilled agents with a public sector preference will
apply to work as a bureaucrat.4 We assume that there are more skilled
agents with a public sector preference than the civil service vacancies. As
4This public sector preference is similar to the public sector motivation (PSM) in
Jaimovich and Rud (2014) and Macchiavello (2008). These two papers have provided
more detailed analyses of public-private employment occupational choice relating to PSM
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such, the public sector positions are always lled and some skilled agents
with a taste for working in the public sector have to work in the modern
sector. This assumption is not crucial in deriving our result. However, it
ensures that the government is always able to ll all public sector vacancies
and get the replacement for the dismissed corrupt bureaucrats. By adopting
this assumption, we have excluded the governments recruitment problem
which is not the main issue of this chapter. Instead, we focus on our main
concern which is gender di¤erences in corrupt incentives.
In our model, the government hires bureaucrats to administer public
funds; corruption arises as a result of the opportunity of public o¢ cials to
embezzle these public funds due to imperfect monitoring. Bureaucrats are
delegated the task of administering public projects on behalf of the govern-
ment. This task entails the provision of productive public goods and services
used in the traditional sector using the revenues from taxation. Corruption
may arise because of the opportunity of bureaucrats to benet by abusing
their positions of authority. Bureaucrats have the potential to enrich them-
selves illegally by embezzling public funds. An individual who does this faces
a probability of being caught, in which case he/she loses everything being
ned the full amount of his/her legal and illegal income. The government
seeks to eliminate corruption by using an imprecise monitoring technology
which determines partly the corrupt bureaucrats probability of being de-
tected. We assume that all corruptible bureaucrats who get caught are able
to nd a position in the modern sector. In addition, the public sector is able
to ll the empty vacancies by appealing to the skilled workers working in the
modern sector. Thus, the red bureaucrats are replaced by the skilled agents
with a preference for working in the public sector; those of who did not get a
position in the government in the rst-round of hiring. Rational bureaucrats
take into consideration the public-private wage di¤erential when calculating
their expected utility from being corrupt.
in their static equilibrium analyses of corruption and rent-seeking. While we are aware
of the possible complexity relating to public-private employment occupational choice, we
have imposed certain parameter restrictions for public and private sector preference to al-
low a simple job allocation mechanism in a dynamic general equilibrium analysis. A simple
job allocation mechanism is commonly adopted in the theoretical investigations of corrup-
tion and development within a dynamic general equilbrium framework (e.g., Blackburn
and Forgues-Puccio, 2011; Blackburn, 2012; Blackburn et al., 2006). Moreover, by doing
so we are able to focus on and to clarify our analysis of gender di¤erences in incentives to
be corrupt in such framework.
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1.2.1 Private Sector
Firms
This economy produces output in two sectors: modern sector and traditional
sector. These sectors have di¤erent production technologies and use di¤erent
types of inputs of production. Each sector is represented by a unit mass of
rms which hire these inputs from perfectly competitive markets.
The representative rm in the modern sector produces output using skilled
labour and capital with positive production externalities as a result of learning-
by-doing (or learning by investing). Formally, units of output are produced
according to the following technology:
yht = (hmt + hft)
k1 t K

t (1.2)
where  2 (0; 1); hit denotes skilled labour of gender i(i = f;m), kt denotes
capital and Kt denotes aggregate capital which serves as the usual proxy for
the stock of disembodied knowledge.5
As the poorer and the less educated members of the society tend to gain
the most benet from public goods provision (e.g., Anand and Ravallion,
1993; Bidani and Ravallion, 1997), to simplify the analysis, we assume that
public goods only play a role in the traditional sector. Consequently, public
goods and services do not enter the modern sectors production function. As
in Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2011), the purpose of this abstraction is
to emphasise the relative importance of public goods and services provision
for di¤erent groups in the society.
We assume that the government derives revenue from this sector by im-
posing a constant proportional tax rate of  2 (0; 1) on its output. Fur-
thermore, following Becker (1971), we assume that rms have a taste for
discrimination.6 Firms are therefore willing to pay in terms of reduced
prots to reduce their association with female workers; rms are utility max-
imisers rather than prot maximisers. The representative rm is interested
in nding the level of wages whit that maximise its utility. In particular, the
rm will act as if the net cost of employing a female worker is whit(1+d) where
5This aggregate externality is a common feature of the endogenous growth model and
allows us to work with a simple technology where the social returns to capital are constant.
Our results will not change if we assume diminishing returns to capital instead.
6According to Becker (1971), a taste for discrimination embodies both ignorance and
prejudice (i.e., preference). The spread of knowledge can quickly eliminate ignorance but
not prejudice (Becker, 1971).
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d > 0 is what is termed as discrimination coe¢ cientby Becker (1971) and
assumed to be exogenous. The parameter d represents a non-monetary cost
of production for the rm with respect to hiring female workers.
Assuming that the price of output in the modern sector is equal to one,
the rms utility is given by the following expression:
Uht = (1  )(hmt + hft)k1 t Kt   whmthmt   whft(1 + d)hft   rtkt: (1.3)
The utility maximisation conditions are therefore given by:
whmt =
(1  )k1 t Kt
h1 t
; (1.4)
whft =
(1  )k1 t Kt
(1 + d)h1 t
; (1.5)
rt = (1  )(1  )ht k t Kt : (1.6)
Given that d > 0, that is, rms discriminate against women, whft =
whmt
(1+d)
<
whmt where
1
1+d
2 (0; 1). To simplify the algebra in our analysis, we dene
  1
1+d
and consequently:
whft = w
h
mt: (1.7)
As in equilibrium, ht = h and kt = Kt, the above optimality conditions may
be written as:
whmt =
(1  )kt
h1 
; (1.8)
whft =
(1  )kt
h1 
; (1.9)
rt = r = (1  )(1  )h: (1.10)
Thus, the equilibrium wage is proportional to the capital stock while the
equilibrium interest rate is constant.
Next, output in the traditional sector is produced by unskilled agents
whose productivity is augmented by the provision of various public goods and
services that are targeted towards the poor (e.g., publicly-provided health-
care, education and training). We assume that the government does not
impose any taxes on this sector and there is no wage discrimination in this
sector. This is a reasonable assumption as the traditional sector in our model
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would be equivalent to home production. The production function of the tra-
ditional sector is given by:
ylt = ltgt; (1.11)
where lt denotes unskilled labour and gt denotes government expenditure on
public goods and services.
Each unskilled agent receives wage of wlt for providing their labour. As-
suming that the price of output in the traditional sector is equal to one, prot
is given by:
lt = (lmt + lft)gt   wlt(lmt + lft); (1.12)
and prot maximisation implies:
wlt = w
l
mt = w
l
ft = gt: (1.13)
The government is implicitly taxing skilled workers (male and female) and us-
ing these resources to nance expenditure in health and education to increase
the productivity of unskilled workers. Provided the population of unskilled
workers is not lower than the population of skilled agents, wages of skilled
workers will always be higher than wages of unskilled agents:
whmt > w
h
ft > w
l
t (1.14)
Agents
The population of agents is divided into skilled agents and unskilled agents.
Each skilled agent supplies one unit of his/her labour to rms in the modern
sector, and each unskilled agent supplies one unit of his/her labour to rms in
the traditional sector. Each young agent of generation t and gender i working
as a worker type j(j = l; h) receives an income of zjit comprising a salary of
wjit from supplying inelastically one unit of his/her labour endowment to a
(modern/traditional) rm plus bequest qit which he/she saves at the market
rate of interest r to obtain a nal level of wealth (1 + r)zjit when he/she
reaches old age. An agent consumes part of its wealth and bequeaths the
remainder to his/her o¤spring; the amount available for his/her consumption
is given by (1 + r)(wjit + qit)  qit+1.
Agents working in the modern sector are of two types: i) those with
private sector preference; and ii) those with public sector preference who
could not obtain a job in the public sector. As described earlier, the former
derives additional utility from working in the private sector, while the latter
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obtains no additional utility. Agents with a private sector preference and
working in the private sector derive lifetime utility of:
uhhit = (1 + r)z
h
it + 
h   qit+1 + (qit+1) (1.15)
and agents with a public sector preference, but working in the private sector
derive lifetime utility of:
uhbit = (1 + r)z
h
it   qit+1 + (qit+1) (1.16)
Agents working in the traditional sector derive lifetime utility of:
ulit = (1 + r)z
l
it   qit+1 + (qit+1) (1.17)
The role of bequests in the model is to ensure the existence of the non-
degenerate steady state equilibrium. Thus, we adopt the simplest form of mo-
tive for giving bequests which is altruism consistent with the simple warm-
glow or joy of giving; this assumption is reected by a strictly concave
function () that satises the usual Inada conditions. Utility is maximised
by setting 0() = 1 , implying an optimal xed size of bequest from one
generation to the next, qit = qit+1 = q. As the rate of interest r is con-
stant in equilibrium, the expected utility of an agent is fully determined once
his/her expected income or saving is determined. Therefore, each agent saves
zjit = w
j
it + q.
1.2.2 Public Sector
Government
The objective of the government is to foster economic development and re-
duce inequality. The government achieves this by providing public goods
and services, represented by gt, which contribute to the e¢ ciency of output
production in the traditional sector. Such provision may include healthcare,
education, and infrastructure. The government hires bureaucrats to distrib-
ute these public funds. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity of
bureaucrats to benet by abusing their positions of authority.
The government determines the bureaucratssalaries, wbit, as follows. Any
bureaucrat of gender i can work for a modern sector rm to receive an income
equal to the wage paid to the modern sector worker of gender i, that is,
whit. Any bureaucrat who is willing to accept a salary less than this wage
must be expecting to receive compensation through bribery and is therefore
immediately identied as being corrupt. As in other analyses (e.g., Acemoglu
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and Verdier, 1998; Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2011, 2007; Blackburn,
2012; Blackburn et al., 2006), we assume that a corrupt bureaucrat who
is caught is subject to the maximum ne of having all of his/her income
conscated (that is, he/she is dismissed without pay). Given this, then no
corruptible bureaucrat would ever reveal himself in the way described above.
In addition, the government does not know the value of the public sector
preference that belongs to some skilled agents. As such, the government can
minimise its labour costs while ensuring complete bureaucratic participation,
by setting the salaries of all bureaucrats equal to the wage paid by rms to
skilled workers in the modern sector.7
Moreover, the government also follows an anti-discriminatory policy. As
we will show later, this is a critical assumption in our analysis and is based on
existing empirical evidence that the public sector is less gender discrimina-
tory than the private sector. These ndings are generally taken as evidence
that anti-discrimination enforcement is more e¤ectively and aggressively im-
plemented in the public sector than in the private sector (Arulampalam et al.,
2007; Barón and Cobb-Clark, 2010; Fuller, 2005; Melly, 2005; Panizza and
Qiang, 2005). The government is more concerned with the issue of pay eq-
uity and fairness than the private sector as they have di¤erent environment
within which they operate. The government operates within the political
market while the private sector operates within the economic market (Melly,
2005). In addition, the government is often expected to set the pace as equal
employment opportunities provider (Fuller, 2005). For these reasons, the
government is more likely to provide a less gender-discriminatory working
environment than the private sector. Our analysis will not change if the gov-
ernment also wage-discriminates the female workers. As long as the public
sector wage-discriminates females less than the private sector, our results will
still hold. Hence, to simplify the analysis, we assume that male and female
bureaucrats are paid the same wage.
Given all the above considerations, salaries for all bureaucrats in the
public sector are set as follows:
wbmt = w
b
ft = w
b
t = w
h
mt (1.18)
Assuming that the value of h is uniform across gender, we set h  (1 )whmt
such that only skilled females with public sector preference will apply to work
as bureaucrats. In other words, women with private sector preference are
7This has the usual interpretation of an allocation of talent condition. Although the
government cannot force any of the potential bureaucrats to actually work in public sector,
it can induce them to do so by paying them at least what they could get elsewhere.
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willing to accept a lower wage in the modern sector provided it compensates
for the extra utility they derive from working in their preferred job.
The government nances its expenditures each period by running a bal-
anced budget. Its revenue consist of the taxes collected by bureaucrats from
rms plus the income recovered from bureaucrats caught engaging in cor-
ruption. The government uses the remaining public funds to pay for public
goods and services after deducting the bureaucratssalaries. Corruption oc-
curs after the tax rate has been set and consequently, the government cannot
replace the amount stolen by bureaucrats by raising taxes. The government
is fully aware when corruption is occurring but it cannot retrieve all stolen
income due to its imperfect power of detection.8 The government uses an
imprecise monitoring technology. This technology implies that each corrupt
bureaucrat faces a probability of detection for each individual corrupt act,
p 2 (0; 1).
Bureaucrats
The population of bureaucrats is a measure of mass b. Each bureaucrat sup-
plies one unit of labour to the government for the purpose of administering
public funds for the procurement of public goods and services. Such dele-
gation of authority leads to opportunity for corruption as the bureaucrats
may be tempted to appropriate a fraction of public funds under their re-
sponsibility. As our focus is on gender di¤erences in incentives to be corrupt,
we assume for simplicity that all bureaucrats are corrupt.9 Generally, bu-
reaucrats may try to avoid detection in various ways, including hiding their
illegal income and investing it di¤erently from their legal income. Similar
to Blackburn and Sarmah (2008) and Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2011),
we consider a simple scenario where the bureaucrats hide their illegal income
instead of investing it in capital in order to minimise the risk of detection.
As such, this illegal income does not derive any interest and does not form
part of productive saving and investment in the economy. However, while
the above two papers assume that such e¤ort to avoid detection is costly, we
8The government knows how much tax revenues would be collected as it knows how
many taxable rms are in this economy. Given that the government knows the amount of
bureaucratssalaries, it also knows the amount of public funds available for the procure-
ment of public goods and services in the absence of corruption. Any shortfall below this
amount is an immediate indication that corruption is occurring.
9Our focus in this paper is not to analyse the environment with or without corruption.
Rather, we want to analyse the environment where women are less corrupt than men.
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assume that such e¤ort is costless.10 Furthermore, the above mentioned two
papers assume that a corrupt bureaucrat can avoid immediate detection by
putting such (costly) e¤ort. In our chapter, however, by putting such (cost-
less) e¤ort, a corrupt bureaucrat minimises their probability of being caught
but still faces a certain probability of detection.
Furthermore, we assume that all bureaucrats who get caught will work for
rms in the modern sector. We adopt this assumption owing to the evidence
which shows a relationship between public-private sector wage ratio and cor-
ruption. Specically, the higher the public-private sector wage ratio is, the
lower the corruption is. For instance, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001)
nd a statistically signicant negative relationship between the relative civil
service pay and corruption in a sample of developing and low-income OECD
countries. In particular, the corruption index improves by at least 0.5 points
as a result of increasing civil service pay from 100% to 200% of the manufac-
turing wage. This result is supported by an earlier study by Goel and Rich
(1989) that nds a positive relationship between the relative private sector
earnings and bribe taking by public o¢ cials in the US. A more recent study
on Ukraine by Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter (2007) is also in line
with these ndings. This study nds that despite the fact that the public
sector employees earn 24-32% less salaries than the private sector employees,
there are no essential di¤erences between their consumption expenditures
and asset holdings. In relation to this, the non-reported compensation for
public sector employees is estimated to be in between 460 million and 580
million US dollars (Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter, 2007). Such evi-
dence supports our argument that working in the modern sector is an outside
option for a bureaucrat.
Next, after the dismissal of corrupt bureaucrats who are caught, the gov-
ernment conducts a second hiring to ll in the empty vacancies. The gov-
ernment will therefore replace a dismissed bureaucrat with a skilled agent
with public sector preference who is currently working in the private sector
because he/she did not get a position in the civil service in the rst round
of hiring. To simplify and preserve the clarity of our subsequent analysis,
we assume that the government keeps the gender ratio constant in the rst
and second hiring. In other words, the government maintains the same gen-
der ratio policy before and after corruption takes place. As a result, it will
10As our focus is on the gender di¤erences in corruption, this assumption is adopted
to simplify the algebra. This assumption will not change our analysis as long as the cost
of such e¤ort (if any) is the same across gender. This assumption is appropriate for our
present analysis as we do not nd evidence of gender di¤erences in the costs of hiding
illegal income.
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replace a dismissed corrupt bureaucrat with another bureaucrat of the same
gender. This assumption simplies our subsequent analysis when we analyse
the impact of increasing female participation in government on corruption.
Moreover, we assume that after uncovering and dismissing corrupt bureau-
crats, the government will monitor very closely the public projects that were
under their supervision. As such, the replacement bureaucrats face tacitly
a probability of detection equal to one (that is, replacement bureaucrats do
not engage in corruption).
Bureaucratsincentives to be corrupt are modelled as in Van Rijckeghem
and Weder (2001).11 In the model, bureaucrats are responsible to administer
public projects for the provision of public goods and services. They have in-
centives to engage in corruption given that the government cannot perfectly
monitor their actions. Their expected income from being corrupt is deter-
mined by the amount of embezzlement, the number of times the embezzle-
ment takes place, probability of being detected, and the penalties incurred
in the event of detection. Corrupt bureaucrats can commit embezzlement
more than once during their service and the embezzled amount is exogenous
and normalised to one. The level of corruption is therefore determined by
the number of corrupt acts. With probability pCit 2 (0; 1) a bureaucrat of
gender i who engages in corruption gets caught and with probability 1 pCit
he/she avoids detection. The overall probability of detection, pCit, equals
to probability of detection for each individual corrupt act, p, multiplied by
the number of times the corrupt act is being committed by a bureaucrat of
gender i, Cit. If a bureaucrat is found engaging in corruption then he/she is
red and subsequently he/she has to nd a job in the modern sector. Based
on our specication, the modern sector is always hiring. Thus, dismissed
bureaucrats will always be able to nd a job in the modern sector.
Each young bureaucrat of generation t and gender i receives an income of
zbit comprising of a salary of w
b
it from supplying their labour inelastically to
the government plus bequest qit which they save at the market interest rate
r to obtain a nal level of wealth of (1+ r)zbit+Cit when they reach old age.
A bureaucrat consumes part of their wealth and bequeaths the remainder to
their o¤spring. As all bureaucrats are skilled agents who prefer to work in
public sector, they derive an additional utility of b from working in the public
sector. With probability 1 pCit a corrupt bureaucrat of gender i is successful
and obtains a lifetime utility of (1+r)(wbit+qit)+Cit+
b qit+1+(qit+1). With
probability pCit a corrupt bureaucrat of gender i is caught and goes to the
modern sector and obtains a lifetime utility of (1+r)(whit+qit) qit+1+(qit+1).
A corruptible bureaucrat will choose the optimum number of corrupt acts by
11This is a variant of a model by Becker and Stigler (1974).
24
maximising their expected utility while balancing the costs and benets from
corruption. We assume that all bureaucrats are risk-neutral. The expected
utility of a corruptible bureaucrat is therefore given by:
E(ubit) = (1  pCit)

(1 + r)(wbit + qit) + Cit + 
b   qit+1 + (qit+1)

+pCit

(1 + r)(whit + qit)  qit+1 + (qit+1)

(1.19)
As for the private agents, () is a strictly concave function that satises
the usual Inada conditions; utility is maximised by setting 0() = 1, implying
an optimal xed size of bequest from one generation to the next, qit = qit+1 =
q. Maximising expression (1.19) with respect to Cit yields:
Cit =
1
2

1
p
  b   (1 + r)(wbit   whit)

(1.20)
From equation (1.20), it is evident that if wbmt whmt  wbft whft and all other
variables are the same across gender, then Cmt  Cft. Since wbmt   whmt 
wbft   whft can be re-written as wbmt   wbft  whmt   whft, equation (1.20) tells
us that if the gender wage gap in the public sector is smaller than the gender
wage gap in the private sector, ceteris paribus, male bureaucrats will commit
more corrupt acts than female bureaucrats.
Furthermore, taking derivative of equation (1.20) with respect to p yields:
@Cit
@p
=   1
2p2
< 0 (1.21)
Expression (1.21) implies that ceteris paribus, the higher the probability of
being detected for each individual corrupt act, the lower the number of cor-
rupt acts committed. As such, if female bureaucrats face higher probability
of being caught as suggested by Wängnerud (2010) in the case of Mexico, this
higher probability of detection serves to further reduce womens incentives
to be corrupt in the public sector. This is also true if p represents perceived
instead of actual probability of detection and if women in fact perceive higher
probability of detection as suggested by Richards and Tittle (1981).
By combining equations (1.7), (1.18) and (1.20), we obtain the number
of corrupt acts of male and female bureaucrats respectively as follows:
Cmt =
1
2

1
p
  b

(1.22)
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Cft =
1
2

1
p
  b   (1 + r)(1  )whmt

(1.23)
By choosing optimum Cit, a bureaucrat of gender i maximises his/her ex-
pected utility; this maximum expected utility is higher than the bureaucrats
utility from being honest (see Appendix). By comparing expressions (1.22)
and (1.23), and taking into account that  2 (0; 1), it should be clear that
Cmt  Cft for any given value of p and b. In particular:
Cmt   Cft = 1
2
(1 + r)(1  )whmt  0 (1.24)
Expression (1.24) reveals that the higher the gender discrimination women
face in the private sector relative to the public sector (that is, lower ), the
fewer the corrupt acts that female bureaucrats commit relative to their male
counterparts. The economic intuition behind this is that female bureaucrats
face lower incentives to be corrupt than male bureaucrats when the value of
their outside option relative to their earning in the public sector is lower. Ex-
pressions (1.23) and (1.24) also tell us that as the economy develops (that is,
higher kt and consequently higher whmt), female bureaucrats reduce their num-
ber of corrupt acts resulting in higher gender gap in corrupt acts.12 Higher
whmt decreases the value of the female bureaucratsoutside option relative to
their earning in public sector thereby lowering their incentives to be corrupt.
This is because female and male bureaucrats are paid the same wage as male
workers in the modern sector (that is, whmt ) but female workers in the mod-
ern sector earn only a fraction of whmt (that is, w
h
ft = w
h
mt;  2 (0; 1)) due to
gender discrimination.
Moreover, depending on the value of p which is exogenously given and the
same across gender, it is possible that for a certain value of p all corruptible
female bureaucrats choose to be honest while male bureaucrats still choose
to be corrupt. Male bureaucrats need a higher threshold value of p than
female bureaucrats to behave honestly. We can nd these threshold values
for bureaucrats of gender i, pit, by setting Cmt = 0 and Cft = 0 to obtain:
pmt =
1
b
(1.25)
pft =
1
b + (1 + r)(1  )whmt
(1.26)
12From (1.8), we can see that wage level is driven by capital accumulation. Higher wages
therefore indicate higher development.
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Comparing (1.25) and (1.26) reveals that pmt  pft for any given value of
b. This implies that for any given value of b, male bureaucrats need higher
probability of being detected than female bureaucrats to behave honestly. To
ensure that pmt; p

ft 2 (0; 1), we set b  1.
Also, if pft < p < p

mt, all women in the public sector behave honestly
while all men in the public sector are corrupt (that is, Cft = 0;Cmt > 0). As
pft is a decreasing function of w
h
mt, there exist a critical level of wage below
which Cft; Cmt > 0 and above which Cft = 0;Cmt > 0:
 
whm
C
=
1
p
  b
(1 + r)(1  ) (1.27)
Moreover, as the wage level is driven by capital accumulation (see (1.8)), we
may express (1.27) in terms of the critical level of capital as follows:
kC =
h1 

1
p
  b

(1  )(1 + r)(1  ) (1.28)
To ensure that
 
whm
C
; kC > 0, we set 1
p
 b > 0. Consequently, we establish
a relationship between corruption and development where higher develop-
ment reduces corruption by inducing female bureaucrats to be less corrupt.
In equilibrium, total bureaucrats are composed of the successful corrupt
bureaucrats (that is, those who are not caught) and the replacement bureau-
crats. As mentioned earlier, the replacement bureaucrats are honest as they
face p = 1. The utility of a replacement bureaucrat of gender i is given by:
urbit = (1 + r)z
b
it   qit+1 + (qit+1) (1.29)
and the utility of a successful corruptible bureaucrat of gender i is given by:
usbit = (1 + r)z
b
it + Cit   qit+1 + (qit+1) (1.30)
As indicated earlier, (i) each successful corrupt bureaucrat of gender i hides
their illegal income, Cit, instead of saving it as part of productive investment;
(ii) qit = qit+1 = q. On reaching old age, a bureaucrat retires and consumes all
of his/her remaining wealth. Each bureaucrats productive saving is therefore
zbit = w
h
mt + q.
1.2.3 General Equilibrium
The nal component in our description of the economy is the process by
which the economic development takes place. The process by which economic
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development takes place is summarised by the dynamic path of capital ac-
cumulation, obtained from the equilibrium condition that the total demand
for capital by rms is equal to the total supply of savings by agents. To
determine the latter, it is necessary to take into account of public nances to
establish the level of government expenditure on public goods and services.
The governments budget constraint is derived as follows. The govern-
ments only source of revenue is tax from the (private) modern sector rms
of yht = h

t k
1 
t K

t . In equilibrium, kt = Kt and ht = h, therefore
yht = h
kt. The government uses these tax revenues to pay bureaucrats
salaries of bwhmtand to provide public goods and services to home production
agents, gt. In addition, due to the opportunity for corruption, an amount
of Et is lost in the hands of corrupt bureaucrats. Consequently, corruption
a¤ects this economy through its impact on gt. Specically, corruption causes
the public goods provision gt to be reduced by Et. The government runs a
balanced budget by equating revenues and expenditures. As such,
gt = h
kt   bwhmt   Et (1.31)
where
Et =
(
(1  pCmt)Cmtbmt + (1  pCft)Cftbft if kt < kC ;
(1  pCmt)Cmtbmt if kt  kC :
(1.32)
Substituting optimum Cmt and Cft into (1.32) yields:
Et =
8>><>>:
b
4
h
1
p
  p(b)2
i
  bft
4

[p(1 + r)(1  )whmt]2 + 2p(1 + r)(1  )whmtb
	
if kt < kC ;
bmt
4
h
1
p
  p(b)2
i
if kt  kC :
(1.33)
By substituting (1.4) and (1.33) into (1.31), we get the nal expression for
gt:
gt =
8>>><>>>:
pbft
4
h
(1+r)(1 )(1 )
h1 
i2
k2t
+
n
h (1 )[b  1
2
p(1+r)(1 )bbft]
h1 
o
kt   b4
h
1
p
  p(b)2
i
if kt < kC ;h
h b(1 )
h1 
i
kt   bmt4
h
1
p
  p(b)2
i
if kt  kC :
(1.34)
From (1.32), we can see that higher number of corrupt acts increases
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overall probability of being detected and at the same time increases the
total amount successfully embezzled. Consequently, in the case where kt <
kC the net e¤ect of increasing female proportion in the public sector (who
commit fewer corrupt acts than their male counterparts) on the total amount
successfully embezzled is not obvious. However, we will prove below that
increasing female proportion in the public sector reduces the total amount
successfully embezzled. By nding the derivative of (1.33) with respect to
bft and taking into account that bmt = b  bft, we obtain:
@Et
@bft
=
8<: 
(1+r)(1 )(1 )pkt
4h1 
h
(1+r)(1 )(1 )kt
h1  + 2
b
i
< 0 if kt < kC ;
 1
4
h
1
p
  p(b)2
i
< 0 if kt  kC :
(1.35)
Also, considering (1.31) and (1.35), the higher the number of female bureau-
crats (that is, higher bft), the higher is the actual provision of public goods
and services (that is, higher gt) by means of reducing the amount successfully
embezzled from the public funds. We will return to this discussion in our
subsequent analysis.
Next, we will now proceed to deduce total savings in the economy and
with this, the dynamic equation for capital accumulation. Traditional sector
agents of whom there are l each saves gt + q. Male agents in the modern
sector, of whom there are hmt, each saves whmt + q. Female agents in the
modern sector, of whom there are hft, each saves whft+ q. All bureaucrats of
whom there are b each saves whmt + q. By collecting all these terms together
we can nd total savings in the economy:
st = l(gt + q) + hmt(w
h
mt + q) + hft(w
h
ft + q) + b(w
h
mt + q) (1.36)
We obtain the following dynamic capital accumulation equation by further
combining (1.1), (1.4), (1.7), (1.36) and the equilibrium condition kt+1 = st:
kt+1 = F (kt) = lgt +
(1  )(hmt + hft + b)kt
h1 
+ xq (1.37)
From (1.37), we can see that gt a¤ects capital accumulation and therefore
development. As corruption a¤ects this economy by reducing gt (see equation
(1.31)), we establish how corruption a¤ects economic development in this
economy. Taken together, the results in equations (1.34) and (1.37) imply a
two-way causal relationship between corruption and development; the level of
corruption both inuences and is inuenced by the level capital accumulation.
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The full implications of this are shown by consolidating the results into a
single expression that characterises the capital accumulation process given
by the following transition equation:
F (kt) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
pbftl
4
h
(1+r)(1 )(1 )
h1 
i2
k2t
+
n
l[h (1 )]+(1 )(hmt+hft+b)
h1 
o
kt + xq   "l if kt < kC ;n
l[h b(1 )]+(1 )(hmt+hft+b)
h1 
o
kt + xq
  bmt
4
h
1
p
  p(b)2
i
if kt  kC :
(1.38)
where  = [b  pbbft(1+r)(1 )
2
] and " =
b[ 1
p
 p(b)2]
4
. In what follows we assume
that l[h (1 )]+(1 )(hmt+hft+b)
h1  2 (0; 1) and xq  "l  0 in order to ensure
the feasibility of steady state equilibria.
Based on the above, we are able to di¤erentiate between two types of
development regime for the economy: the rst where kt < kC is a low
development regime in which the incidence of corruption is at its higher
level where both male and female bureaucrats are corrupt; the second where
kt  kC is a high development regime in which the incidence of corrup-
tion is at its lower level where only male bureaucrats are corrupt. Those
regimes are shown in Figure 1.1 which depicts the shape of the transition
function F () in this economy. A steady state equilibrium is dened by a
stationary point of this function such that k = F (k). The equilibrium
is stable if F 0(k) < 1 and unstable if F 0(k) > 1. Three possible equi-
libria are illustrated in Figure 1.1. However, only two of them are sta-
ble and they may exist simultaneously. One of these  associated with
Cmt > 0;Cft = 0  is a high equilibrium in which the steady state level
of capital is kH =
xq  lbmt
4
[ 1
p
 p(b)2]
1  l[h (1 )]+(1 )(hmt+hft+b)
h1 
> kC ;another associated
with Cmt > 0;Cft > 0  is a low equilibrium in which the steady state
level of capital kL satises k

L < k
Cand F 0(kL) < 1. In addition, an unstable
equilibrium is an intermediate equilibrium in which the steady state level of
capital kU satises k

L < k

U < k
Cand F 0(kU) > 1.
Our analysis above reveals that the feasibility of transition between de-
velopment regimes determines the overall evolution of the economy. The
complete process of transition is from the low development regime to the
high development regime. Depending on conditions, this transition may or
may not be accomplished such that the economy may end up in any one
of these regimes including the regime where it started. For example, if the
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economy is poor with all male and female bureaucrats are corrupt to begin
with, it may end up in a steady state in which it is still poor with all male
and female bureaucrats are still corrupt. Alternatively, it may end up in a
steady state in which there is prosperity with minimum corruption (that is,
only male bureaucrats are corrupt and all female bureaucrats are honest).
Figure 1.1: Two Steady State Equilibria
Figure 1.1 illustrates the two stable steady state equilibria at kL and k

H
and one unstable steady state equilibrium kU . If the economy starts with the
initial capital stock k0 < kU , it is inescapably destined to end up at k

L where
all male and female bureaucrats are corrupt, resulting in higher corruption.
In contrast, if the economy starts with the initial capital stock k0 > kU , it
will end up at kH where only male bureaucrats are corrupt (and all female
bureaucrats are honest) resulting in lower corruption. As where the economy
ends up is determined by whether k0 < kU or k0 > k

U , the model presents a
situation in which the initial circumstances essentially determine the limiting
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outcomes in the economy.
Figure 1.2: One Steady State Equilibrium
Figure 1.2 depicts the second scenario where there is a single stable steady
state equilibrium at kH . Regardless of which initial capital stock k0 the
economy starts from, the economy undergoes a complete transition towards
this steady state with declining female corruption and consequently declining
overall corruption along the transition.
Next, we will illustrate how the economy can move from low capital ac-
cumulation path to high capital accumulation path by increasing female pro-
portion in the public sector. Analysing the e¤ect of higher bft in (1.34) and
(1.38) reveals that increasing female proportion in the public sector leads
to higher capital accumulation and higher steady state capital due to the
following e¤ects:
1. As illustrated by (1.35), increasing female proportion in the public sec-
tor reduces the total amount successfully stolen by corrupt bureaucrats,
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that is, Et is reduced. As a result, the actual provision of goods and
services in the economy is higher, leading to higher savings.
2. Given that in equilibrium b and h are xed, increasing female pro-
portion in the public sector implies increasing bft and reducing bmt .
Moreover, given that nm and nf are also xed, this implies higher hmt
and lower hft (see equation (1.1)). That is, given a xed number of
skilled worker of each gender, increasing female share in government
leads to lower female share in the modern sector. Consequently, given
that the size of public sector and private sector is xed, the male pro-
portion in the public sector is reduced while the male proportion in
the modern sector increases. As a result, there are fewer women being
wage discriminated in this economy by working in the public sector.
Therefore, total savings in the economy increases.
Figure 1.3: General Equilibrium with a Higher Share of Female Bureaucrats
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Figure 1.3 illustrates how increasing female proportion in the public sector
may result in the economy jumping from low capital accumulation path F ()
(before the increase in female proportion in the public sector) to high capital
accumulation path F () (after the increase in female proportion in the public
sector). Along the low path F (), if the economy starts from k0 < kU , it
will end up in the low steady state equilibrium kL ; if k0 > k

U , it will end
up in the lower high steady state equilibrium kH . Along the high path F (),
the economy escapes the poverty trap and undergoes a smooth transition to
the higher high steady state equilibrium kH regardless of which initial capital
stock it starts from. In conclusion, increasing female proportion in the public
sector may result in higher economic development where the initial condition
does not determine the economys limiting outcomes.
1.3 Conclusion
Our chapter provides an economic explanation for the observed negative
correlation between female participation in the government and corruption,
without relying on the existence of gender di¤erences in moral attitudes to-
wards corruption. By assuming no gender di¤erences in corruptibility in our
model, we have contributed to the gender-corruption literature by investi-
gating another possible factor that may cause women to act more honestly
than men. Specically, in our model, female bureaucrats are less corrupt
than male bureaucrats as the public sector is less wage discriminatory rela-
tive to the private sector. As the private sector is the bureaucratsoutside
option in the event of detection, female bureaucrats have a lower value of
outside option than male bureaucrats. Accordingly, female bureaucrats face
higher costs of corruption and therefore commit fewer corrupt acts than male
bureaucrats.
Furthermore, our results hold even if there is equal opportunity for corrup-
tion in terms of equal representation in the public sector and equal probability
of being caught. Although gender di¤erences in opportunity for corruption
is not the focus of our chapter, our model can easily incorporate the di¤er-
ences in opportunity for corruption as a determinant of gender di¤erences
in corrupt behaviour. The possibility that socialisation or di¤erences in risk
aversion may also shape gender di¤erences in corrupt behaviour does not
contradict our argument. These two factors can also be incorporated easily
in our model. For instance, if women face higher social stigma than men
about engaging in corruption due to socialisation, this social stigma acts as
an additional cost of corruption for women. Alternatively, if women are in-
deed more risk-averse than men, their expected utility from being corrupt is
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lower relative to the mens. To sum up, we do not rule out other determi-
nants of gender di¤erences in corrupt behaviour. Rather, we aim to enrich
the discussion in this area by o¤ering an economic theory that is able to
explain the links between gender and corruption without simply relying on
the assumption of womens moral attitudes towards corruption.
Another thing that makes our theory important is the existence of the
two-way causality between corruption and development in which lower cor-
ruption and higher development further reduces the incentives of female bu-
reaucrats to be corrupt as compared to male bureaucrats. These interactions
create the possibility of a corruption-induced poverty trap and corruption-
dependent threshold e¤ects. Consequently, our model generates multiple
(history-dependent) equilibria. The model thus presents a situation in which
the initial circumstances essentially determine the limiting outcomes of the
economy. Equally important, our model has also illustrated how increasing
female participation in the public sector may result in a situation where the
initial condition does no longer determine the economys limiting outcomes.
In other words, increasing female participation in the public sector (if it is
large enough) can potentially help an economy escape from the corruption-
induced poverty trap.
Based on our results, we may derive a few important policy implications.
If the policy makers hire women in the public sector solely based on womens
incorruptible nature, they may stop hiring women in the public sector when
they nd that women may just be as corruptible as men. Hence, we have
made an important consideration to be taken into account by the policy
makers in implementing policy initiative to reduce corruption without hin-
dering the progress of gender equality. Our results also imply that a policy
to increase female participation in the public sector is more e¤ective in re-
ducing corruption if the government is a more gender-equal employer than
the private sector. Moreover, our results are consistent with much evidence
that the public sector is less gender-discriminating than the private sector.
Therefore, policy that increases female participation in the public sector to
reduce corruption must be accompanied by the governments continuous ef-
fort to promote the overall gender equality in the public sector. Given that
the government is able to control more e¤ectively gender discrimination in
the public sector than in the private sector, the government must ensure
that it serves as a role model by eliminating discrimination in the public sec-
tor. By investigating the interaction between the structure of the economy,
gender, and economic behaviour, our model may help design more e¤ective
policies that promote individual and societal wellbeing. "Public-policy schol-
ars cannot o¤er real policy innovations that improve well-being (particularly
of marginalized groups) without rst knowing a good deal about the social
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location of the people they are trying to help, and how their social locations
structure their responsiveness to policy change."(Manuel, 2006, p. 196)
Our theory is somewhat similar to the theory proposed by Esarey and
Chirillo (2013) suggesting that the structure of government matters in ex-
plaining the link between gender and corruption. However, while we cat-
egorise the structure of government based on the level of gender equality,
Esarey and Chirillo (2013) categorise the structure of government based on
the level of democracy. Interestingly, Esarey and Chirillo (2013) shows a
closer link between our theory and theirs by suggesting that women in non-
democracies - associated with high discrimination - are less able to reduce
corruption than in democracies - associated with low discrimination - as they
have less power to make changes. In addition, Esarey and Chirillo (2013)
provide a policy implication similar to ours which is the benet of employ-
ing women in the public sector in lowering corruption is greater when such
recruitment is associated with e¤orts to promote gender equality in other
aspects.
We have not included the interaction between gender discrimination and
economic development in our analysis. As taste for discrimination incor-
porates ignorance and preference (Becker, 1971), the relationship between
discrimination and development is complex. While economic development
may increase the spread of knowledge and therefore reduce the taste for
discrimination related to ignorance, it may not eliminate the preference for
discrimination easily. For instance, a study by Croll (2000) shows that son
preference remains strong in the most developed regions of East and South
Asia; it does not deteriorate as the economy in those regions develops. Due to
this complexity, we have assumed an exogenous discrimination coe¢ cient and
do not allow it to vary with development in our model. It will be an interest-
ing future research avenue to analyse the interaction between discrimination
and development in the context of gender and corruption. One possible ex-
tension of our model is to let the taste discrimination (represented by the
discrimination coe¢ cient) decreases as the economy develops (represented
by the capital accumulation). However, even if the taste discrimination is
reduced as the economy develops, our results remain as long as the gender
wage gap in the public sector is lower than in the private sector. Our theory
is supported by much evidence of the public sectors being a more gender
equal employer than the private sector despite the improvement of womens
economic status in both sectors over the years.
Another interesting future research avenue in relation to gender and cor-
ruption will be the disproportionate impact of corruption on women. Nawaz
(2009) claims that the disproportionate impact of corruption on women ap-
pears to be the most profound in terms of access to resources especially
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public services. This is consistent with the ndings of UNIFEM (2008) that
gender di¤erences in the perception of corruption are the most signicant in
the service provision area such as health, education and utilities. Women in
most countries still belong to the marginalised group and thus tend to rely
more on the state for delivery of public goods and services such as educa-
tion and healthcare; corruption which reduces public funds therefore harms
women more in terms of access to these resources (Nyamu-Musembi, 2007).
Moreover, resources that are earmarked for women may be vulnerable to cor-
ruption. For instance, a 2005 Transparency International Bangladesh survey
reports that 22% of the secondary girl students must pay a certain enrolment
fee to receive the stipend they are entitled to under the Female Stipend Pro-
gram; some students also reported that the authority deducted a fraction
of their stipend at the time of payment (UNIFEM, 2008).
In our model, this disproportionate impact of corruption can be repre-
sented by the over-representation of women in the traditional sector and the
under-representation of women in the modern sector and the public sector.
The World Bank (2012) has reported such empirical facts in most countries.
Consequently, corruption which lowers provision of public goods and services
will a¤ect women more than men. To date, there is still limited research on
this topic. Therefore, further investigation both theoretically and empirically
on how corruption a¤ects women disproportionately will give further insights
into the links between gender and corruption.
Based on the results in our chapter, we also suggest considering the role of
the gender gap in the public-private sector wage di¤erential in the future em-
pirical research on the nexus between gender and corruption. Future research
on gender and corruption should also include further investigations on other
possible factors (e.g., gender empathy, culture, socialisation, risk-aversion
and opportunity) which potentially cause gender di¤erences in corrupt be-
haviour and to analyse their interaction with corruption and development.
Moreover, further research should be conducted to analyse the two-way rela-
tionship between gender and corruption, that is, how gender equality a¤ects
corruption and how corruption a¤ects gender equality.
Given that in most countries females are still under-represented in the
government, increasing female participation in government should be a pri-
mary goal in its own right to foster equal opportunity. Nevertheless, as
documented in the literature and illustrated in this chapter, achieving gen-
der equality in participation in the government is likely to create a positive
externality where corruption is reduced, resulting in higher economic de-
velopment. Higher development may in turn lead to lower corruption and
higher gender equality. Thus, the promise of further research on this topic is
to design more e¤ective policies to reduce corruption and to promote gender
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equality and economic development. Such policies may lead the economy to
a sustainable development where the economy is in a virtuous cycle of higher
gender equality, lower corruption and higher economic development.
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Appendix
We will prove that the maximum utilities of male and female bureaucrats
obtained by choosing the optimum level of Cmt and Cft given by (1.22) and
(1.23) respectively are higher than the utility obtained from being honest.
The expected utility of a corruptible bureaucrat is given by (1.19) and the
utility from being honest is obtained by setting Cit = 0 in (1.19). Corruptible
bureaucrat of gender i will commit corrupt acts if the expected utility from
being corrupt is higher than the utility from being honest; that is if:
f(1  pCit)(1 + r)(wbit + qit) + Cit + b   qit+1 + (qit+1)
+pCit

(1 + r)(whit + qit)  qit+1 + (qit+1)
g
 (1 + r)(wbit+qit) + b (1.39)
Combining (1.18) and (1.39), we obtain the following for male bureaucrat:
f(1  pCmt)

(1 + r)(whmt + qit) + Cmt + 
b   qit+1 + (qit+1)

+pCmt

(1 + r)(whmt + qit)  qit+1 + (qit+1)
g
 (1 + r)(whmt+qit) + b (1.40)
Substituting (1.22) into (1.40) and rearranging it yields the following:
p  1
b
(1.41)
Thus, as long as (1.41) holds, it pays o¤ for a male bureaucrat to be corrupt
by choosing the optimum Cmt. Note that the condition expressed in (1.41)
is consistent with the threshold probability of detection for male in (1.25).
As such, we conrm that the condition represented by (1.40) is fullled.
Combining equations (1.39), (1.7) and (1.18), we obtain the following for
a female bureaucrat:
f(1  pCft)

(1 + r)(whmt + qit) + Cft + 
b   qit+1 + (qit+1)

+pCft

(1 + r)(whmt + qit)  qit+1 + (qit+1)
g
 (1 + r)(whmt+qit) + b (1.42)
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Substituting (1.23) into (1.42) and rearranging it yields the following:
p  1
b + (1 + r)(1  )whmt
(1.43)
Thus, as long as (1.43) holds, it pays o¤ for a female bureaucrat to be corrupt
by choosing the optimum Cft. Note that the condition in (1.43) is consistent
with the threshold probability of detection for female in (1.26). As such, we
conrm that the condition in (1.42) is fullled.
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Chapter 2
Pollution, Corruption and
Economic Development: A
Theoretical Investigation
Abstract
This chapter presents an analysis of the e¤ect of corruption on pol-
lution and economic development when there is a two-way feedback
between pollution and development. The relationship between pollu-
tion and development is represented by an inverse U-shaped curve,
commonly known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve. Thus, the
e¤ect of corruption on pollution depends on the economys level of
development. In addition, pollution a¤ects development by reducing
the health of unskilled workers in the economy as they tend to be more
susceptible to the adverse e¤ect of pollution. The analysis is based on
a dynamic general equilibrium model in which capital accumulation
drives economic development. The government appoints bureaucrats
to administer public policy to abate pollution. Corruption may arise
due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds. Our
main results can be summarised as follows: (1) there is a simulta-
neous causality between corruption and economic development; (2)
corruption a¤ects pollution directly by reducing pollution abatement
resources and indirectly through its impact on development; (3) the
total e¤ect of corruption on pollution depends on the level of develop-
ment; (4) corruption and poverty may be permanent features of the
economy; (5) policy to reduce corruption should be done side by side
with policy to reduce pollution and to reduce negative health e¤ect of
pollution, such that the maximum benet is achieved in the form of
lower pollution, lower corruption, poverty alleviation accompanied by
higher development and lower inequality.
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2.1 Introduction
The impact of corruption on pollution has been somehow neglected in the
empirical literature until very recently. It is not until Welsch (2004) published
his seminal work on the topic, that other authors have started working in
the area. Welsch (2004) identies two e¤ects of corruption on pollution: the
direct e¤ect and the indirect e¤ect. The direct e¤ect of corruption relates
to how corruption is likely to increase pollution by decreasing the strictness
of environmental regulation (see Damania et al., 2003; Fredriksson et al.,
2004; López and and Mitra, 2000; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2006; Zugravu
et al., 2008; Leitão, 2010) and/or the e¤ectiveness of environmental regula-
tion (see Biswas et al., 2012; Lippe, 1999; Callister, 1999; Ivanova, 2011).
The indirect e¤ect of corruption relates to how corruption a¤ects pollution
through its impact on economic development. The generally harmful im-
pact of corruption on economic development has been pointed out by many
authors (e.g., Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; Keefer and Knack, 1997; Li et al.,
2000; Mauro, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Bardhan, 1997; Gupta et al.,
2002). This harmful impact of corruption on development may act through
many channels including reducing the quantity and/or the quality of public
investment; increasing inequality and poverty; and reducing bureaucratic ef-
ciency. However, the relationship between pollution and development may
not be as straightforward; many studies have found evidence of an inverse
U-shaped relationship between pollution and development (e.g., Grossman
and Krueger, 1995; Selden and Song, 1994; Leitão, 2010; Shak, 1994; Cole
et al., 1997; Panayotou, 1993, 1997; Carson et al., 1997; Hettige et al., 1992),
which is often referred to as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) in the
literature. As a result, the indirect e¤ect of corruption on pollution cannot
be determined without knowing where the economy is located on its EKC.
If the economys income is below the income level at the turning point of the
EKC, corruption has an indirect negative e¤ect on pollution. If the econ-
omys income is above the income level at the turning point of the EKC,
corruption has an indirect positive e¤ect on pollution. Consequently, the
total e¤ect of corruption on pollution cannot be determined without inves-
tigating the interdependencies between pollution, corruption and economic
development.
As a follow up to Welsch (2004), some researchers have conducted fur-
ther empirical studies on the impact of corruption on pollution (e.g., Morse,
2006; Cole, 2007; Ivanova, 2011; Leitão, 2010). Nevertheless, to date, there
is only one theoretical study that has explicitly investigated the impact of
corruption on pollution; López and and Mitra (2000) conducts this study by
using a static analysis approach. Therefore, the objective of our chapter is to
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contribute to the theoretical literature on this topic by employing a dynamic
analysis approach to enable us to see a range of possible outcomes of the
impact of corruption on pollution, taking into account the overall dynamic
evolution of the economy. For the purpose of this chapter, we adopt a general
denition of corruption as the abuse of authority by public servants for their
own private gain.
Furthermore, in generating the EKC in our chapter, we have assumed
increasing returns to pollution abatement; the evidence of which has been
provided by Carson et al. (1997) and Andreoni and Levinson (2001). In
addition, we have also taken into account the role of government policies and
institutions in mediating the improvement in environment (see Grossman
and Krueger, 1996; Arrow et al., 1995; Bimonte, 2002) which is supported by
wide evidence (e.g., Panayotou, 1997; Bimonte, 2002; Farzin and Bond, 2006;
Dasgupta et al., 2002). Thus, we have let the government to be in charge of
reducing pollution by implementing pollution abatement policies funded by
taxes.
Equally important, we have also shown the two-way feedback between pol-
lution and development which is rarely done in the literature notwithstand-
ing much evidence suggesting it. Much evidence has revealed the negative
health impact of pollution (see Gwynn and Thurston, 2001; Gangadharan
and Valenzuela, 2001; Brunekreef and Holgate, 2002; Kampa and Castanas,
2008; Yang and Omaye, 2009). Generally, this evidence shows that pollution
is associated with chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases, cardiovascular dis-
eases, ashtma, cancer, respiratory diseases, heart diseases, bronchitis, prema-
ture mortality and reduced life expectancy. One recent study by Gra¤ Zivin
and Neidell (2012) has also found that pollution reduces worker productiv-
ity. Given substantial evidence of negative correlation between health and
development (e.g., Bloom et al., 2004; Aguayo-Rico et al., 2005; Gyimah-
Brempong and Wilson, 2004; Narayan et al., 2010), it is reasonable to in-
fer that pollution could reduce development through its negative impact on
health.
Furthermore, the negative health impact of pollution is likely to be greater
for the poor than it is for the rich due to di¤erences in exposure to pollu-
tion (Bell et al., 2005; Lipfert, 2004; Samet and White, 2004; Gwynn and
Thurston, 2001; Brown et al., 2003; Morello-Frosch, 2002; Makri and Stil-
ianakis, 2008; ONeill et al., 2003) and/or di¤erences in susceptibility to
health e¤ect of pollution (Bell et al., 2005; Lipfert, 2004; Samet and White,
2004; Makri and Stilianakis, 2008; Gwynn and Thurston, 2001; ONeill et al.,
2003). We have also incorporated this environmental inequality into our
model; we have shown that through its negative health impact, pollution not
only reduces economic development but also increases inequality.
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We establish our results within a dynamic general equilibrium frame-
work where corruption and development are determined jointly and endoge-
nously as the outcomes of the individualsdecision given the structure of the
economy. A key feature of our model is the existence of multiple develop-
ment regimes and multiple (history-dependent) long-run equilibria including
a poverty trap equilibrium. The existence of a poverty trap equilibrium in
our chapter is consistent with some observations that corruption and poverty
may coexist as permanent instead of transient features of the economy (e.g.,
Bardhan, 1997; Sah, 2007). It has also been illustrated in many theoret-
ical investigations of the relationship between corruption and development
(e.g., Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2011; Blackburn, 2012; Blackburn et al.,
2006). As in these papers, notwithstanding a lack of robust evidence regard-
ing the existence of poverty traps, our analysis illustrates the idea of institu-
tionalpoverty trap as a result of poor governance which has obtained more
support in recent years (see Easterly, 2006).
To the best of our knowledge, our chapter is the rst to present an analysis
of the interdependencies between pollution, corruption and economic devel-
opment within a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Our chapter is
also the rst to incorporate the two-way causal relationship between pol-
lution and development in addition to the two-way causal relationship be-
tween corruption and development, while taking into account environmental
inequality. Thus, our chapter makes a signicant contribution in this liter-
ature by showing the important feedback between pollution, corruption and
economic development in a single unied model. As a result, we are able
to show di¤erent possible outcomes of the impact of corruption on pollution
within the context of economic development.
By presenting our analyses, we have also contributed to important policy
implications concerning improving environmental quality and fostering good
governance and development. In particular, policy to improve environmen-
tal quality should be done simultaneously with the policy to improve good
governance. Such policy will potentially result in better environmental qual-
ity, better governance, poverty alleviation, higher income equality and higher
economic development.
In the remainder of our introductory section, we will provide a broad
overview of the di¤erent literatures on which we draw to give a background
for and motivate our analysis.
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2.1.1 The Impact of Economic Development, Policies
and Institutions on Pollution
There exists much evidence showing that the relationship between pollution
and income is represented by an inverse U-shaped curve (e.g., Grossman and
Krueger, 1995; Selden and Song, 1994; Leitão, 2010; Shak, 1994; Cole et al.,
1997; Panayotou, 1993, 1997; Carson et al., 1997; Hettige et al., 1992). Such
inverse U-shaped pollution-income curve is generally known as the Environ-
mental Kuznets Curve (EKC). The existence of the EKC implies that at
the low level of development, pollution rises as the economy develops; this
process continues until the economy reaches the turning point of the EKC
where pollution starts to decrease as the economy develops further. However,
the existence of the EKC does not mean that this process is automatic and/or
inevitable (Grossman and Krueger, 1995, 1996; Cole et al., 1997; Arrow et al.,
1995; Panayotou, 1997; Farzin and Bond, 2006; Shak, 1994). Nor does it
tell us about the mechanism governing this relationship between income and
pollution (Grossman and Krueger, 1996).
There are many theories that could explain the existence of the EKC.1
For instance, higher income may be linked with: i) change in the composi-
tion of output from more pollution-intensive goods to less pollution goods; ii)
change in the production technologies employed from dirtier ones to cleaner
ones; iii) greater public demands for cleaner environment which translate
into stricter environmental regulations, or all three of them (Grossman and
Krueger, 1996). In addition, Andreoni and Levinson (2001) has demon-
strated how increasing returns to scale of pollution abatement could explain
the existence of the EKC in their model. They have also provided evidence
of increasing returns to scale in pollution abatement at plant level, at na-
tional level and at the US states level. Although their evidence implies that
pollution-income relationship will have an inverse U-shape regardless of the
existence of environmental regulations; they maintain that in the absence of
environmental regulations, the level of pollution at every income level will be
ine¢ ciently high. Similarly, Carson et al. (1997) nd evidence showing that
the initial level of air toxic emissions matter in determining the relationship
between income and pollution in 50 US states. Hence, they suggest it is
cheaper to reduce pollution when pollution is high than when pollution is
low. They also claim that the variability in pollution across the US states
can be explained by their di¤erent income level and correspondingly, their
available resources to regulatory agencies.
Other authors have also pointed out that the improvement of environment
1For more details, see a survey by Dinda (2004).
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could be largely mediated by government policies, implying that policies that
foster economic growth cannot substitute environmental policies (e.g., Gross-
man and Krueger, 1996; Arrow et al., 1995; Bimonte, 2002). Arrow et al.
(1995) also suggests that environmental quality is inuenced by the content
of growth (that is, the composition of output and input), which is determined
by the economic institutions. Consequently, institutional design is crucial for
protecting environment. Without good policies and institutions, it is pos-
sible that greater output continuously leads to environmental degradation
beyond recovery. The institution should be designed to overcome the specic
issues pertaining to the management of environmental resources including
uncertainty, inequity, ine¢ ciency and rigidity (Hanna, 1996). Along these
lines, Varvarigos (2014) develops a model to explain how the government
through taxation can encourage entrepreneurs to move towards technologies
with lower impact on the environment. Hence, the endogenous technological
choice induced by taxes on emissions may provide an alternative explanation
to the observation that advanced economies seem to have higher environ-
mental quality than poor economies.
There is much empirical evidence supporting the theory that policies and
institutions are important determinants of environmental quality. For in-
stance, Panayotou (1997) nds evidence showing that better policies and in-
stitutions atten the EKC and enable the economy to reach the turning point
earlier. He argues that although higher development raises the demand for
cleaner environment and the resources for supplying it, the materialisation of
better environmental quality depends critically on government policies and
quality of institutions. Torras and Boyce (1998) nd that more equitable
power distribution through more equitable income distribution, wider lit-
eracy and stronger political liberties and civil rights has positive e¤ect on
environmental quality. They also nd that this e¤ect is more signicant in
poor countries. Similarly, Magnani (2000, 2001) nds that income inequality
is negatively correlated with environmental protection. Hence, they conclude
that in rich countries, the downward sloping portion of the EKC is more likely
to occur if higher income does not lead to a big increase in income inequality.
Bimonte (2002) also nds that higher participation in the development
process through higher literacy, information access and equality increases
demand for environmental quality. As a result, the minimum level of envi-
ronmental quality that a society is willing to accept before the positive rela-
tionship between environmental quality and income occurs is reduced; level
of participation thus shifts the EKC downwards. Furthermore, Farzin and
Bond (2006) nd that agents can express their preferences for environmental
quality more e¤ectively to and receive more favourable response from the gov-
ernment in more democratic regime than in autocratic regime. Consequently,
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democracy is positively associated with environmental quality. Additionally,
they also nd that societal preferences are a¤ected by other factors such as
income inequality, age distribution, education and urbanisation. Thus, the
inverse U-shaped EKC is created by the interactions between these factors
a¤ecting societal preferences and the qualities of political institutions (Farzin
and Bond, 2006). On a similar note, Dasgupta et al. (2002) also state that
the relationship between income and environmental quality is inuenced by
the reaction of the parties involved - including citizens, businesses and policy
makers - to the economic growth and its side e¤ects. The EKC may become
atter and lower due to the rising public concern and research knowledge
about the quality of environment and regulation (Dasgupta et al., 2002).
2.1.2 The Impact of Pollution on Economic Develop-
ment
While many studies have investigated how economic development a¤ects pol-
lution, very few studies have investigated the important feedback from pol-
lution to economic development. As such, based on her survey of the EKC
hypothesis, Dinda (2004) concludes that we need economic models which
incorporate the two-way feedback from income to environment and from en-
vironment to income. One of such studies is done by Ezzati et al. (2001) who
develop a model which incorporates the two-way feedback from economic
activity and food production to environment and from pollution to income
and food production. They demonstrate that in such a case, the negative ef-
fect of economic activity on the environment puts a stop to income and food
growth; as a result, pollution starts to decline. They argue that although
their model results in an income-environment curve resembling an inverse U-
shaped EKC, this relationship does not imply that economic growth results
in better environment. Therefore, they agree with Arrow et al. (1995) that
there is a basis for policies that are targeted towards environment instead of
merely towards growth.
Pollution may also harm economic development through its impact on
human health and productivity. There exists much evidence that pollution
reduces human health. For instance, Gwynn and Thurston (2001) nd signi-
cant positive correlation between air pollution and hospitalisation admissions
in New York City. Gangadharan and Valenzuela (2001) also nd that pol-
lution has signicant negative e¤ect on health status in a panel of countries
they study. There are also many reviews documenting in more details various
evidence of the negative e¤ect of pollution on health (e.g., Brunekreef and
Holgate, 2002; Kampa and Castanas, 2008; Yang and Omaye, 2009). These
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reviews generally reveal that air pollution reduces health by contributing
to chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases, cardiovascular diseases, ashtma,
cancer, respiratory diseases, heart diseases, bronchitis, premature mortality
and reduced life expectancy. In a more recent study, Gra¤ Zivin and Neidell
(2012) nd that a decrease in the average ozone exposure improves agricul-
tural worker productivity in the Central Valley of California signicantly.
They also suggest that protecting environment can be viewed as an invest-
ment in human capital and should be taken into account by policy makers.
Equally important, the negative e¤ect of pollution on health tends to be
greater for people with lower socioeconomic status. This disproportionate
burden of air pollution could be due to di¤erences in exposure to pollution
and/or di¤erences in susceptibility to health e¤ect of pollution. People from
lower socioeconomic status tend to be more susceptible to the negative health
e¤ect of air pollution due to their generally poorer baseline health status
and/or having less access to healthcare (Bell et al., 2005; Lipfert, 2004; Samet
and White, 2004; Makri and Stilianakis, 2008; Gwynn and Thurston, 2001;
ONeill et al., 2003).2 For example, lower income and minority groups su¤er
from asthma and other diseases more than other groups (Brown et al., 2003).
Furthermore, Gwynn and Thurston (2001) nd evidence showing that the
e¤ect of air pollution on hospital admission is the greatest for the poor people.
Moreover, people from lower socioeconomic status are likely to be more
exposed to air pollutants due to their living conditions (Bell et al., 2005;
Lipfert, 2004; Samet and White, 2004; Gwynn and Thurston, 2001; Brown
et al., 2003; Morello-Frosch, 2002; Makri and Stilianakis, 2008; ONeill et al.,
2003). For instance, Marshall (2008) nds that low income and non-white
sub-populations are more likely to be highly exposed to the primary pollu-
tants in Californias South Coast Air Basin. Similarly, Walker et al. (2005)
nd that Industrial Pollution Control sites in England are disproportionately
located and more clustered in more socially deprived areas. In the US, Per-
lin et al. (2001) nd that compared with the Whites and wealthier people,
African Americans and poor people tend to live nearer to the Toxic Release
Inventory sites. A more recent study of the US by Bell and Ebisu (2012) also
discovers that people with lower socioeconomic status - indicated by educa-
tion, unemployment, poverty and earnings - have higher estimated exposure
to pollution. These ndings highlight the need to safeguard the health of the
population, particularly the more vulnerable ones in the society, from the
negative health e¤ect of air pollution (Makri and Stilianakis, 2008; Perlin
2There is much evidence showing that poor people have worse health and less adequate
health facilities compared to wealthier people. The World Health Organization (2002)
provides a review of this evidence.
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et al., 2001).3
In addition to the substantial evidence of the negative health impact
of pollution and the disproportionate burden of this health impact, there
also exists substantial evidence showing positive correlation between health
and economic growth in the regression analyses (see Bloom et al., 2004).
However, Bloom et al. (2004) argue that it is not clear in these analyses
whether health is a direct determinant of growth or only a representation
of other unobservable or mismeasured factors. In order to investigate if
health directly fosters growth by increasing labour productivity, they include
health in a well-specied aggregate production function. Their analysis yields
nding that health positively and signicantly a¤ects growth by improving
populations life expectancy and consequently, output in a panel of countries
they study. Aguayo-Rico et al. (2005) extend this study by using a self-built
ordinal health index incorporating four determinants of health - lifestyle,
environment, health services and socioeconomic conditions - as a proxy for
health in their study of a panel of countries. They also obtain results that
health signicantly and positively a¤ects growth. Next, Gyimah-Brempong
and Wilson (2004) nd that the health human capital stock positively and
signicantly a¤ect growth in a quadratic way in samples of OECD and Sub-
Saharan African countries. A more recent study by Narayan et al. (2010) also
discovers that health has a signicant and positive e¤ect on growth in ve
Asian countries, that is, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand. In
addition, Aguayo-Rico et al. (2005) suggests that poverty trap may be formed
from a combination of low income and poor health, further highlighting the
importance of health to economic development.
This positive correlation between health and development can be ex-
plained by a substantial body of evidence showing a positive correlation
between health and workersphysical and work capacities, productivity and
wages. Healthier workers are also found to be less likely to miss work due to
illness. Strauss and Thomas (1998) provides a comprehensive review of this
evidence which is later extended by the World Health Organization (2002)
in its report.
2.1.3 The Impact of Corruption on Pollution
Empirical investigation of the e¤ect of corruption and pollution is pioneered
by Welsch (2004). In his investigation, he classies the e¤ects of corruption
on pollution into direct e¤ect and indirect e¤ect. Corruption may directly in-
crease pollution by decreasing the strictness of environmental regulation (see
3See Deaton (2003) for a survey on health, inequality and economic development.
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Damania et al., 2003; Fredriksson et al., 2004; López and and Mitra, 2000;
Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2006; Zugravu et al., 2008; Leitão, 2010) and/or the
e¤ectiveness of the enforced environmental regulation (see Biswas et al., 2012;
Lippe, 1999; Callister, 1999; Ivanova, 2011). Moreover, corruption may indi-
rectly a¤ect pollution through its e¤ect on economic development which in
turn a¤ects pollution. Taking into account the evidence of generally harm-
ful impact of corruption on economic development (e.g., Gyimah-Brempong,
2002; Keefer and Knack, 1997; Li et al., 2000; Mauro, 1995; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1993; Bardhan, 1997; Gupta et al., 2002) as well as the evidence of
the EKC (e.g., Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Selden and Song, 1994; Leitão,
2010; Shak, 1994; Cole et al., 1997; Panayotou, 1993), the indirect e¤ect
of corruption on pollution cannot be determined straightforwardly. At lower
income level before the turning point of the EKC, corruption has an indirect
negative e¤ect on pollution; corruption reduces income and reduced income
lowers pollution. On the contrary, at higher income level after the turning
point of the EKC, corruption reduces income and reduced income increases
pollution; corruption has a positive indirect e¤ect on pollution. As a con-
sequence, the total e¤ect of corruption on pollution cannot be determined
without investigating the interdependencies between pollution, corruption
and economic development.
Accounting for these direct and indirect e¤ects and using data available
from the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) for a panel of countries,
Welsch (2004) nds that the direct e¤ect and the total e¤ect of corruption
on pollution is positive for all indicators of ambient air and water pollution
he uses. He also nds that corruption and income per capita are signicantly
and negatively correlated, further conrming the evidence of negative e¤ect
of corruption on development. However, the relationship between pollution
and income per capita is not the same across all indicators of pollution he
investigates. NO2, TSP, dissolved oxygen demand and suspended solids have
a negative relationship with income, resulting in a positive indirect e¤ect of
corruption on pollution over a large portion of the income scale. SO2 has an
inverse U-shaped relationship with income. As a result, the indirect e¤ect
of corruption on pollution is negative at lower income level; it turns positive
at higher income level. Also, except for dissolved oxygen demand and TSP,
there is a range of income at which corruption has a negative indirect e¤ect
on pollution. In such cases, however, the direct e¤ect still dominates the
indirect e¤ect. Furthermore, Welsch (2004) nds that the e¤ect of corruption
on pollution is especially strong in low income countries. Thus, he concludes
that reducing corruption will lead to lower pollution; this is especially so for
the poor countries.
Following up on Welsch (2004), Morse (2006) criticises Welsch (2004)
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for dealing solely with the state (ambient) indicators in his analysis and
in deriving his conclusions. As such, the validity of the ndings presented
by Welsch (2004) is questionable as they rely on highly aggregated indices
reected in single values for a country (Morse, 2006). In order to rectify
this problem, Morse (2006) examines the Pressure-State-Impact-Response
(PSIR) components of the ESI to investigate if the e¤ect of corruption on
environmental sustainability is di¤erent for each component for a panel of
countries. He nds that while corruption is negatively related to income per
capita, ESI is positively related to income per capita. Morse (2006) also nds
as corruption increases, both environmental sustainability and income per
capita decrease; this relationship could be explained in terms of both direct
and indirect e¤ects. Moreover, he nds that corruption is only signicantly
correlated with the response indicators of the ESI, particularly environmental
governance, private sector responsiveness and participation in international
collaborative e¤orts. This relationship could be explained in terms of how
closely these indicators reect the e¤ect of corruption on decision making.
He also suggests that corruption, income and environmental sustainability
may be inter-linked in a complex feedback e¤ect. Low income and poor
environment may both cause and be caused by corruption. The former can
be explained by the wish to move from polluted places to more prosperous
places (Morse, 2006). Furthermore, Morse (2006) suggests complementing
quantitative studies with qualitative studies on this topic to generate further
insights.
Further investigation of the impact of corruption on pollution for a panel
of countries is done by Cole (2007). Cole (2007) criticises Welsch (2004) for
using only one year data which does not explain unobserved heterogeneity
across countries and for not making provision for the potential endogeneity
between income and corruption. Cole (2007) therefore aims to rectify these
two problems in his study. Based on his study of two pollutants, CO2 and
SO2, Cole (2007) nds that corruption is signicantly and negatively corre-
lated to income per capita; while both pollutants are signicantly correlated
with income per capita in a cubic way. He also nds a positive direct e¤ect
of corruption on emissions which does not vary with income. However, the
indirect e¤ect of corruption on emissions is negative at the median income
levels for both pollutants, resulting in a negative total e¤ect.
In contrast with Welsch (2004), Cole (2007) nds that the indirect e¤ect
is larger than the direct e¤ect for the majority of the sample income range.
Moreover, this indirect e¤ect increases as income per capita increases; at
some point, this indirect e¤ect turns positive as income per capita increases.
Thus, although the total e¤ect of corruption on emissions is generally nega-
tive, it also increases in income and becomes positive at the upper end income
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levels. Cole (2007) argues that Welsch (2004) yields di¤erent results from his
because Welsch (2004) does not allow for potential endogeneity between in-
come and corruption; the problem which is rectied by Cole (2007) in his
study. Not surprisingly, Cole (2007) derives conclusions which contradict
those proposed by Welsch (2004). Cole (2007) suggests that the benet of
reducing corruption on environment is greater for the high income countries
where both direct and indirect e¤ect are positive resulting in positive total
e¤ect of corruption on pollution. In low income countries where the nega-
tive indirect e¤ect dominates the positive direct e¤ect, reducing corruption
results in higher prosperity but also higher pollution. As higher economic
development appears to be a necessity for low income countries, reducing
corruption and improving environmental protection should be done side by
side for those countries (Cole, 2007).
Next, Leitão (2010) provides further evidence of the impact of corruption
on pollution by focusing on the implication of corruption on income-pollution
path across countries. His study aims to test empirically if higher corruption
results in higher income per capita at the turning point of the EKC, as
suggested by López and and Mitra (2000). Leitão (2010) also accounts for
the indirect e¤ect of corruption on pollution by following Cole (2007) closely.
Based on his study, Leitão (2010) conrms that the relationship between
pollution and income is inverse U-shaped whether or not corruption exists.
Furthermore, he nds evidence that higher corruption increases the income
per capita threshold above which pollution declines. Hence, corruption may
cause income-pollution paths to di¤er across countries (Leitão, 2010). Leitão
(2010) therefore proposes that lowering corruption appears to enhance the
strictness of environmental regulation, reduce the income per capita at the
turning point of the EKC and yield considerable economic benets.
A more recent evidence of the impact of corruption on pollution is pro-
vided by Ivanova (2011). She nds that countries with e¤ective regulatory
frameworks are likely to report relatively high emissions of sulphur but have
lower actual pollution levels compared to others. Based on her results, she
highlights the importance of improving transparency in data reporting partic-
ularly in countries with poor regulatory regimes in order to reduce pollution
in those countries. As there is an interaction e¤ect between reducing corrup-
tion in connection with reducing pollution and the strengthening of the legal
system, they have to be done simultaneously (Ivanova, 2011).
On a related note, there exists some evidence showing how corruption
a¤ects the environment through its interaction with other variables. For
example, Damania et al. (2003) nd that while trade liberalisation has a
positive e¤ect on the stringency of environmental regulation, this e¤ect de-
pends on the degree of corruption. Specically, the e¤ect is larger when the
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government is more corrupt and it becomes negative for the most honest
governments. Moreover, while corruption has a negative e¤ect on the strin-
gency of environmental regulation, this e¤ect is larger when the trade policies
are more distorted (Damania et al., 2003). Cole et al. (2006) also provide
evidence showing that the e¤ect of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on en-
vironmental policy depends on the degree of corruption in the government.
When corruption is low, FDI increases the stringency of environmental pol-
icy; when corruption is high, FDI reduces the stringency of environmental
policy.
Next, Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) discover that the e¤ect of po-
litical stability on environmental regulations is conditional on the degree
of corruption. When corruption is high, political instability increases the
stringency of environmental regulations; when corruption is low, political in-
stability decreases the stringency of environmental regulations. Fredriksson
and Svensson (2003) also nd that the e¤ect of corruption on environmental
regulations depends on the degree of political instability. Although corrup-
tion lowers the strictness of environmental regulations, this e¤ect vanishes as
political instability increases. A more recent evidence is provided by Biswas
et al. (2012) who nd that while shadow economy has a positive e¤ect on
pollution, this e¤ect is reinforced by corruption.
2.1.4 Theoretical Literature on Pollution and Corrup-
tion
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one published paper to date
which explicitly models the relationship between pollution and corruption
in a theoretical framework. This model is constructed by López and and
Mitra (2000); it analyses how the governments corrupt and rent-seeking
behaviour a¤ects the relationship between pollution and income in a static
model. López and and Mitra (2000) assume that the goal of the government
policy-making is to win elections and allows the government to seek rent.
Consequently, the government maximises its objective function taking into
account the probability of being re-elected and rents. The probability of being
re-elected is increasing in social welfare which is determined by output and
pollution. Pollution directly and negatively a¤ects social welfare function;
it also acts as a variable factor of production. Corruption in this model
occurs in the form of lobby payments or bribes to government o¢ cials by the
private rm to increase the amount of allowable pollution and consequently,
output. The model analyses the scenarios of both cooperative and non-
cooperative interactions between the private rm and the government. The
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model concludes that corruption leads to pollution levels which are always
above the socially optimal level for any level of income per capita regardless
of the type of interaction. The model also concludes that corruption is not
likely to prevent the occurrence of the EKC under both scenarios. However,
with the existence of corruption, the turning point of the EKC would occur
at income and pollution levels above socially optimal level.
Our model di¤ers from López and and Mitra (2000) in which we employ
a dynamic general equilibrium model in a macroeconomic framework. As a
result, our model is able to illustrate the links between pollution, corruption
and economic development in a single unied model; and show a range of
possible outcomes as the economy develops. Additionally, corruption in our
model is in the form of embezzlement of public funds by the bureaucrats.
Although some of our conclusions are similar to those of López and and Mitra
(2000), our model lls the gap in the current literature by demonstrating the
dynamic analysis of the links between pollution, corruption and economic
development.
2.1.5 Outline of the Chapter
Our main objective in this chapter is to explore the dynamic general equilib-
rium interactions between pollution, corruption and economic development
in an environment where both pollution and corruption have a two-way rela-
tionship with economic development. For this purpose, we develop a model
that describes an economy in which the government delegates the authority
to administer public policy to abate pollution to public servants. The public
servants are responsible to use the available public funds for this purpose.
As a result, public servants have the opportunity to be corrupt by embez-
zling public funds.4 The e¤ect of corruption is to reduce the actual pollution
abatement expenditure. As pollution a¤ects the health of low-skilled agents,
the reduction in pollution abatement expenditure results in lower wages for
the low-skilled agents. As a consequence, there is a reduction in total sav-
ings and thus capital accumulation in the economy. At the same time, as
the capital accumulates, incentives to be corrupt disappear and there is a
critical (threshold) of capital above which corruption disappears. This two-
way causality between corruption and development leads to the possibility of
4As pointed out by López and and Mitra (2000), corruption is likely to occur more
broadly where corruption relating to environmental regulations is a part of it. Nevertheless,
similar to López and and Mitra (2000), we adopt a simple formulation where corruption
occurs only in the form of embezzling pollution abatement funds in order to simplify our
analysis.
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multiple (history-dependent) equilibria, including poverty trap equilibrium.
The model is used to analyse the interactions between pollution, corrup-
tion and economic development which is quite complex considering both pol-
lution and corruption have a two-way feedback with development. The model
also shows that with the existence of the EKC, the impact of corruption on
pollution is not necessarily straightforward. In particular, while the direct
e¤ect of corruption is to increase pollution, the indirect e¤ect of corruption
on pollution acting through its impact on development is ambiguous. Specif-
ically, it depends on where the economy is located on its EKC. The indirect
e¤ect of corruption on pollution is negative when the economys income is be-
low the income level at the turning point of the EKC; it is positive when the
economys income above the income level at the turning point of the EKC.
Our analysis aims to simplify this complexity without losing the intuition;
and to investigate di¤erent cases leading to various possible outcomes of the
impact of corruption on pollution within the context of economic develop-
ment. We hope that our analysis can help policy makers to implement policies
that can lead to better environment, higher economic development, lower in-
equality and help an economy escape from a corruption-induced poverty trap.
Our approach is consistent with many theoretical models on the relationship
between corruption and development (e.g., Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio,
2007, 2011; Blackburn and Sarmah, 2008; Blackburn, 2012; Blackburn et al.,
2006, 2010).
The remainder of this chapter will be organised as follows. We will provide
our analysis in Section 2.2 and conclude in Section 2.3.
2.2 The Model
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0; :::;1. We consider an economy in-
habited by two-period-lived agents belonging to overlapping generations of
dynastic families. There are two groups of agents of each generation di-
vided at birth, that is, private individuals (households) and public servants
(bureaucrats).5 Private individuals work for the private sector to produce
output. The private sector is further divided into two sectors: modern and
traditional. Firms in the modern sector hire labour from skilled agents and
rent capital from all agents; rms in the traditional sector hire labour from
5While we are aware of the possible complexity relating to public-private employment
occupational choice, we have adopted this simple job allocation mechanism as commonly
adopted in the theoretical investigations of corruption and development within a dynamic
general equilbrium framework (e.g., Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2011; Blackburn, 2012;
Blackburn et al., 2006).
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unskilled agents. Public servants work for the government to administer
public policy specically to reduce pollution on behalf of the government.
Corruption may arise as a result of the opportunity of public o¢ cials to em-
bezzle these public funds due to imperfect monitoring. All agents are risk
neutral, working only when young and consuming only when old.
2.2.1 Private Sector
Firms
This economy produces output in two sectors: the modern sector and the
traditional sector. These sectors have di¤erent production technology and
use di¤erent types of inputs of production. Each sector is represented by a
unit mass of rms which hire these inputs from perfectly competitive markets.
There is also a unit supply of labour to each sector.
Modern Firms As in Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2011) and Black-
burn and Forgues-Puccio (2007), the representative rm in the modern sec-
tor produces output using skilled labour and capital with positive production
externalities as a result from learning-by-doing. Formally, units of output are
produced according to the following technology:
yht = (Aht)
k1 t K

t (2.1)
where  2 (0; 1); ht denotes skilled labour, A  1 represents health capital of
the skilled workers, kt denotes physical capital andKt denotes aggregate cap-
ital which serves as the usual proxy for the stock of disembodied knowledge.6
We assume that A is labour-augmenting and a product of innate health and
other inuencing factors including access to healthcare, environment and
lifestyle.
We assume that the government derives revenue from this sector by im-
posing a constant proportional tax rate of  2 (0; 1) on its output. As the
government will use this tax revenue to abate pollution caused by this sector,
this tax is equivalent to pollution tax. Assuming that the price of the good
is equal to one, the rms prot is given by the following expression:
ht = (1  )(Aht)k1 t Kt   wht ht   rtkt (2.2)
6This aggregate externality is a common feature of endogenous growth model and allows
us to work with a simple technology where the social returns to capital are constant. Our
results will not change if we assume diminishing returns to capital instead.
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The prot maximisation conditions are therefore given by:
wht =
(1  )Ak1 t Kt
h1 t
(2.3)
rt = (1  )(1  )(Aht)k t Kt (2.4)
Given that in equilibrium ht = 1 and kt = Kt, we will re-write the above
optimality conditions as:
wht = (1  )Akt (2.5)
rt = r = (1  )(1  )A (2.6)
Thus, the equilibrium wage is proportional to the capital stock while the
equilibrium interest rate is constant.
Traditional Firms Output in the traditional sector is produced by un-
skilled agents whose productivity is augmented by their health. We assume
that the unskilled workers possess lower health capital than the skilled work-
ers because they are poorer. This assumption is in accordance with the wide
evidence that the poor tends to have lower baseline health status and/or less
access to healthcare compared to the rich (see World Health Organization,
2002). Moreover, the poor also tends to be more exposed to pollution than
the rich (Bell et al., 2005; Lipfert, 2004; Samet and White, 2004; Gwynn
and Thurston, 2001; Brown et al., 2003; Morello-Frosch, 2002; Makri and
Stilianakis, 2008; ONeill et al., 2003). All these factors cause the poor to
be more susceptible to negative health e¤ect of pollution than the rich. For
simplicity, we assume an extreme case where pollution reduces health of the
unskilled workers while it does not reduce the health of the skilled workers.7
The production function of the traditional sector is given by:
ylt = (B  
"
Kt
Pt)lt (2.7)
where B 2 (1; A) denotes health capital of the unskilled workers, lt denotes
unskilled labour, Pt denotes pollution level and "Kt denotes the sensitivity of
health to pollution. Similar to A; B is a product of innate health and other
7In reality, the health of the skilled workers is likely to also be a¤ected by pollution.
However, as they are richer, they may experience less health impact of pollution than the
unskilled ones who are poorer. Our main results will not change drastically if we assume
such a case instead although the algebra will be more complex.
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inuencing factors including access to healthcare, environment and lifestyle.
The parameter, " 2 (0; 1), represents the health impact per unit of pollution
which is a product of the amount of exposure per unit of pollution and health
impact associated to it. We assume that the aggregate disembodied knowl-
edge in the economy, Kt, reduces the sensitivity of health to pollution by
promoting behaviours that help reduce the health impact of pollution.8 The
parameter,  2 (0; 1), represents the strength of this positive externality.9
Each unskilled agent receives wage of wlt for providing their labour. We
assume that the government does not impose any taxes on this sector. As-
suming that the price of output is equal to one, prot in this sector is given
by:
lt = (B  
"Pt
Kt
)lt   wltlt (2.8)
Prot maximisation implies:
wlt = B  
"Pt
Kt
(2.9)
Given that in equilibrium kt = Kt, we will re-write the above optimality
condition as:
wlt = B  
"Pt
kt
(2.10)
Households
The population of households is divided into skilled households and unskilled
households. Each skilled household supplies one unit of its labour to rms in
8This assumption allows us to work with a simple production function which is linear
and increasing in capital stock. Our main results will not change if the production function
has a quadratic relationship with the capital stock due to the inclusion of pollution func-
tion. However, the algebra will be much more complex and di¢ cult to analyse. Moreover,
exposure to pollution is often associated with agents exposure behaviour (Ezzati et al.,
2005; Jin et al., 2006; Ezzati et al., 2002) which is likely to be changed by the knowledge of
health hazards caused by pollution (Jin et al., 2006; Niphadkar et al., 2009). To the extent
that the stock of disembodied knowledge in the economy, Kt; incorporates knowledge of
health risk associated with pollution along with all other knowledge, our assumption is a
reasonable one to adopt.
9According to the Information-Behavioural Skills Model, health behaviours are de-
termined by health-related information, motivation and behavioural skills (Fisher et al.,
2003). In view of this theory, the value of  in our model may also be determined by
agentsmotivation and behavioural skills.
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the modern sector; each unskilled household supplies one unit of its labour
to rms in the traditional sector. Each young household of generation t
working as worker type j(j = l; h) receives an income of zjt comprising of a
salary of wjt from supplying inelastically one unit of its labour endowment to
a (modern/traditional) rm plus bequest qt which it saves at the market rate
of interest r to obtain a nal level of wealth (1+r)zjt when it reaches old age.
Each household consumes part of its wealth and bequeaths the remainder
to its o¤spring. Each households utility function is therefore given by the
following expression:
ujt = (1 + r)z
j
t   qt+1 + (qt+1) (2.11)
The role of bequests in the model is to ensure the existence of the non-
degenerate steady state equilibrium. Thus, we adopt the simplest form of mo-
tive for giving bequests which is altruism consistent with the simple warm-
glow or joy of giving; this assumption is reected by a strictly concave
function () that satises the usual Inada conditions. Utility is maximised
by setting 0() = 1 , implying an optimal xed size of bequest from one
generation to the next, qt = qt+1 = q. As the rate of interest r is constant in
equilibrium, the expected utility of a household is fully determined once its
expected income or saving is determined. Therefore, each household saves
zjt = w
j
t + q.
2.2.2 Public Sector
Government
The objective of the government is to foster economic development and re-
duce inequality by reducing pollution. The government achieves this objec-
tive by providing public goods and services specically to reduce pollution.
Such provision may include research and social infrastructures for pollution
abatement. gt represents a consolidation of these public goods. The govern-
ment hires bureaucrats, of which there is a unit mass, to distribute public
funds for the purpose of the provision of such public good and services. Cor-
ruption may arise because of the opportunity of bureaucrats to benet by
abusing their positions of authority.
In view of this, the government determines the bureaucratssalaries as
follows. Any bureaucrat can work for a modern sector rm to receive an
income equal to the wage paid to the modern sector worker, that is, wht .
Any bureaucrat who is willing to accept a salary less than this wage must be
expecting to receive compensation through bribery and is therefore immedi-
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ately identied as being corrupt. As in other analyses (e.g., Acemoglu and
Verdier, 1998; Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2011, 2007; Blackburn, 2012;
Blackburn et al., 2006), we assume that a corrupt bureaucrat who is caught is
subject to the maximum ne of having all of his/her legal income conscated
(that is, he/she is dismissed without pay). Given this, then no corruptible
bureaucrat would ever reveal himself in the way described above. As such,
the government can minimise its labour costs while ensuring complete bu-
reaucratic participation, by setting the salaries of all bureaucrats equal to
the wage paid by rms to skilled workers in the modern sector.10
The government nances its expenditures each period by running a bal-
anced budget. Its revenues consist of the taxes collected by bureaucrats
from the rms. Corruption occurs after the tax rate has been set and con-
sequently, the government cannot replace the amount stolen by bureaucrats
by raising taxes. The government uses the remaining public funds available
after deducting the bureaucratssalaries and the amount corrupted by the
bureaucrats from the tax revenues. The government is fully aware when
corruption is occurring but it cannot retrieve the stolen income due to its
imperfect power of detection.11 The government uses an imprecise monitor-
ing technology to catch a corrupt bureaucrat. This technology implies that
each corrupt bureaucrat faces a probability of avoiding detection , p 2 (0; 1).
In order to keep a balanced budget every period, we assume that the gov-
ernment distributes among households any unexpected saving that may arise
from the caught corrupt bureaucrats.
Bureaucrats
The population of bureaucrats is a measure of mass 1, of which a fraction
 2 (0; 1) is corruptible and the remaining fraction 1   is non-corruptible.
Corruptible bureaucrats will always be corrupt if the benet from corruption
is greater than the benet from being honest. Each young bureaucrat of
generation t receives a salary of wht from supplying inelastically one unit
of his/her labour endowment to the government which he/she saves at the
10This has the usual interpretation of an allocation of talent condition. Although the
government cannot force any of the potential bureaucrats to actually work in public sector,
it can induce them to do so by paying them at least what they could get elsewhere.
11The government knows how much tax revenues are as it knows how many taxable
rms are in this economy. Given that the government knows the amount of bureaucrats
salaries, it also knows the amount of public funds available for pollution abatement in the
absence of corruption. Any shortfall below this amount is an immediate indication that
corruption is occurring.
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market rate of interest r to obtain (1 + r)wht when he/she reaches old age.
For simplicity, we assume that bureaucrats are non-altruistic and therefore
do not make bequests to their o¤spring.12
Bureaucrats are responsible to administer public projects to reduce pol-
lution. Such delegation of authority leads to opportunity for corruption as
the bureaucrats may be tempted to appropriate the public funds for their
own benets. Moreover, corrupt bureaucrats have incentives to engage in
corruption by embezzling money from the public funds he/she is in charge
of given that the government cannot perfectly monitor their actions.
Engaging in corruption is costly in terms of moral costs and resources
needed to minimise probability of detection. The higher the amount being
corrupted, the higher the moral costs and the resources needed to minimise
detection are. As a convenient formalisation of these costs of corruption, we
adopt a convex cost function cet (c > 0;  > 1) where et denotes the amount
embezzled. The expected return from embezzlement is maximised by setting
1 = ce 1t implying an optimal xed amount of embezzlement et = e.
Generally, corrupt bureaucrats may try to avoid detection in various ways,
including hiding their illegal income and investing it di¤erently from their
legal income. In our chapter, we consider a simple scenario where corrupt bu-
reaucrats have to consume their illegal income in hiding in order to minimise
the probability of detection. This assumption implies that this illegal income
does not derive any interest and does not form part of productive saving and
investment in the economy. In principle, once stolen, illegal income can be
immediately consumed. We observe in the real world that the total embez-
zled funds are normally very di¢ cult to retrieve. The government may only
manage to recover a fraction of them when corruption is uncovered. Thus,
to simplify the algebra we assume that the stolen resources are never recov-
ered by the government. The bureaucratsutility prole ubt may be therefore
summarised as follows:
ubt =
8><>:
(1 + r)wht if non-corrupt or et = 0;
(1 + r)wht + e  ce with prob. p if et > 0;
e  ce with prob. 1  p if et > 0:
(2.12)
Next, a corruptible bureaucrat will engage in corruption if the benet
from corruption is at least as great as the benet from being honest. Formally,
12We make this assumption as it is not consequential to our results. For the purposes
of our analysis, it is su¢ cient to assume that only private agents make bequests to their
o¤spring.
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this condition can be written as:
(e  ce)  (1  p)wht (2.13)
Naturally, a bureaucrats likelihood to be corrupt is positively related
to the amount of illegal income (net embezzlement); and negatively related
to the amount of legal income (wage) lost in the event of detection. As a
bureaucrats wage is driven by capital accumulation (see (2.5)), the bureau-
crats incentive to be corrupt is also determined by capital accumulation.
Substituting (2.5) into (2.13), the condition for corruption to occur can be
re-written as:
kt  (e  ce
)
A(1  )(1  p)  k
C (2.14)
Thus, the higher the net embezzlement, the higher is the critical level of cap-
ital. By analysing bureaucratsincentives to be corrupt, we have established
the rst relationship between corruption and economic development where
higher development (associated with higher wages and higher capital) leads
to lower corruption by reducing bureaucratsincentives to be corrupt.
Government Budget Constraint
The governments budget constraint is derived as follows. The governments
only source of revenue is tax from the modern sector rms of yht ; substituting
equation (2.1) into this expression yields yht = (Aht)
k1 t K

t . In equilib-
rium, kt = Kt and ht = 1, therefore yht = A
kt. The government uses these
tax revenues to pay bureaucratssalaries of wht and to provide public funds
to reduce pollution, gt. In addition, due to the opportunity for corruption,
an amount of e is lost in the hands of corrupt bureaucrats. Consequently,
corruption a¤ects this economy through its impact on gt. Specically, cor-
ruption causes the pollution abatement provision gt to be reduced by e. The
government runs a balanced budget by equating revenues and expenditures
according to the following expression:
gt = A
kt   wht   e: (2.15)
2.2.3 Pollution
We model pollution as a function of capital as some authors have done so
in their theoretical papers on pollution and growth (e.g., Selden and Song,
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1994; Smulders and Gradus, 1996; Jones and Manuelli, 2001). As income has
a positive linear relationship with capital in our model, the relationship be-
tween pollution and capital applies to the relationship between pollution and
income. The relationship between pollution and capital in our model is repre-
sented by an inverse U-shaped curve in accordance with much evidence of the
EKC (e.g., Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Selden and Song, 1994; Leitão, 2010;
Shak, 1994; Cole et al., 1997; Panayotou, 1993, 1997; Carson et al., 1997;
Hettige et al., 1992). On the one hand, capital creates more pollution; on the
other hand, it augments public goods and services earmarked to reduce pol-
lution. Formally, pollution level, Pt; in this economy is given by the following
equation:
Pt = kt   ktgt (2.16)
where  2 (0; 1) represents the emission rate per unit of capital, which can
indicate the cleanlinessof the production technology used. By substituting
(2.5), (2.15) into (2.16) we re-write (2.16) as:
Pt = kt( + e)  k2tA(   (1  )) (2.17)
Thus, while capital increases pollution linearly, the pollution abatement
exhibits increasing returns resulting in an inverse U-shaped relationship be-
tween pollution and capital, that is, the EKC. We have adopted increasing
returns to pollution abatement in our model following similar formulation
in Andreoni and Levinson (2001). However, unlike their model in which
pollution abatement expenditure is determined by consumers utility max-
imisation; our model assumes that pollution abatement is implemented by
the government and funded through taxes.
Next, from (2.17), we obtain the following capital level at the turning
point of the EKC:
kP   + e
2A(   (1  )) (2.18)
Pollution increases with development when kt < kP ; pollution declines with
development when kt > kP :
Moreover, we adopt parameter restriction to ensure that Pt  0 through-
out our model. Based on (2.17), this implies that the following parameter
restriction applies throughout our model:
0  kt   + e
A[   (1  )] (2.19)
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It is clear from (2.18) that higher corruption increases the capital level at
the turning point of the EKC. By substituting  = 0 and  = 1 separately
into (2.18), we obtain the following:
kPnc 

2A[   (1  )] (2.20)
kPwc 
 + e
2A[   (1  )] (2.21)
where nc denotes "no corruption" and wc denotes "with corruption".
Hence, we have established the rst relationship between pollution and
economic development. When the economy is still relatively poor, higher
economic development initially increases pollution; this process continues
until the economy reaches a level of development at the turning point of the
EKC after which higher development brings down pollution.
2.2.4 General Equilibrium
The nal component in our description of the economy is the process by
which economic development takes place. This process is summarised by
the dynamic path of capital accumulation, obtained from the equilibrium
condition that the total demand for capital by rms is equal to the total
supply of savings by agents.
We will now proceed to deduce total savings in the economy and with
this, the dynamic equation for capital accumulation. Modern sector house-
holds, represented by a mass population of 1, each saves wht + q. Traditional
sector households, represented by a mass population of 1; each saves wlt + q.
Successful corrupt bureaucrats, of whom there are p, each saves wht . Cor-
rupt bureaucrats who get caught, of whom there are (1  p), are red and
the government saves their wages, wht , unfortunately as we are assuming, the
embezzled resources, (e   ce), cannot be recovered. As we said the gov-
ernment redistributes this unexpected saving to all households resulting in
additional savings in the economy. By collecting all these terms together we
nd the following total savings in the economy:
st = (w
h
t + q) + (w
l
t + q) + (1  + p)wht + (1  p)wht (2.22)
We obtain the following dynamic capital accumulation equation by further
combining (2.5), (2.10) and (2.17) and equilibrium condition kt+1 = st:
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kt+1 = 2(1  )Akt +B   "fkt( + e)  k
2
t [A
   (1  )A)]g
kt
+ 2q (2.23)
(2.23) can be further simplied to arrive at the following expression for dy-
namic capital accumulation:
kt+1 = f2(1  )A + "A
[   (1  ))]

gkt +B   "( + e)

+ 2q (2.24)
Under the parameter restrictions 2(1 )A+ "A[ (1 ))]

2 (0; 1) and
B+2q > "(+e)

, (2.24) describes a transition path along which the economy
converges towards a unique long run equilibrium at the positive steady state
level of capital k where kt+1 = kt = k:
k =
B + 2q   "(+e)

1  f2(1  )A + "A[ (1 ))]

g
(2.25)
In our subsequent general equilibrium analyses, we will focus on two cases:
one in which all bureaucrats are honest ( = 0); and another one in which
all bureaucrats are corrupt ( = 1).
Corruption and Economic Development
By substituting  = 0 and  = 1 separately into (2.25), we derive the steady
state level of capital in an economy where all bureaucrats are honest and
where all bureaucrats are corrupt respectively as follows:
knc =
B + 2q   "

1  f2(1  )A + "A[ (1 ))]

g
(2.26)
kwc =
B + 2q   "(+e)

1  f2(1  )A + "A[ (1 ))]

g
(2.27)
We can appreciate the impact of corruption on the steady state level of capital
by comparing (2.26) and (2.27). Notice the presence of embezzlement, e, in
the numerator in (2.27) preceded by a minus sign. Consequently knc > k

wc
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applies throughout our analysis. This result is consistent with substantial
evidence showing that corruption lowers economic development.
Thus, we have established the second relationship between corruption and
economic development in our model where corruption lowers economic de-
velopment by reducing the public funds available to reduce pollution. Taken
together with our result in (2.14), we have established a two-way causal re-
lationship between corruption and development; the level of corruption both
inuences and is inuenced by the level of capital accumulation.
Pollution and Economic Development
We will now analyse how pollution a¤ects development in this economy. In
our model, pollution reduces economic development by reducing the health
of the unskilled households and consequently, their wages. Lower wages
translate into lower savings in the economy and as a result, lower capital
accumulation and economic development. We can see the e¤ect of pollution
on economic development through the e¤ect of parameters  and "

on the
steady state level of capital, k. From (2.25), it is clear that the higher the
resulting pollution from each unit of capital (that is, higher ), the lower is
the steady state level capital. As the e¤ect of "

on k from equation (2.25)
is not so obvious at rst glance, we take the derivative of (2.25) with respect
to "

. From this exercise, we nd:
@k
@

"

 =  (B + 2q)A[   (1  ))] + ( + e) [1  2(1  )A]h
1  2(1  )A   "A[ (1 ))]

i2  0:
(2.28)
Notice that the terms in square brackets in the numerator of expression
(2.28) are always positive, given the parameter restrictions we impose to nd
a unique steady state.
In conclusion, the greater the pollution emission rate per unit of capital
(that is, higher ) and the greater the impact of pollution on the health of
unskilled households (that is, higher "

), the lower is the steady state level
of capital, k; in the economy. Thus, we have now established the second
relationship between pollution and economic development. Taken together
with our result in (2.18), we have established a two-way causal relationship
between pollution and development; the level of pollution both inuences
and is inuenced by the level of capital accumulation.
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Pollution, Corruption and Economic Development
We are now ready to analyse the links between pollution, corruption and
development in a dynamic general equilibrium framework; taking into ac-
count the two-way relationships between pollution and development as well
as between corruption and development.
Corruption a¤ects pollution directly by reducing the resources available
for pollution abatement and indirectly through its e¤ect on economic de-
velopment. From (2.17), we can see that the direct e¤ect of corruption on
pollution is clearly positive; higher corruption (higher e) increases pollu-
tion at every capital level. This can be illustrated by an upward shift of the
EKC. Moreover, this direct e¤ect increases as capital increases. Comparing
(2.20) and (2.21), it is also clear that with corruption, the turning point of
the EKC will occur at a higher capital level. This is consistent with the
empirical ndings of Leitão (2010) and the theoretical ndings of López and
and Mitra (2000).
The indirect e¤ect of corruption on pollution is however not as straightfor-
ward due to the inverse U-shaped relationship between pollution and capital.
Specically, the indirect e¤ect of corruption on pollution depends on the level
of capital in the economy. If kt < kP ; the indirect e¤ect of corruption on pol-
lution is negative. The total e¤ect of corruption on pollution will therefore
be determined by the relative magnitude of the direct and indirect e¤ects of
corruption on pollution. If the direct e¤ect is greater than the indirect e¤ect,
the total e¤ect of corruption on pollution is positive; otherwise, it will be
negative. If however kt > kP , the indirect e¤ect of corruption on pollution
is positive. Hence, the direct and indirect e¤ects of corruption on pollu-
tion reinforce each other, resulting in an unambiguous positive total e¤ect of
corruption on pollution.
All these possibilities will be clearly illustrated in our diagrams that will
follow shortly. We will use these diagrams to analyse the economys transition
from the initial capital to the steady state; we will then compare the level of
the steady state pollution with corruption and with no corruption. As the
location of the steady state level of capital in relation to the capital level
at the turning point of the EKC are important to our analysis, we will rst
nd the thresholds that will determine their location on the diagram. From
(2.21) and (2.27), we nd that kwc < kPwc if:
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" > f(B + 2q)2A
[   (1  ))]
 + e
  1 + 2(1  )Ag

A[   (1  ))]  "wc (2.29)
Similarly, from (2.20) and (2.26), we nd that knc < kPnc if:
" > f(B + 2q)2A
[   (1  ))]

  1 + 2(1  )Ag

A[   (1  ))]  "nc (2.30)
Comparing (2.29) and (2.30), we can see that "nc > "wc given that, e, is in
(2.29) in the denominator.
After obtaining these thresholds, we will now illustrate the interdepen-
dencies between pollution, corruption and economic development in three
possible cases.
Case 1 Figure 2.1 illustrates Case 1 where " > "nc > "wc such that kwc <
knc < kPnc < kPwc, that is, all steady state equilibria occur below the turning
point of the EKCs. This case is more likely to happen the bigger " and  are,
and the smaller  is, ceteris paribus.
There are three capital accumulation paths and three steady state equi-
libria in Figure 2.1. The rst one is the capital accumulation path with no
corruption denoted by nc() in which the steady state capital is given by
knc. The second and the third ones are the capital accumulation paths with
corruption, di¤erentiated by the severity of corruption. The severity of cor-
ruption in our model may come from the probability of avoiding detection, p.
The high probability of avoiding detection is associated with high corruption
and low probability of avoiding detection is associated with low corruption.
It can also come from the cost of engaging in corruption represented by the
convex cost function, cet (c > 0;  > 1). The lower the cost of engaging in
corruption, the higher is the optimal embezzled amount. The capital accu-
mulation path with low corruption is denoted by lc() in which the steady
state capital is given by klc. The capital accumulation path with high cor-
ruption is denoted by hc() in which the steady state capital is given by
khc. As Figure 2.1 shows, higher corruption is associated with lower capital
accumulation path and consequently, lower steady state capital.
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Figure 2.1: Case 1
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Next, there are two EKCs in Figure 2.1: one is the EKC with no corrup-
tion, denoted by nc(), the other one is the EKC with corruption, denoted by
wc(). Due to corruption, the EKC shifts upwards (downwards in the gure)
with its turning point occurring at the higher capital level. The direct e¤ect
of corruption on pollution is higher pollution at every capital level shown
by the vertical distance between the two EKCs; corruption directly increases
pollution. The indirect e¤ect of corruption on pollution is negative when
k < kP ; corruption reduces the steady state level of capital which in turn
reduces pollution. The total e¤ect of corruption on pollution therefore de-
pends on whether the direct e¤ect is greater than the indirect e¤ect. Higher
corruption results in a lower steady state capital and consequently, a greater
indirect e¤ect of corruption on pollution.
We will start our analysis with the high corruption state and therefore
the economy is on the lowest capital accumulation path hc(). Suppose
the economy starts with initial capital, k0; and the corresponding pollution,
P0. Which steady state the economy ends up with, that is, either khc or
knc; depends on where the critical level of capital above which corruption
disappears, kC ; is located. If k0 < kC < khc, as capital accumulates and
reaches kC , the corrupt incentive for bureaucrats disappears. This will push
the economy to move to the capital accumulation path with no corruption,
nc() and the corresponding EKC, nc(). Consequently, the economy will
converge to the steady state equilibrium with no corruption, knc. In this
steady state, the pollution level is given by P nc. This chain of event describes
the transition from the high-corruption regime to the no-corruption regime.
Nonetheless, this outcome is not guaranteed in our model. For instance,
if k0 < khc < kC , the economy is locked forever on the high corruption
accumulation path, hc(), and destined for the high corruption steady state
capital, khc. The economy is also locked forever on the EKC with corruption
and destined for the high corruption steady state pollution, P hc:
Figure 2.1 shows that P nc > P

hc; the steady state pollution with no cor-
ruption is higher than the one with high corruption. Eliminating corruption
in this scenario results in higher development and higher pollution. In par-
ticular, the positive direct e¤ect of corruption on pollution is smaller than
its negative indirect e¤ect; corruption thus has a total negative e¤ect on
pollution.
Next, suppose the economy has low corruption and therefore is on the
low corruption capital accumulation path lc(). Suppose the economy also
starts with initial capital, k0; and the corresponding pollution, P0. The chain
of event in this economy as development takes place is similar to that in the
economy with high corruption. If k0 < kC < klc, the economy will end up
with the no corruption steady state capital, knc; and the corresponding steady
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state pollution, P nc: If, however, k0 < k

lc < k
C , the economy is destined for
the low corruption steady state capital, klc; and the corresponding steady
state pollution, P lc.
Figure 2.1 also shows that P nc < P

lc; steady state pollution with no
corruption is lower than the steady state pollution with low corruption. Thus,
eliminating corruption in this scenario results in higher development and
lower pollution. In particular, the positive direct e¤ect of corruption on
pollution is greater than its negative indirect e¤ect; corruption thus has a
positive total e¤ect on pollution.
Based on the above analysis, we conclude that when pollution emission
rate per unit of capital is higher (indicated by bigger ) and the negative
e¤ect of pollution on health is bigger (indicated by bigger " and smaller )
resulting in level of development below the level at the turning point of EKC
with or without corruption, the benet of eliminating corruption on reducing
pollution is greater when corruption is low as compared with when corruption
is high.
Case 2 Figure 2.2 illustrates Case 2 where "nc > " > "wc such that
kwc < kPnc < kPwc < k

nc: This case is similar to Case 1 except that k

nc > k
P
nc.
That is, while the two steady states with corruption occur below the turning
point of the corresponding EKC; the steady state with no corruption occurs
above the turning point of the relevant EKC. This case is more likely to
happen the smaller " and  are and the bigger  is compared to those in
Case 1, ceteris paribus.
The analysis bears resemblance to that in Case 1 and it also leads to
the same conclusion. However, if the economy escapes the poverty trap and
jumps to the higher capital accumulation path with no corruption, nc(), it
will take longer for the economy to reach the steady state with no corruption
in comparison with Case 1. As a result, in the short run, the pollution level
will be higher compared to that in Case 1. In fact, the economy has to
go through the turning point of the EKC with no corruption, nc(); and
therefore experience maximum pollution level, before it settles at the steady
state with no corruption. At this point, the economy will have lower pollution
and higher development. As in Case 1, we conclude that the benet of
eliminating corruption in reducing pollution is greater when corruption is
low than when corruption is high.
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Figure 2.2: Case 2
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Figure 2.3: Case 3
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Case 3 Figure 2.3 illustrates Case 3, the scenario where "nc > "wc > " such
that kPnc < kPwc < k

wc < k

nc, that is, all steady state equilibria occur after
the turning point of the corresponding EKCs. This case is more likely to
happen the smaller " and  are and the bigger  is, ceteris paribus, compared
to those in Cases 1 and 2.
There are two capital accumulation paths and two steady state equilibria
in Figure 2.3. The rst one is the capital accumulation path with no cor-
ruption denoted by nc() in which the steady state capital in equilibrium is
given by knc. The second one is the capital accumulation path with corrup-
tion denoted by wc() in which the steady state capital is given by kwc. We
do not di¤erentiate between low corruption equilibrium and high corruption
equilibrium as the impact of corruption on pollution is the same in both
scenarios.
There are also two EKCs associated with the path with no corruption
and with corruption, denoted by nc() and wc() respectively. As in the two
previous cases, the direct e¤ect of corruption on pollution is always positive;
corruption increases pollution at every capital level. The indirect e¤ect of
corruption on pollution is positive when k > kP ; corruption reduces the
steady state level of capital which in turn increases pollution. The indirect
e¤ect thus reinforces the direct e¤ect, resulting in an unambiguous positive
total e¤ect of corruption on pollution.
Similar to the previous two cases, which steady state the economy ends
up with, that is, either kwc or k

nc; depends on where kC is located. If
k0 < kC < k

wc, as capital accumulates and reaches kC , the economy will
move to the higher capital accumulation path with no corruption, nc()
with the corresponding EKC, nc(). As such, the economy will converge
to the steady state with no corruption with the corresponding steady state
capital, knc. At this steady state, the corresponding pollution is P

nc. This
chain of event describes the transition from the corruption regime to the
no corruption regime. Nonetheless, this outcome is not guaranteed in our
model. For instance, if k0 < kwc < kC , the economy is locked forever on the
capital accumulation path with corruption, wc(), and destined for the cor-
responding steady state capital, kwc. The economy is also locked forever on
the EKC with corruption, wc(); and destined for the corresponding steady
state pollution, P wc:
Figure 2.3 also shows that P nc < P

wc; the steady state pollution with
no corruption is lower than the one with corruption. Thus, eliminating cor-
ruption in this case unambiguously results in higher development and lower
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pollution. Based on the above analysis, we conclude that when pollution
emission rate per unit of capital is lower (indicated by smaller ) and the
negative e¤ect of pollution on health is smaller (indicated by smaller " and
bigger ) resulting in level of development above the level at the turning
point of the EKC with or without corruption, eliminating corruption unam-
biguously results in lower pollution.
2.3 Conclusion
We have presented an analysis of the impact of corruption on pollution in
a dynamic general equilibrium framework. We have taken into account the
inter-relationship between pollution, corruption and economic development
in an environment where both pollution and corruption have a two-way rela-
tionship with development. The relationship between economic development
and pollution is represented by an inverse U-shaped EKC. Before the turn-
ing point of the EKC, increasing development also increases pollution, while
after the turning point, increasing development reduces pollution. Equally
important, pollution reduces development by way of reducing health and
productivity of workers. Moreover, the negative health impact of pollution
is greater for the poor than it is for the rich. Hence, by reducing health
and productivity, pollution not only reduces development but also fosters in-
equality. Furthermore, the relationship between corruption and development
is also related to the link between pollution and development. Specically,
corruption reduces development by reducing public funds aimed at reducing
pollution. In addition, higher development reduces corruption by lowering
bureaucratsincentives to be corrupt. We conclude that pollution, corruption
and economic development are inter-connected. A complete investigation of
the impact of corruption on pollution cannot be done without considering
the feedback interactions between these three variables.
Our analysis also reveals that the feasibility of transition between devel-
opment regimes determines the overall evolution of the economy (that is, the
process of transition from the low development regime to the high develop-
ment regime). Depending on certain conditions, this transition may or may
not be accomplished, such that the economy may end up in a bad equilibrium
with low capital accumulation and high levels of corruption. This illustrates
how poor quality governance may cause a type of institutionalpoverty trap.
Our model generates multiple (history-dependent) equilibria. The economy
may end up in a particular equilibrium (high or low) depending on the initial
level of capital stock.
Due to the complex relationship between pollution and development, the
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total impact of corruption on pollution may not be determined in a straight-
forward manner. The total e¤ect of corruption on pollution is the sum of its
direct and indirect e¤ect on pollution. Corruption has a clear positive direct
e¤ect on pollution. It increases pollution directly by decreasing the strict-
ness and/or lowering the e¤ectiveness of the environmental regulation. Also,
corruption a¤ects pollution indirectly through its negative e¤ect on devel-
opment. Moreover, whether corruption has a positive or a negative indirect
e¤ect on pollution depends on where the economy is located on its EKC.
If the economys income is above the income level at the turning point of
its EKC, the indirect e¤ect of corruption on pollution is always positive. In
such a case, the positive indirect e¤ect of corruption on pollution reinforces
its positive direct e¤ect resulting in an unambiguous positive total e¤ect.
On the other hand, if the economys income is below the income level at
the turning point of its EKC, the indirect e¤ect of corruption on pollution is
negative. In such a case, the total e¤ect of corruption on pollution depends
on whether its positive direct e¤ect is greater or smaller than its negative
indirect e¤ect. The higher the corruption and the less developed the econ-
omy, the greater is the negative indirect e¤ect of corruption on pollution.
Thus, the negative indirect e¤ect of corruption on pollution is more likely to
dominate its positive direct e¤ect when corruption is higher.
Next, we have shown through our analysis that the impact of eliminating
corruption in reducing pollution is greater when the economys income is
above the income level at the turning point of the EKC. Correspondingly, our
results reveal that the benet of eliminating corruption on reducing pollution
is greater when the economy is located in a steady state above the capital
level at the turning point of the EKC (with or without corruption).13 As
pollution reduces development, this case is more likely when each capital
emits lower pollution and when pollution has lower negative health impact,
ceteris paribus, resulting in higher development. On the other hand, if the
economys income is below the income level at the turning point of the EKC,
eliminating corruption is more benecial for environment when corruption is
less severe. In fact, when the economys income is below the income level at
the turning point of the EKC, eliminating corruption may result in higher
pollution. This is more likely when corruption is more severe. However,
this does not imply that poor economies should not eliminate corruption to
preserve or improve their environmental quality.
Corruption is harmful for economic development and the poor countries
are those that tend to derive the most benet from higher development in
13As income in our model is positively and linearly related to capital, the relationship
between pollution and capital applies to the relationship between pollution and income.
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the form of a higher standard of living and poverty alleviation. Therefore,
e¤orts to reduce corruption have to be done simultaneously with e¤orts to
reduce pollution. This is particularly important for low income countries
where reducing corruption may result in higher pollution. The result of
e¤ective implementation of such policy combination is lower corruption, lower
pollution, poverty alleviation and higher development. Equally important,
as pollution a¤ects the health of the poor more, such policy combination
is also likely to lower income inequality. This is because when there is an
important interaction between income and health, health distribution will
determine income distribution (Deaton, 2003).
Taking into account all of the above, we also propose that policy to im-
prove environmental quality should not be substituted with policy to foster
economic development. Our model has shown that government policies and
institutions hold an important role in reducing pollution by taking the active
role in abating pollution through collecting taxes. Pollution may be higher
if the government does nothing in reducing pollution. In addition, the gov-
ernment initiative to abate pollution should also include initiative to reduce
emission per unit of capital. For example, the government could fund more
research and development to develop cleaner technology. Equally important,
the government should aim not only to reduce pollution but also to reduce
the negative health impact of pollution. This could be achieved, for example,
by delivering more public information on how to reduce exposure to pollu-
tion. Another example would be developing public infrastructure that will
help reduce exposure to pollution and increase access to health care. Given
much evidence that the poor tend to be more exposed to pollution and also
more susceptible to the negative health e¤ect of pollution, the government
should also target some of these policy initiatives towards the poor.
We are aware that there are other studies that do not nd an inverse U-
shaped relationship between income and pollution. For instance, Torras and
Boyce (1998) nd evidence of an N-shaped relationship between income and
pollution; at the higher income level, pollution may rise again after previously
falling. Moreover, in his study of the e¤ect of corruption on pollution, Welsch
(2004) also nds a negative relationship between some indicators of pollution
and income. He also points out that the e¤ect of corruption on pollution is a
consequence of the shape of the relationship between income and pollution.
Notwithstanding such evidence, our inclusion of the EKC in our analysis
yields results that can be applied to both positive and negative relationships
between income and pollution. Hence, our model can be used to explain the
existing empirical evidence of the e¤ect of corruption on pollution (e.g., Cole,
2007; Leitão, 2010; Morse, 2006; Welsch, 2004).
In particular, our model can explain the empirical evidence found by Cole
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(2007) closely as the pollutants he studies have inverse U-shaped relation-
ships with income. However, while we nd the direct e¤ect of corruption
in pollution that increases with income in our model; Cole (2007) nds the
direct e¤ect of corruption on pollution which does not vary with income.
Nevertheless, we yield similar results and conclusions as in Cole (2007). As
research on this topic is still relatively new, more research should be con-
ducted in order to derive more robust conclusions regarding the relationships
between the direct e¤ect and the indirect e¤ect of corruption on pollution
with development.
In addition, our model has excluded the analysis of the optimum govern-
ment policy concerning the environmental quality. There are many existing
theoretical models which have done such analysis (e.g., Bovenberg and Sjak,
1995; Stokey, 1998; Smulders and Gradus, 1996; Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen,
1993; Ligthart and van der Ploeg, 1994; Williams III, 2003; Mohtadi, 1996).
Nor have we included the role of individualschoices in maintaining environ-
mental quality; such analysis has been demonstrated by John and Pecchenino
(1994) and Jones and Manuelli (2001) in their theoretical papers. Our analy-
sis has a broader range than these models as we aim to demonstrate the links
between pollution, corruption and development in a single unied dynamic
general equilibrium model. For this reason, we have simply adopted an ex-
ogenous tax rate imposed by the government to fund pollution abatement
in order to preserve the clarity, the simplicity and the focus of our analy-
sis. For readers who are interested in more specic analysis of the role of
environmental regulation and/or the role of individualschoices in maintain-
ing environmental quality, we strongly suggest referring to the papers listed
above.
Finally, there is still plenty of scope for further research both empirically
and theoretically on the e¤ect of corruption on pollution. This is especially
so considering the importance of such research and the fact that research
on this topic is only relatively recent. Such research also needs to broaden
its range by including the two-way feedback between pollution and develop-
ment as well as environmental inequality. This is important because we need
economic models that represent the complex reality, from which important
policy implications that benet the whole society can be derived. Thus, the
promise of further research on this topic is to design more e¤ective policies
to reduce both corruption and inequality; to alleviate poverty; and to foster
both economic development and environmental quality. Such policies may
lead the economy to a sustainable development where the economy is in a
virtuous cycle of better environment, lower corruption, lower poverty, higher
equality and higher economic development.
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Chapter 3
Investigating the Causal E¤ect
of Womens Share in
Parliament on Corruption: A
Panel Study
Abstract
Many studies have found evidence of a negative correlation between
womens share in parliament and corruption. The evidence relies heav-
ily on single period, cross-country studies which are vulnerable to bi-
ases arising from unobserved heterogeneity, reverse causality and other
sources of the endogeneity of womens share in parliament. To cor-
rect for these biases, we exploit panel data covering 133 countries for
the period 1984 to 2013. We instrument the share of women in par-
liament using gender quotas in the form of party quotas, legislative
quotas and reserved seats quotas. We investigate the validity of our
instruments, the robustness of the results and the extent of regional
heterogeneity. Our main ndings can be summarised as followed: (i)
we nd no statistically and quantitatively signicant e¤ect of womens
share in parliament on corruption in our full sample; (ii) we only nd
a statistically and quantitately signicant negative e¤ect of womens
share in parliament on corruption in the single case of Africa, using
reserved seats quotas as our instrument.
3.1 Introduction
There have been many studies nding a negative relationship between female
participation in government and corruption (e.g., Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy
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et al., 2001; Michailova and Melnykovska, 2009; Treisman, 2007; Samimi
and Hosseinmardi, 2011; Wängnerud, 2010; Jha and Sarangi, 2015; Esarey
and Chirillo, 2013). Most of these studies are single period cross-country
studies relying on pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) regressions. As such,
they are likely to su¤er from biases resulting from unobserved heterogeneity,
reverse causality and other sources of the endogeneity of womens share in
parliament. In particular, womens share in parliament variable is likely
to be endogenous as it is likely to be correlated with unobserved variables
relating to corruption. Due to these potential biases, we caution against
the direct causal interpretation of studies of womens share in politics and
corruption. The aim of this chapter is to investigate this causal e¤ect by: (i)
exploiting panel data from 133 countries for the period 1984 to 2013 using
xed e¤ects (FE) models; and (ii) instrumenting womens share in parliament
using quotas in the form of party quotas, legislative quotas and reserved seats
quotas in two stage least squares (TSLS) regressions. Panel data allow us to
control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries and across time. Using
instruments for womens share in parliament further allows us to isolate the
exogenous variation in the womens share in parliament variable. In addition
to analysing our full sample, we also conduct regional analysis to investigate
regional heterogeneity.
In order to derive a valid causal inference from the TSLS regressions,
the instruments must be both relevant and exogenous. In our study, gender
quotas are relevant instruments if they have a statistically signicant positive
e¤ect on womens share in parliament. Moreover, they are exogenous if they
have no e¤ect on corruption other than through their impact on womens
share in parliament. We will show through our tests for valid instruments
that gender quotas are both relevant and plausibly exogenous. Hence, the
use of quotas as instruments in our study is justied.
Our main ndings can be summarised as follows. First, we nd a statis-
tically and quantitatively signicant negative correlation between womens
share in parliament and corruption when we use POLS. This result is consis-
tent with the ndings of previous comparable studies using the same method.
However, when country xed e¤ects and country-specic time trends are in-
cluded in our full sample OLS regressions, womens share in parliament loses
its statistical and quantitative signicance. Nevertheless, our regional OLS
regressions suggest that increasing womens share in parliament may result
in lower corruption in Asia and Africa. Second, our full sample TSLS re-
gressions suggest that increasing womens share in parliament may not a¤ect
corruption signicantly. Our regional TSLS regressions using di¤erent types
of quotas as instruments yield a negative e¤ect of womens share in parlia-
ment on corruption only in Africa, similar to the OLS results for Africa.
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Although the TSLS coe¢ cients of womens share in parliament in Africa are
not statistically signicant, they are quantitatively signicant. This result
leads us to focus our regional analysis on Africa, using reserved seats quo-
tas as instruments as they are the most e¤ective type of quotas in Africa.
Consequently, we nd a statistically and quantitatively signicant negative
e¤ect of womens share in parliament on corruption in Africa. We nd no
such conclusive ndings for other regions. Notably, Africa is the most cor-
rupt, the least democratic and the least developed region with the fewest
economic and social rights for women. Furthermore, reserved seats quotas
are mostly adopted in Africa.
This chapter will be organised as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe
our data and measures. We provide our OLS methodology and results in
Section 3.3. Our TSLS methodology, results and robustness checks follow in
Section 3.4. We conclude in Section 3.5. In the remainder of this introductory
section, we summarise the di¤erent literatures on which we draw to give the
context and motivation for our analysis.
3.1.1 The Link betweenWomens Share in Politics and
Corruption
There exists a substantial volume of evidence showing that a higher female
share in government is linked to lower corruption. The rst cross-country
studies revealing such evidence were conducted by Dollar et al. (2001) and
Swamy et al. (2001). The study by Dollar et al. (2001) covers more than 100
countries; while the study by Swamy et al. (2001) covers more than 90 coun-
tries. Both studies nd that increasing womens share in parliament is associ-
ated with lower corruption; this correlation is statistically and quantitatively
signicant. Equally important, Swamy et al. (2001) nd that increasing the
share of women in top ministerial/bureaucratic positions (that is, inuential
women) is also associated with lower corruption. The statistical and quan-
titative signicance of the share of these inuential women is similar to that
of the share of women in parliament. If interpreted causally, the results from
these studies imply that policy which increases female proportion in politics
may lead to better governance.
Despite much supporting evidence, these ndings have been subject to
some critiques. For example, Sung (2003) criticises Dollar et al. (2001) and
Swamy et al. (2001) on the basis that the correlations between womens
share in parliament and corruption found in their studies are likely to be
spurious. Based on his analysis of 99 countries and territories, Sung (2003)
shows that there is no statistically signicant relationship between female
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share in government and corruption when measures of liberal democracy are
controlled for. Hence, he argues that both female share in government and
corruption are associated with liberal democracy. However, some studies
have challenged this liberal democracy argument. For instance, Treisman
(2007) nds a quite robust negative correlation between female participation
in politics and corruption after controlling for measures of liberal democracy.
An analysis of transition countries by Michailova and Melnykovska (2009)
also reveals that whether or not their ndings support the fairer system
thesis by Sung (2003) depends largely on which corruption index is used.
Furthermore, Michailova andMelnykovska (2009) also nd evidence show-
ing a statistically signicant negative correlation between female share in the
government and corruption. A study of 25 developing countries during the
period 2000 to 2008 by Samimi and Hosseinmardi (2011) and a case study
of Mexico as of 2005 by Wängnerud (2010) also generate similar ndings.
Based on data from national survey in Mexico, Wängnerud (2010) nds that
states with more women elected tend to display lower corruption than the
states with fewer women elected. This result at the sub-national level also
challenges the liberal democracy argument proposed by Sung.
More recent support for the negative correlation between womens share in
parliament and corruption is also provided by Jha and Sarangi (2015). Their
cross-country OLS ndings are consistent with those of Dollar et al. (2001)
and Swamy et al. (2001). Additionally, they conduct another analysis using
Instrumental Variable (IV) approach to address the endogeneity of womens
share in parliament variable and to establish causality. Specically, they use
two instruments for womens share in parliament: the year when su¤rage was
granted to women and years since transition to agriculture. Their IV nd-
ings also reveal a highly statistically and quantitatively signicant negative
correlation between womens share in parliament and corruption. Moreover,
their IV coe¢ cients of womens share in parliament are always greater than
their OLS coe¢ cients in absolute terms. Thus, they claim that the OLS co-
e¢ cients are biased upwards. In addition, they investigate whether women
behave as corruptly as men as they gain more equal status by controlling
for the Gender Inequality Index from the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme as a measure of status di¤erences across gender. They nd that as
women achieve more equal status, increasing womens share in parliament
still lowers corruption. As a result, they suggest that gender di¤erences in
status does not drive the correlation between womens share in parliament
and corruption.
Nevertheless, there exist a few studies which do not support the ndings
of Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001). For instance, Vijayalak-
shmi (2008) studies a local government in India and nds no statistically
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signicant relationship between female proportion in the government and
corruption. Also, based on an analysis of a sample of developing countries,
Branisa and Ziegler (2011) nd that there is higher corruption in societies
that limit womens freedom from participating in social life, after control-
ling for democracy and female representation in parliament and in business.
Therefore, policy to reduce corruption may need more than democratic re-
forms and increasing female representation in political and economic life.
However, this nding is contradicted by a recent cross-country study cov-
ering 157 countries from 1998 to 2007. Esarey and Chirillo (2013) report
evidence of an interaction between democracy and female participation in
the government in relation to corruption. Specically, they nd that the
negative e¤ect of female participation in the government on corruption is
greater in democratic states than in autocratic states.
Taking into account the weight of evidence to date, there appears to be a
considerable support for the proposition that increasing female participation
in the government reduces corruption. In relation to this, there are many
studies conducted in the attempt to explain why women are less corrupt than
men. These explanations include gender di¤erences in: (i) moral attitudes
towards/perceptions of corruption (Swamy et al., 2001; Torgler and Valev,
2010; Michailova and Melnykovska, 2009; Rivas, 2013); (ii) access to corrupt
opportunities/networks (Gërxhani, 2007; Alhassan-Alolo, 2007; Goetz, 2007;
Esarey and Chirillo, 2013); (iii) risk aversion (Schulze and Frank, 2003; Ar-
mantier and Boly, 2010); ( iv) resistance towards corruption (Lambsdor¤and
Frank, 2011); (v) corrupt incentives (Wängnerud, 2010). Other explanations
rely more on the institutional context. For instance, Mukherjee and Gokcekus
(2004) suggest that gender equality in organisations seems to minimise cor-
ruption. Furthermore, Esarey and Chirillo (2013) maintain that women are
less corrupt than men in democratic institutions than in autocratic institu-
tions. Similarly, Alatas et al. (2009) and Michailova and Melnykovska (2009)
suggest that gender di¤erences in corrupt behaviour are culture specic.
In the rst chapter of this thesis, we also construct a theoretical model
o¤ering an alternative explanation combining the institutional context and
corrupt incentives. A substantial amount of evidence from many di¤erent
countries has shown that women are less wage discriminated against in the
public sector than in the private sector (see Chapter 1 for a list of evidence).
As the private sector serves as an outside option for a corrupt bureaucrat
who gets caught and dismissed, female bureaucrats have lower outside option
values and hence lower corrupt incentives than male bureaucrats. For more
details on our theory and a more comprehensive literature review on the link
between gender and corruption, refer to Chapter 1.
To sum up, the existing evidence to date strongly suggests that increasing
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female participation in the government reduces corruption. However, there
appears to be no single universal explanation for this nding. Furthermore,
there is limited evidence for a causal e¤ect of womens participation in politics
on corruption. The aim of this chapter is to exploit panel data and a di¤erent
instrumental variable for womens share in parliament, that is, quotas to
investigate this causal e¤ect.
3.1.2 The Adoption of Gender Quotas
Gender quotas aimed to increase female participation in politics were rst
introduced in the 1930s (Krook, 2009). Nevertheless, the widespread adop-
tion of quotas has only occurred since the 1990s. Between the 1930s and the
1980s, there were only about 20 countries which had adopted quotas (Krook,
2009). Currently, there are more than 100 countries that have adopted this
type of measure (Quota Project, 2015). The majority of these countries has
adopted quotas since the 1990s; the same decade when the United Nations
Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing (1995). The result-
ing Platform for Action agreed upon at this Conference has been seen to be
an important inuence on the introduction of gender quota in politics around
the world (Dahlerup, 2006a). From 1995 to 2013, the global average share
of women in parliament has been steadily increasing and almost doubled
from 11.3% to 21.8%; this increasing trend has been consistently attributed
to the implementation of gender quotas (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2013).
Moreover, Tripp and Kang (2008) report that in the former Soviet republics,
the elimination of quotas explains the sharp decrease in the average percent-
age of women in legislatures from 50% in 1985 to 11% in 2000. All in all,
quotas appear to be a signicant mechanism for increasing womens political
representation.
Quotas can be categorised into three basic types according to their at-
tempt to reform the candidate selection dynamics (Krook, 2009, 2013). The
rst type is reserved seats quotas which require a minimum number of female
legislators to be elected; they attempt to reform the electoral system. The
second type is party quotas which are voluntarily adopted by political par-
ties; they attempt to reform the practices of political parties. Party quotas
can be further divided into aspirant quotas which establish the nomination
of women in the pre-selection processes; and candidate quotas which require
a certain proportion of women in the nal candidate lists (Matland, 2006).
The third type is legislative quotas which are passed by the national parlia-
ments and require all parties to nominate a particular proportion of women
as candidates; they attempt to reform the norms of equality and representa-
tion. Therefore, depending on which type of reform that the countries wish
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to achieve in terms of the dynamics of candidate selection, countries may
di¤er in terms of the kinds of quotas they adopt.
Countries that adopt quotas also have diverse cultural, economic, so-
cial and political spheres. Nevertheless, many countries adopted quota mea-
sures around the same time, that is, since the 1990s. In view of these facts,
Krook (2009) analyses quota adoption by identifying patterns among coun-
tries which have adopted quotas and producing a common framework. She
suggests the following four basic accounts, each of which could explain partly
the adoption of quotas around the world: (i) the womens movement inside
and outside political parties, (ii) political elites, (iii) norms of equality and
presentation and (iv) international organisations and transnational networks.
However, Krook (2009) also points out that there exists some evidence
which challenges each of these four accounts as follows respectively: (i) some
feminists oppose quotas by arguing that quotas are degrading women; (ii)
some political elites reject quotas because of their concerns about electoral
competition; (iii) some reformers in countries experiencing democratic tran-
sition reject quotas by arguing that quotas are anti-democratic; (iv) some
international organisations reject quotas in some countries where they view
quotas as being incompatible with best electoral practices. As such, not all
factors operate in the same way for all countries (Krook, 2009).
Nonetheless, there is some evidence supporting the view that quotas are a
global phenomenon and that quota campaigns around the world share some
important common attributes (Krook, 2009). For instance, a majority of
quota policies have been adopted since around 1995. In addition, di¤erent
timelines correspond to di¤erent popular types of quota adopted. Reserved
seats quotas were popular between the 1930s and the 1970s and then again
since 2000; party quotas were popular between the 1970s and the 1990s; leg-
islative quotas were popular since the 1990s. There is also evidence of cross-
country sharing judging from the popularity of 30% quota policies around the
world; a percentage which most international documents regarding womens
representation recommend (Childs and Krook, 2006).
Countries that introduce quotas may also share some elements of their
political contexts (Krook, 2009). For instance, some countries which approve
quotas are post-conict countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq (Ballington
and Dahlerup, 2006) and/or countries experiencing democratic transition like
Latin American countries (Araujo and Garcia, 2006). There is also evidence
of womens collective action in Latin American countries such as the net-
work for parliamentary women, Parlatino, which played an important role
in discussion on quotas before and after the Beijing Conference (Araujo and
Garcia, 2006).
In addition, there are some region-specic experiences relating to quota
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adoption. Countries in the same region are more likely to adopt the same
type of quotas. Reserved seats quotas are more prevalent in Africa, Asia
and the Middle East; party quotas are more prevalent in Europe; legislative
quotas are more prevalent in Africa, Latin America and various parts of Eu-
rope. Furthermore, the Nordic countries (that is, Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway and Sweden) represent a special case for gender quotas. The Nordic
countries only have voluntary party quotas and these quotas were adopted
when there was already a high representation of women in politics, i.e, be-
tween 20 to 30 %; thus, these countries represent the incremental model of
increasing womens representation in politics (Fredidenwall et al., 2006). In
these countries, the introduction of quotas was inuenced by a large minor-
ity of women who had already gained inuential position inside the political
parties (Dahlerup, 1988). Although not all women politicians wished to be
connected with womens sections inside the political parties, these womens
sections have actively hired female candidates (Fredidenwall et al., 2006).
In relation to this, Caul (2001) also nds evidence that the presence of
women among the partys leadership is a signicant inuence for the adoption
of party quotas. Having higher number of women in the decision-making
positions appears to increase the likelihood of party quota adoption. Caul
(2001) also nds that the earlier the rst quota is adopted by a political
party in the system, the higher the likelihood that the other rival parties
will follow. Another signicant inuence on party quota adoption is a leftist
ideology (Caul, 2001). These ndings are consistent with the "contagion
theory" of Matland and Studlar (1996) which suggests that the adoption of
policies by one party in a multiparty system (usually a smaller party from
the left) inuences the rival parties to follow the same policies.
3.1.3 The Impact of Gender Quotas
Womens Share in Politics
There is mixed evidence concerning the impact of gender quotas on the nu-
merical representation of women in politics. However, on the whole, the
empirical evidence generally supports the view that gender quotas are e¤ec-
tive in increasing womens share in politics. Moreover, studies which do not
nd signicant e¤ects of gender quotas on womens political representation
tend to rely on data from the earlier period; the period when there were fewer
countries adopting gender quotas.
For instance, a study using data from 73 countries by Kunovich and Pax-
ton (2005) reveals that national and party level quotas do not have signicant
e¤ects on the percentage of female legislators. However, this nding should
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be interpreted with caution as this study does not take into account the
variation of the quota designs and implementations (Kunovich and Paxton,
2005; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). Kunovich and Paxton (2005) maintain that
this exclusion is a result of the constraints of their data. They expect to nd
a positive impact of quotas on womens political representation if there is
more data available and these quota di¤erences are taken into account. Also,
this study uses data only from 1991 to 1996 resulting in the exclusion of the
adoption of quotas which happened subsequently (Tripp and Kang, 2008).
A study conducted by Reynolds (1999) based on data from 180 countries
as of 1998 also faces a similar critique. Not surprisingly, Reynolds (1999)
also nds that the average percentage of women legislators in countries with
quotas was only marginally higher than the worldwide average.
Furthermore, Kunovich and Paxton (2005) nd that legislative appoint-
ments (reserved seats), the percentage of women attending tertiary educa-
tion, the percentage of economically active women, the level of development
and the Proportional Representation (PR) Party-List electoral system also
do not a¤ect the percentage of female legislators signicantly. Interestingly,
liberal democracy has a statistically signicant negative relationship with the
percentage of women legislators. According to Kunovich and Paxton (2005),
this is because some non-democratic countries such as Cuba, North Korea
and Vietnam have a high proportion of female legislators due to a lack of
democracy. This lack of democracy enables women to be placed in political
positions without having to go through the competitive process common to
democratic insitutions. When the least democratic countries were removed
from their sample, the liberal democracy variable lost its statistical signi-
cance.
Another study using data from the earlier period, however, shows that
the adoption of party quotas results in an increase in the percentage of female
Members of Parliament (MPs) over time. This study is conducted by Caul
(2001), investigating 71 parties in 11 advanced industrial countries from 1975
to 1995. Specically, Caul (2001) nds that parties which did not adopt
quotas had a lower percentage of female MPs by the end of 1995 than parties
adopting quotas; although they started o¤with roughly the same percentage
in the 1970s. Equally important, Caul (2001) nds no statistically signicant
relationship between the percentage of women in national parliaments and
the likelihood of party quota adoption. This nding strongly suggests that
the direction of the causality is more likely to be from the adoption of quotas
to higher womens political representation rather than the other way around.
The fact that the sharp increase in womens legislative representation around
the world has occured following the upward jump in the number of countries
adopting quotas further supports this argument.
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Next, taking into account the di¤erent types of quotas adopted by di¤er-
ent countries, Tripp and Kang (2008) investigate the e¤ects of three di¤erent
types of quotas - reserved seats quotas, voluntary party quotas and compul-
sory party quotas - on womens political representation. Their analysis takes
into account womens representation as of 2006 in 153 countries. Based on
their analysis, Tripp and Kang (2008) report that only voluntary party quotas
and reserved seats quotas have statistically signicant positive correlations
with womens representation. In addition, reserved seats quotas have the
greatest impact on womens representation. Their analysis yields no statis-
tically signicant correlation between compulsory party quotas and womens
political representation.They explain this result by maintaining that com-
pulsory party quotas represent less commitment by the parties to increase
womens representation than the voluntary party quotas. However, their nd-
ing may be a result of excluding the design of quota laws such as quota size,
placement mandate and enforcement mechanism (Schwindt-Bayer, 2009).
In addition, Tripp and Kang (2008) nd that the PR-List electoral system
has a statistically signicant positive e¤ect on womens political representa-
tion; this e¤ect is however less quantitatively signicant than the e¤ect of
quotas. Democracy, on the other hand, does not have a statitistically sig-
nicant relationship with womens political representation; and years since
women could run for o¢ ce only has a statistically signicant relationship with
womens representation in established democracies (Tripp and Kang, 2008).
Tripp and Kang (2008) also nd a statistically signicant positive relation-
ship between the level of development and womens representation although
the e¤ect of quotas is more statistically and quantitatively signicant. Based
on their results, Tripp and Kang (2008) conclude that quotas have the most
explanatory power for the increase in womens political representation.
Another study conducted by Chen (2010) also supports Tripp and Kangs
(2008) nding. Chen di¤erentiates the types of quotas into voluntary party
quotas and legal quotas (including reserved seats quotas). Based on her
analysis of 103 countries between 1970 and 2006, Chen nds that only volun-
tary party quotas have a statistically signicant positive correlation with the
percentage of female legislators. On average, countries adopting voluntary
party quotas have a higher average proportion of female legislators by 4.18
percentage points than countries without voluntary party quotas. Although
legal quotas are not statistically signicant in explaining womens represen-
tation in politics, they appear to have a quantitatively signicant impact
on womens political representation. Countries adopting legal quotas have a
higher average percentage of female legislators by 2.3 percentage points.
Next, a recent study of Latin American countries during the period 1985
to 2009 yields results which contradict the ndings of Chen (2010) and Tripp
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and Kang (2008). In this study, Kotsadam and Nerman (2012) take into
account the size of legislative quotas. As a result, they report that legislative
quota size is statistically and quantitatively signicant in increasing womens
share in parliament. Specically, an increase of 1 percentage point in the
quota size results in an increase of 0.22 percentage points in womens share
in parliament. In addition, Kotsadam and Nerman (2012) nd that the e¤ect
of quotas is greater the longer the quotas have been adopted.
The inclusion of the quota size is also found in a study by Schwindt-Bayer
(2009) investigating the reasons why quotas are more e¤ective at increasing
womens representation in some countries than in others. Specically, she
focuses on three dimensions of quotas in 26 countries that have adopted
national candidate quota laws or constitutional provisions through the rst
half of 2007. The rst is the quota size which dictates the required womens
percentage of a political partys candidates; the second is the placement
mandate which requires female candidates to be put in winnable positions
on party ballots; the third is the strictness of the enforcement mechanism of
the quota laws.
Her analysis reveals that out of these three dimensions, only quota size
has a statistically signicant positive correlation with womens representa-
tion independent of the other two dimensions. Placement mandate and en-
forcement mechanism only have statistically signicant positive e¤ects on
womens representation when they interact with each other and with the
quota size. Moreover, the marginal e¤ect of quota size is bigger when the
quota law includes both placement mandate and strong enforcement mecha-
nism; that is, when the quota is strong. Specically, strong quotas yield an
increase of 0.92 percentage points with a 1% increase in size. Additionally,
Schwindt-Bayer (2009) nds that the level of development and the quota du-
ration have statistically signicant positive relationships with womens rep-
resentation. However, contradicting the nding of Tripp and Kang (2008),
Schwindt-Bayer (2009) nds no signicant relationships between electoral
rules (that is, closed-list PR and open-list PR) and womens representation.
All in all, based on the current available evidence, gender quotas (that
is, party quotas, legislative quotas and reserved seats quotas) seem to be
e¤ective in increasing the share of women in politics. Quotas also appear
to be more e¤ective the longer they have been implemented. Additionally,
the e¤ects of other variables such as democracy and electoral systems on
womens share in politics appear to be weaker. Thus, quotas appear to be a
relevant instrumental variable for womens share in politics.
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Corruption and Policy Outcomes
Despite nding positive e¤ects of legislative quotas on womens share in par-
liament in Latin American countries, Kotsadam and Nerman (2012) nd no
signicant e¤ects of legislative quotas on corruption, policy and political par-
ticipation. Moreover, they nd that the share of women in parliament who
are elected without quota measures is associated with more policies closer
to womens interest, higher womens political participation and lower cor-
ruption. This result seems to imply either these correlations are spurious;
or there are di¤erences between women elected through quotas and those
elected without quotas (Kotsadam and Nerman, 2012).
In general, there is mixed evidence concerning the e¤ects of womens
share in parliament on various policy outcomes. Some studies nd that while
higher share of women in politics may change the policy agendas, it may not
a¤ect policy outcomes (e.g., Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Devlin and Elgie,
2008). Chen (2010), however, nds evidence suggesting that womens share
in parliament a¤ects policy outcomes. As there has been very little research
done on this topic, more research is needed to derive more conclusive results.
3.2 Data and Measures
We use panel data covering 133 countries for the period 1984 to 2013. These
countries and the investigation period are chosen based on the availabil-
ity of data on the longest corruption index available, the share of women
in parliament and the quota adoption. We exclude countries that cease to
exist during our investigation period such as the USSR, Serbia and Montene-
gro, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and West Germany. We further exclude
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates because women were al-
lowed to run for election and/or be appointed in these countries only after
1984. An increase in womens political representation in these countries dur-
ing our investigation period could be related to the change in election law
which initiated womens inclusion in politics, in addition to quotas (if any).
Therefore, we exclude these countries to minimise the noise relating to the
e¤ect of quotas on womens political representation in our study. Appendix
A gives the list of all countries included in our sample, sorted by region.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 give the summary statistics of our data for our full
sample and for its regional disaggregation respectively.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics - Full Sample
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Min Max
Corruption 3,747 3.02 1.36 0 6
Democracy 3,735 3.14 6.84 -10 10
% Women in parliament 3,568 13.99 10.01 0 48.9
Log real GDP per capita 3,985 8.63 1.25 5.64 11.44
Womens economic rights 3,391 1.36 0.69 0 3
Womens political rights 3,414 1.89 0.56 0 3
Womens social rights 2,561 1.30 0.86 0 3
Legislative quota size 1,075 8.75 15.03 0 50
Reserved seats quota size 420 5.83 8.09 0 30
Duration (legislative quota) 1,080 8.31 5.71 1 21
Duration (party quota) 1,860 15.89 8.43 0 41
Duration (reserved seats quota) 420 15.71 11.57 2 39
Duration (quota) 2,520 16.68 8.67 1 41
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics - Regional
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Min Max
Corruption:
Africa 1091 3.61 1.02 0 6
Asia 902 3.37 1.11 0 6
Europe 888 1.91 1.38 0 5
Latin America 746 3.42 0.98 1 6
OECD 964 1.57 1.20 0 4
% Women in parliament:
Africa 944 11.53 8.58 0 44.8
Asia 834 9.23 7.26 0 28.5
Europe 931 19.95 10.91 1.5 47.3
Latin America 739 14.34 9.41 0.7 48.9
OECD 976 19.19 11.14 1.3 47.3
Democracy:
Africa 1,097 -0.98 5.49 -9 9
Asia 911 0.06 7.27 -10 10
Europe 887 8.27 4.10 -9 10
Latin America 720 5.86 4.85 -9 10
OECD 952 9.14 2.57 -7 10
Log real GDP per capita:
Africa 1,109 7.38 0.96 5.64 9.69
Asia 957 8.57 1.09 6.57 11.44
Europe 1,050 9.75 0.67 7.41 11.24
Latin America 749 8.71 0.60 7.05 10.06
OECD 1,020 9.99 0.49 8.47 11.24
Womens economic rights:
Africa 969 0.97 0.51 0 3
Asia 796 1.11 0.58 0 3
Europe 857 1.91 0.61 0 3
Latin America 657 1.38 0.58 0 3
OECD 914 1.97 0.59 0 3
Womens political rights:
Africa 982 1.76 0.55 0 3
Asia 800 1.62 0.59 0 3
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Europe 858 2.18 0.48 1 3
Latin America 662 1.98 0.43 0 3
OECD 918 2.18 0.48 1 3
Womens social rights:
Africa 769 0.77 0.58 0 2
Asia 598 0.89 0.60 0 3
Europe 617 2.16 0.73 0 3
Latin America 490 1.32 0.55 0 3
OECD 685 2.16 0.77 0 3
Legislative quota size (%):
Africa 267 3.56 11.49 0 50
Asia 180 6.28 10.83 0 30
Europe 298 7.92 16.06 0 50
Latin America 330 15.05 16.39 0 50
OECD 298 8.89 16.53 0 50
Reserved seats quota size (%):
Africa 270 5.90 8.36 0 30
Asia 150 5.71 7.60 0 25
Duration (party quota):
Africa 480 13.69 5.40 3 25
Asia 180 14.17 9.00 4 30
Europe 780 17.85 9.56 4 41
Latin America 360 14.42 7.93 0 30
OECD 810 19.44 9.04 4 41
Duration (legislative quota):
Africa 270 3.11 1.67 1 6
Asia 180 8.83 4.23 2 15
Europe 300 6.30 4.01 2 15
Latin America 330 14.09 4.57 2 21
OECD 300 7.20 4.32 2 15
Duration (reserved seats quota):
Africa 270 14.78 10.45 2 39
Asia 150 17.40 13.23 4 37
Duration (quota):
Africa 780 13.42 8.32 1 39
Asia 420 16.07 9.53 2 37
Europe 810 18.85 9.10 4 41
Latin America 450 18.27 5.62 11 30
OECD 810 21.04 7.85 7 41
3.2.1 Instrumental Variables
Gender Quotas
Many studies have shown that quotas are e¤ective in increasing the share of
women in politics (e.g., Caul, 2001; Tripp and Kang, 2008; Chen, 2010; Kot-
sadam and Nerman, 2012). In addition, quotas appear to be more e¤ective in
increasing womens numerical representation in politics than other explana-
tory variables (Tripp and Kang, 2008). Hence, we instrument womens share
in parliament using gender quotas, assuming quotas are not correlated to
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corruption other than through their impact on womens political represen-
tation. Data on the quota adoption periods are collected from the Quota
Project database (Quota Project, 2015), Krook (2009), Krook (2006), Chen
(2010) and Dahlerup (2006b).
In the case of a single instrument, that is, Quotas (of any type), the quota
dummy variable takes the value 1 in the period when the quotas were in e¤ect
and 0 otherwise. We count quotas to be in e¤ect starting from the election
year in which they are implemented. Our approach di¤ers from Chens (2010)
which counts quotas to be in e¤ect starting from the year they are adopted.
Our approach is justiable on the ground that the election year (and not the
adoption year) is the rst year that the quotas (that is, the "treatment")
are e¤ectively applied in order to increase womens share in politics. Equally
important, we only count quotas to be in e¤ect when the exact e¤ective years
are known and treat them as missing variables otherwise.
We further categorise quotas into voluntary party quotas, legislative can-
didate quotas and reserved seats quotas following Krook (2009, 2013). For
party quotas and legislative quotas, we only include quotas which apply to
the candidateslist at national elections. This is because quotas which ap-
ply only to partiesinternal elections or the pre-selection process have been
shown to be ine¤ective in raising womens political representation. The ex-
amples of such cases are the party quota adopted in United Kingdom during
the period 1983 to 1996; and the legislative quota adopted in Paraguay since
1998.
In addition and as discussed earlier, the size of quotas is likely to a¤ect the
e¤ectiveness of quotas in increasing womens share in parliament. As such,
we use the size of legislative quotas and the size of reserved seats quotas as
instruments in our analysis. The size of party quotas is not included because
of measurement problems given their magnitude may di¤er across parties
in one country. On the contrary, the size of legislative quotas and reserved
seats quotas are commonly applied nation-wide in countries which adopt
these types of quotas. Consequently, for party quotas, we use party quota
dummy variable as our instrument which takes the value 1 in the period when
the quotas were in e¤ect and 0 otherwise.
Table 3.1 shows that among countries which adopt legislative quotas, the
average size of legislative quotas is 8.75% and the maximum size is 50%.
Out of ve regions, Latin America has the highest average size and Africa
has the lowest (see Table 3.2). Next, Table 3.1 shows that among countries
which adopt reserved seats quotas, the average size of reserved seats quotas
is 5.83% and the maximum size is 30%. Africa and Asia are the only two
regions which adopt reserved seats quotas in our sample and Africa has a
slightly higher average size of reserved seats quotas than Asia (see Table
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3.2). On average, the size of legislative quotas is higher than that of reserved
seats quotas.
Appendix B contains the quota information for each country in our dataset
during our investigation period. Specically, it shows the corresponding pe-
riods when quotas were in e¤ect, di¤erentiated by each type of quotas; and
when there were no quotas in e¤ect. Additionally, there are some countries
which had adopted party quotas but the exact e¤ective party quota years are
unknown. Hence, we di¤erentiate party quota periods between "With info"
and "No info". For legislative quotas, we also di¤erentiate between strong
and weak legislative quotas. Following Schwindt-Bayer (2009), we dene leg-
islative quotas as strong if the quotas have both placement mandate and
strong enforcement mechanism. As discussed in the literature review sec-
tion, Schwindt-Bayer (2009) nds quotas with both placement mandate and
strong enforcement mechanism have the highest marginal e¤ect. However,
she also nds that weak quotas still have a positive e¤ect on womens share in
parliament. Thus, we will use the size of legislative quotas (of any strength)
as instruments in our main analysis. We will then investigate the impact of
di¤erentiating between strong legislative quotas and weak legislative quotas
in our set of instruments in the robustness check section. Appendix C gives
the information on the size of legislative quotas by countries; Appendix D
gives the information on the size of reserved seats quotas by countries.
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Figure 3.1: Trends in Quota Adoption
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Figure 3.1 displays the trends in quota adoption for countries in our
dataset. It clearly shows that party quotas and legislative quotas are adopted
more rapidly after around the mid-1990s. Voluntary party quotas have been
the most widely adopted out of the three types of quotas since after 1984.
Moreover, between the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, the increase in the party
quota adoption is the most rapid out of the three types of quotas. However,
since around the mid-2000s, the use of party quotas declines steadily. On
the contrary, the use of both legislative quotas and reserved seats quotas
continues to rise. By 2013, the gap between the number of party quotas and
legislative quotas adopted has rapidly diminished. This may indicate that
the use of legislative quotas renders party quotas redundant unless party
quotas have higher size than legislative quotas, which is seldom the case.
Furthermore, while in 1984, reserved seats quotas and party quotas were
equally popular; by 2013, reserved seats quotas were the least popular of the
three.
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Figure 3.2: Quota Adoption by Region
Figure 3.2 shows that the frequency and type of quotas di¤ers by region.
Party quotas dominate in Europe (and the OECD); legislative quotas are
the most popular type in Latin America; and reserved seats quotas are most
common in Africa. Out of the three, party quotas appear to be the most
widespread.
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Duration of Quotas
As conrmed by Schwindt-Bayer (2009) and Kotsadam and Nerman (2012),
duration of quotas positively a¤ects womens political representation. In our
analysis, we include duration by modelling the dynamic e¤ects of quotas.
That is, we di¤erentiate between the e¤ects of quotas on womens share in
parliament in one election period and in another election period when the
quotas are in place, ranked in chronological order from the rst election
period.
Table 3.1 shows that the average duration of quotas of any type is 16.68
years. The average duration of party quotas, legislative quotas and reserved
seats quotas are 15.89 years, 8.31 years and 15.71 years respectively. Thus,
party quotas on average have been adopted for a longer period than the other
types. For a regional disaggregation of the summary statistics, see Table 3.2.
Electoral System
Some studies have shown that higher womens political representation is as-
sociated more with the PR system - particularly the PR-List system - than
with the plurality/majority system. This is because in the PR-system, seats
are allocated to the party in proportion to the overall vote share; whereas in
the plurality/majority system, the winning party/candidate is the one with
a plurality/majority of votes. As a result, in the PR system, women do not
need to be in the party with a plurality/majority of votes or to win a plural-
ity/majority of votes in order to gain seats. As mentioned in our literature
review, the PR system, particularly the PR-List system has been associated
with higher womens share in parliament. This evidence suggests that the
PR-List variable is a relevant instrument for womens share in parliament.
However, there are reasons to believe that the PR system is not exogenous;
in which case it is not a valid instrument. For instance, Swamy et al. (2001)
has found evidence that PR has a statistically signicant negative correla-
tion with corruption. Owing to this reason, we only include PR-List as an
additional instrument in our robustness check.
We use data on electoral systems from a dataset constructed by Bormann
and Golder (2013) which covers a period from 1946 to 2011. For the years
2012 and 2013, we obtain data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2014)
which provides electoral system information for each countrys last election.
Appendix E contains the electoral system information for each country in
our dataset during our investigation period. Specically, it shows the corre-
sponding periods when di¤erent types of electoral system were used; when
the PR system was not used; and when no information is available.
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In addition, it is possible that di¤erent types of PR-List system could have
a di¤erent impact on womens representation. In relation to this, Schwindt-
Bayer (2009) di¤erentiates the PR-List system between closed-list in which
voters cannot express a preference for the candidates; and open-list, in which
voters can express preferences. She argues that the open-list rule may re-
sult in lower womens representation as it may incorporate voterspreference
against women. However, she nds that both variables are not statistically
signicant in explaining womens representation. Owing to this nding and
due to the limitation of data availability considering our large sample size,
we do not di¤erentiate between closed-list and open-list PR in our analysis.
3.2.2 Dependent Variable: Corruption
Due to the discreet nature of corrupt acts, nding an objective measure for
corruption is an impossible task. Even if there is available data based on
the number of corrupt agents who get caught; such measure excludes un-
detected corrupt acts. It is therefore likely to under-report the actual level
of corruption. Despite this measument di¢ culty, various organisations have
constructed indices to measure country level corruption. Some of the most
well-known and widely used indices are the Transparency International (TI)s
Corruption Perception Index, the World Bank (WB)s Control of Corruption
Index and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)s Corruption Rat-
ing. The ICRGs Corruption Rating has been used in the construction of
the TIs index and the WBs index (Swamy et al., 2001). Not surprisingly,
the ICRGs rating has been found to be highly correlated with both the TIs
index and the WBs index (Treisman, 2007).
We will use the ICRGs Corruption Rating as it covers the longest time
period - starting from 1984 - compared with the TIs index which begins in
1995 and the WBs index which begins in 1996. Thus, the use of the ICRGs
rating allows us to include countries which adopted quotas before 1995 in our
dataset. Moreover, this rating has also been used in a number of gender and
corruption studies (e.g., Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001; Branisa and
Ziegler, 2011; Esarey and Chirillo, 2013; Kotsadam and Nerman, 2012). The
ICRGs Corruption Rating assesses corruption within the political system
which is a threat to foreign investment. It takes into account "nancial
corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected
with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police
protection, or loans"; however, "it is more concerned with actual or potential
corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations,
favor-for-favors, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between
politics and business" (Political Risk Services Group, 2014).
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The Political Risk Services Group (2014) explains how this corruption
rating is constructed. The ICRGs Corruption Rating is one of the risk com-
ponents of the ICRGs Political Risk Rating. The ICRGs Political Risk
Rating is based on a 100 point scale and incorporates 12 weighted variables
covering both social and political characteristics. Risk points are assigned
to a pre-set group of variables, termed political risk components. The ICRG
editors assign points based on a series of pre-set queries for each risk com-
ponent in order to ensure consistency across countries and over time. The
lower point indicates higher risk and the higher point indicates lower risk.
The ICRGs Corruption Rating ranges from 0 to 6. In order to improve
the clarity of the interpretation of our results, we have reversed the code
for this index in our analysis such that 0 represents the lowest risk and 6
represents the highest risk. We will base the interpretation of our analysis
on this reversed index.
It is important to note that there are some common problems associ-
ated with using corruption indices in corruption studies. The rst problem
relates to the subjective nature of these indices. Specically, ICRGs Corrup-
tion Rating relies on expertsassessments; it is therefore likely to measure
the perceptions of corruption instead of the actual corruption. Furthermore,
there are some issues arising from using corruption indices in a panel regres-
sion. Yearly changes in these indices may not reect changes in the actual
corruption. Instead, they may reect changes in the sources used, changes
in the methodology and/or changes in expertsknowledge. In the case of
ICRGs Corruption Rating, its creator - the Political Risk Services Group
- does not indicate the criteria which must be fullled by a country in a
particular year to have a certain rating (Treisman, 2007). Thus, it is not
clear how they ensure that the ratings are comparable across countries and
time. Despite their limitations, these corruption indices are highly corre-
lated with various possible determinants of corruption, such as democracy
and economic development (Treisman, 2007). Nonetheless, the empirical re-
sults derived from using these corruption indices should be interpreted with
keeping these limitations in mind.
Table 3.1 shows the mean score of corruption in our data set which is
3.02 and the range is between 0 and 6. Comparing across continents, Table
3.2 shows that the average corruption score is the highest in Africa and the
lowest in Europe.
Figure 3.3 shows that corruption is negatively associated with the female
share in parliament. This association holds not only for our whole investi-
gation period but also for each year of 1990, 2000 and 2010. In addition,
by comparing the graphs, we can see that both corruption and the share of
women in parliament increases over time as shown by the upward shift of the
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linear t line. Figure 3.4 shows more clearly these upward trends in both
corruption and womens share in parliament.
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Figure 3.5: Trends in Corruption
Figure 3.5 displays the trends in corruption over time, with a Quotas and
No quotas comparison as well as with a PR-List and No PR-List comparison.
Generally, there is an increasing trend in corruption over time, both for the
PR-List group and the No PR-List group; and the trend line for each group
is generally parallel to each other. The PR-List group tends to have lower
corruption than the No PR-List group. Moreover, there is also an increasing
trend in average corruption over time, both for the Quotas group and the No
quotas group. The Quotas group tends to have lower average corruption than
the No quotas group. The only exception to this trend is in 1984 to 1985
when the Quotas group had higher corruption than the No quotas group.
However, this is most likely due to two reasons: (i) by 1984 to 1985, there
were very few countries in our sample which had adopted quotas (that is,
only nine countries1); (ii) ve of these countries belong to relatively high
corruption group whose corruption index is above three 2.
1Bangladesh, Belgium, Egypt, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Sweden, United Republic
of Tanzania and Uruguay.
2Bangladesh, Egypt, Pakistan, Philippines and the United Republic of Tanzania.
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3.2.3 Independent Variable: Womens Representation
in Politics
The share of women in parliament is obtained from the Inter-Parliamentary
Union (IPU)s Worldwide Statistical Survey, Women in Parliaments: 1945-
1995 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1995) and the IPU (2014b). Following
Chen (2010) and Kunovich and Paxton (2005), for countries with bicameral
system, we only take into account the share of women in the lower houses.
Chen (2010) justies this approach on the basis that for some countries with
a bicameral system, the results of the election do not show up in the upper
houses. Additionally, Kunovich and Paxton (2005) maintain that in countries
with bicameral systems, upper houses in general have less legislative power
than lower houses.
We are aware that inuential women, that is, the share of women in min-
isterial and top bureaucratic positions, may also have a negative correlation
with corruption as pointed out by Swamy et al. (2001). Nevertheless, we
exclude inuential women from our study due to several reasons. First, gen-
der quotas in politics applies to womens share in parliament and does not
normally apply to womens share in ministerial positions. As such, we have
no instruments available for womens share in ministerial positions to use in
our IV analysis. Second, it is very likely that womens share in parliament is
highly correlated with womens share in ministerial positions. To gain a min-
isterial position, one normally starts from a parliamentary position. Also, in
democratic settings, the ability of a minister to administer a policy is nor-
mally limited by the legislative power of the parliament. Thus, our womens
share in parliament variable may pick up some of the e¤ects of womens share
in inuential positions on corruption. For these reasons, we do not include
the share of inuential women in our study.
Table 3.1 shows that the average share of women in parliament in our
dataset is 13.99% and the highest share is 48.9% (that is, Cuba in the 2013
election). Comparing across continents, Europe has the highest average share
of women in parliament and Asia has the lowest average share (see Table 3.2).
Figure 3.6 shows the trends in women in parliament over time, with a
Quotas and No quotas comparison as well as with a PR-List and No PR-List
comparison. Generally, there is an increasing trend in average female share in
parliament over time, both for the Quotas group and the No quotas group;
and the trend line for each group is generally parallel to each other. The
Quotas group has higher womens representation than the No quotas group.
The same observations and conclusions apply to the trends in average share
of women in parliament with a PR-List and No PR-List comparison. The
upshot is that we observe that the combination of Quotas and PR-List system
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results in the highest womens political representation compared with either
only Quotas or only PR-List or neither (see Figure 3.7).
3.2.4 Control Variables
We control for factors that may a¤ect both womens political representation
and corruption in order to prevent omitted variable bias and spurious cor-
relation problem in our analysis. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show how our control
variables may correlate with both variables.
Democracy
It is possible that democracy a¤ects both womens political representation
and corruption. Following many previous studies on gender and corruption
(e.g., Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001; Sung, 2003; Esarey and Chirillo,
2013; Branisa and Ziegler, 2011), we include democracy as one of our control
variables. As a measure of institutionalised democracy and autocracy, we
use Polity IV Projects Revised Combined Polity Score constructed by the
Center for Systemic Peace (2014). The range of the score is from -10 (strongly
autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic). This measure has also been used in
studies by Esarey and Chirillo (2013) and Branisa and Ziegler (2011). As
Esarey and Chirillo (2013) and Branisa and Ziegler (2011) point out, the
alternatives to this measure such as the Civil Liberties Index, the Political
Rights Index and the Freedom of the Press Index - which have been used in
other gender and corruption studies (e.g., Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al.,
2001; Sung, 2003) - include aspects associated with corruption. Therefore,
the use of Polity IV Projects Revised Combined Polity Score which is not
closely associated with corruption is more appropriate for our analysis than
these alternative measures.
The average democracy index in our data set is 3.14 and the range is from
-10 to 10 (see Table 3.1). On average, Africa is the least democratic continent
and Europe is the most democratic continent (see Table 3.2). Table 3.3 shows
that countries with relatively low corruption have a higher average democracy
index than countries with relatively high corruption. Table 3.4 shows that
countries with relatively low womens representation have a lower average
democracy index than countries with relatively high womens representation.
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Womens Political Rights, Womens Economic Rights andWomens
Social Rights
Womens political rights, womens economic rights and womens social rights
may also be associated with lower corruption and higher womens politi-
cal representation. Greater womens rights may increase both the share
of women in politics and the ability of female politicians to a¤ect corrup-
tion. As a measure of these rights, we use indices constructed by Cingranelli
et al. (2014). The range of the scores is from 0 to 3; higher scores indicates
higher womens rights. Womens political rights and economic rights indices
are available until 2011; while womens social rights index was retired as of
2005/2007.
The range for all three womens rights indices is from 0 to 3; the average
womens economic rights, womens political rights and womens social rights
scores in our dataset are 1.36, 1.89 and 1.30 respectively (see Table 3.1). Eu-
rope has the highest average scores for all womens rights indices compared
with other continents; Africa has the lowest average scores for womens eco-
nomic rights and social rights; Asia has the lowest average score for womens
political rights (see Table 3.2). Table 3.3 shows that on average, countries
with relatively low corruption have more womens rights than countries with
relatively high corruption. Table 3.4 shows that on average, countries with
relatively high womens representation have more womens rights than coun-
tries with relatively low womens representation.
Economic Development
Studies have shown that economic development is negatively associated with
corruption (e.g., Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; Keefer and Knack, 1997; Li et al.,
2000; Mauro, 1995). Moreover, some studies have found that economic devel-
opment is positively associated with womens political representation (e.g.,
Tripp and Kang, 2008; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). As a measure of economic
development, we use logged values of GDP per capita, in xed 2005 prices,
and is adjusted for Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs), as calculated in the
2005 round of the International Comparison Program. This real GDP per
capita data are obtained from The Gapminder Foundation (2014).
Communism
As pointed out by Kunovich and Paxton (2005), some communist countries
such as Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam have high proportions of female
legislators due to a lack of democracy. As such, communism is possibly
correlated with both womens share in parliament and corruption. Thus,
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we control for the e¤ect of communism using communist dummy variable
which takes the value 1 when a country was under a communist regime and
0 otherwise.
3.3 OLS
3.3.1 Methodology
We will start our analysis by applying pooled ordinary least squares (POLS)
and xed e¤ects OLS. The purpose is to compare the resulting estimates
and investigate if they are statistically di¤erent from each other. Panel data
permit the use of xed e¤ects to eliminate bias resulting from: i) omitting
country xed e¤ects - variables that di¤er across countries but are constant
over time (e.g. geographical factors and historical background); ii) omitting
year xed e¤ects - variables that are constant across countries but evolve over
time (e.g. globalisation). By comparing the resulting estimates, we can see
the di¤erences between the results from POLS which su¤er from bias from
omitting these xed e¤ects; and the results from Fixed E¤ects OLS which
control for these e¤ects. We will also analyse if our results are dependent on
region. For this purpose, we will divide our sample on the regional basis and
compare the regression results.
The equation which we estimate is as follows:
Corrit = 0 + 1Femit + 2Wit + i + f(t) + uit (3.1)
whereCorrit denotes corruption level; Femit denotes the proportion of women
in the parliament; Wit denotes a set of control variables as described in the
earlier section; i denotes country xed e¤ects; f(t) denotes the time vari-
able; and uit denotes the error term; i is the country and t is the year. In
order to eliminate country xed e¤ects, we will estimate the following within
transformation of the above equation:
C^orrit = 0 + 1F^ emit + 2gWit + f(t) +fuit (3.2)
where C^orrit = Corrit   Corri is the year-demeaned data by country on
Corrit, and similarly for F^ emit;gWit and fuit: Corri denotes the mean Corrit
over time for each i, and similarly for Femi; Wi and ui:
Following Kotsadam and Nerman (2012), we estimate the above equation
by using two di¤erent specications of f(t): i) f(t) = t; allowing for year
xed e¤ects; ii) f(t) = t + it; allowing for both year xed e¤ects and
country-specic time trends. Including the year xed e¤ects allows us to
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control for variables that are constant across countries but evolve over time.
This setup assumes that, in the absence of quotas, all countries would follow
the same linear trend; although they may start from di¤erent points. Further
including the country-specic time trends has the advantage of introducing
exibility in our model rather than imposing a restrictive assumption of a
common trend. It allows each country to follow its own linear trend which
it deviates from when it adopts a quota. It also allows for di¤erences in
development across countries even in the absence of quotas. However, this
overlooks possible non-linearities in the time-trends. Kotsadam and Nerman
(2012) also warns of the danger of too much exibility when using a short
panel data like theirs. This does not appear to be a big issue for our analysis
as our panel data are quite large. At this point, we have no strong basis to
determine which setup will work better in our case. Therefore, we report the
results from both specications.
We also recognise that the OLS estimations resulting from equation (3.2)
could still be subject to omitted variable bias. Omitted variable bias could
arise in our case if the share of women in parliament is correlated with other
variables a¤ecting corruption; that is, if the share of women in parliament
is correlated with the error term and therefore is endogenous. We have at-
tempted to eliminate this bias by controlling for variables that are possibly
correlated with both corruption and the share of women in parliament in our
regression. These variables are democracy, economic development, womens
rights and communism. Nevertheless, we recognise that these control vari-
ables may also be endogenous. That is, they are likely to be correlated with
other factors relating to corruption. Alternatively they may have a two-way
relationship with corruption and/or womens share in parliament. Since they
are likely to be endogenous, the estimated coe¢ cients of these control vari-
ables do not have a causal interpretation. For this reason, we do not report
the coe¢ cients of these control variables and their interpretations in this
chapter.
In addition, we cannot rule out completely that there may still be other
excluded variables which are correlated with both corruption and womens
share in parliament and not adequately captured by the country-specic time
trends. In Chapter 1, we have suggested that the lower gender wage gap in the
public sector compared to the private sector could be one of the reasons why
women in the public sector are less corrupt than their male counterparts.
If the lower gender wage gap in the public sector relative to the private
sector also makes women more willing to work in public sector, omitting this
relative gender wage gap will result in omitted variable bias. Unfortunately,
such reliable panel data on the relative gender wage gap are not available
to date. We have considered using data on occupational wages from the
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International Labour Organization but there are only very few countries and
years for which data are available on public sector wages by sex.
Moreover, the estimates of equation (3.2) could also be subject to simul-
taneous equations bias; that is, not only the share of women in parliament
a¤ects corruption, but corruption also a¤ects the share of women in parlia-
ment. To date, the literature on gender and corruption has been focussed on
the causal direction from female share in parliament to corruption. Neverthe-
less, the possibility of the reverse direction has been suggested by Mukherjee
and Gokcekus (2004). Their suggestion has also been supported by the em-
pirical nding of Bjarnegaard (2008) based on a case study of Thailand. In
order to address possible bias, we apply TSLS in the next section.
3.3.2 Results
For di¤erent samples, we will analyse four di¤erent models: (i) POLS with
no xed e¤ects; (ii) POLS with year xed e¤ects; (iii) OLS with country
xed e¤ects and year xed e¤ects; (iv) OLS with country xed e¤ects, year
xed e¤ects and country-specic time trends. For each model, we will also
investigate if the results are sensitive to the inclusion of controls.
Full Sample
As we can see from Table 3.5, the regressions with no xed e¤ects (1) and
with year xed e¤ects (2) yield a statistically signicant negative correla-
tion between womens share in parliament and corruption. However, when
country xed e¤ects are included in the regression (3), the correlation be-
tween womens share in parliament and corruption becomes neither statisti-
cally nor quantitatively signicant. Regression with the country-specic time
trends (4) yields a similar result. Repeating the estimation with the inclu-
sion of controls (Columns (5) to (8)) tends to reduce the quantitative e¤ects
of womens share in parliament. However, the overall message remains un-
changed. Judging from the adjusted R-squared values, the country-specic
time trends model appears to possess the highest explanatory power. For this
reason and given the exibility the country-specic time trends model allows
for, we will only report results from this model for all subsequent regressions.
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Our results show that the correlation between womens share in parlia-
ment and corruption is not robust to the inclusion of the country xed e¤ects
and di¤erent specications of the time variable. Furthermore, we nd that
our POLS results are quite similar to the results from the the rst two pio-
neer studies that nd a statistically signicant negative correlation between
corruption and womens share in parliament (i.e., Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy
et al., 2001). The coe¢ cients of womens share in parliament in our pooled
regressions without controls (1) and with controls (5) imply that a one stan-
dard deviation increase (about ten percentage points) is associated with a
decrease in the corruption index by about 12% (with controls) to 26% (with-
out controls) of a standard deviation. Similarly, Dollar et al. (2001) and
Swamy et al. (2001) nd a one standard deviation increase (about eight per-
centage points) in womens share in parliament is associated with a decrease
in the corruption index by 20% of a standard deviation.
However, as we mentioned earlier, POLS results are likely to su¤er from
omitted variable bias. Despite this problem, most previous comparable stud-
ies have used this method following Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al.
(2001). Nonetheless, Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) have also
admitted biases may exist in their studies, notwithstanding their inclusion
of control variables. Our xed e¤ects estimates show that their cross-section
OLS results are biased downwards due to their inability to control for un-
observed heterogeneity across countries that is constant over time. In order
to address this problem, Swamy et al. (2001) use time-series data to analyse
the correlation between the change in corruption index from 1982 to 1997
and the change in womens share in parliament from 1975 to 1994. They
still nd that the increase in womens share in parliament is correlated with
the decrease in corruption; and this correlation is statistically signicant. As
such, they claim that a time-constant country-specic omitted variable does
not a¤ect their main results. Their ndings therefore contradict ours; when
we control for this unobserved heterogeneity by including country xed ef-
fects, we nd no statistically signicant correlation between womens share
in parliament and corruption.
There are several possible reasons for the di¤erences in results. First,
their sample size is smaller than ours, particularly in terms of the number of
years. Our dataset covers a period from 1984 to 2013; while theirs covers a
period from the 1980s to the 1990s. In addition, womens share in parliament
data used in Swamy et al.s (2001) time-series analysis are for 1975, 1985,
1990 and 1994 instead of the annual data used in our analysis. Second, in
controlling for the time-constant unobserved heterogeneity across countries,
Swamy et al. (2001) are using rst-di¤erencing method for a panel of two
time periods. This allows them to control for the unobserved heterogeneity
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between these two time periods. However, Swamy et al. (2001) and Dollar
et al. (2001) do not control for the unobserved heterogeneity across time
which is constant across countries. Swamy et al. (2001) in particular have
pointed out that they cannot rule out bias due to this time-varying omitted
variable. Our inclusion of the year xed e¤ects and the country-specic time
trends in our analysis has allowed us to control for these sources of bias. In
addition, when we limit our sample to the period 1984 to 1997, our results do
not change signicantly. Including country xed e¤ects as well as year xed
e¤ects and/or country-specic time trends in our regressions for this period
still yields no signicant correlation between womens share in parliament
and corruption. For these reasons, we suggest that the ndings of Dollar
et al. (2001), Swamy et al. (2001) and subsequent studies which follow their
method should be treated with much caution.
Next, we will present the results from our regressions for each region
to investigate if the correlation between womens share in parliament and
corruption displays regional heterogeneity.
Regional
Table 3.6 shows that when no controls are included, the coe¢ cients of womens
share in parliament in all regressions are not statistically signicant. Inter-
estingly, the coe¢ cients of womens share in parliament are negative only in
Asia and Africa and similar in magnitude. In addition, they are quantita-
tively signicant and larger in absolute terms than those in other regions.
When controls are included, womens share in parliament becomes weakly
statistically signicant for Africa while still retaining its negative sign. The
results for other regions do not change signicantly. Overall, our results sug-
gest that increasing womens share in parliament might reduce corruption
only in Africa and Asia; the two continents which share some important sim-
ilarities, namely: (i) they consist of mostly developing countries; (ii) they
have the lowest average womens share in parliament compared with other
regions; (iii) they are the least democratic compared with other regions; (iv)
they have the lowest average womens rights compared with other regions;
(v) they are the only two regions in our sample which had adopted reserved
seats quotas (see Table 3.2).
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3.4 TSLS
3.4.1 Methodology
We are interested in estimating the causal e¤ect of increasing female rep-
resentation in the government on corruption by combining xed e¤ects and
two stage least squares (TSLS) methods. By using TSLS, we wish to elim-
inate bias resulting from the endogeneity of our explanatory variable (that
is, womens share in parliament). Our TSLS regressions involve using quo-
tas, in the form of party quotas, legislative quotas, reserved seats quotas as
instrumental variables for the share of women in parliament. We will also
test if our results are robust to including PR-List system as an additional
instrument. By using these instrumental variables, we wish to isolate the
variation in the share of women in parliament that is not correlated with the
error term.
The rst stage of TSLS is to regress the endogenous explanatory variable,
that is, the share of women in parliament in our case, on all the instruments
and exogenous variables. That is, we apply the xed e¤ect transformation
and estimate the following reduced form equation using OLS:
F^ emit = 0 + 1fZit + 2gWit + t + it+fit (3.3)
where F^ emit is the year-demeaned variable of Femit; similarly for fZit;gWit;
and fit. Zit denotes our instruments; Wit denotes a set of control variables;
and it denotes the error term - the problematic component of Femit that
is correlated with uit. As we can see from equation (3.3), we will only esti-
mate the country-specic time trends model for our TSLS regressions. This
is due to its exibility as discussed previously in the OLS section. More-
over, our previous OLS results have revealed that this model has the highest
explanatory power compared with other models.
We will rst consider quotas of any kind as our only instrument; that is,
Zit = Qit where Qit denotes the quota dummy variable that takes the value 1
when quotas were adopted, and 0 otherwise. As noted by Angrist and Pischke
(2009), the just-identied TSLS (that is, with a single instrument) is median
unbiased; it is approximately centred where it should be even with weak
instruments. Therefore, it is not likely to be subject to a critique of weak
instruments. In our later analyses, we will also analyse other cases where
we use di¤erent types of quotas, namely Party Quotas, Legislative Quotas
and Reserved Seats Quotas with their dynamic e¤ects as our instruments.
We model the dynamic e¤ects of each type of quotas to investigate if quotas
become more e¤ective when they have been in e¤ect for longer duration.
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In the second stage of TSLS we estimate the structural corruption equa-
tion, using the tted values from the rst stage.
C^orrit = 0 + 1
\^
Femit + 2gWit + t + it+fuit (3.4)
The resulting estimators are TSLS xed e¤ects estimators. Furthermore, we
are interested in nding out if our results are sensitive to the inclusion of
control variables. As such, we estimate equations with and without a full set
of control variables.
Validity of Instruments
If the instruments we use full certain assumptions underlying the TSLS
method, the TSLS xed e¤ects estimators obtained will be consistent. These
assumptions are: i) the instruments are as good as randomly assigned; (ii)
at least one of the instruments has a non-zero coe¢ cient in the population
regression of the share of women in parliament on the instruments and the
exogenous variables; iii) the instruments are not correlated with the error
term.
The rst assumption does not hold strictly in our case. As discussed in
our literature review, the adoption of quotas is random conditional on some
variables (included as control variables in our analysis). As commonly done
in the econometric literature, the rst assumption can be relaxed by requiring
it to hold, conditional on the control variables.
The second assumption requires our instruments to be relevant. Formally,
this assumption holds if:
Cov(Zit; Femit) 6= 0 (3.5)
If the second assumption does not hold, we have weak instruments, that is,
the instruments that do not explain much of the variation in the share of
women parliamentarians. As a consequence, even for a large sample size, the
sampling distribution of the TSLS estimator and its t-statistic is approxi-
mated poorly by the normal distribution. In addition, the size of standard
errors of the estimators is larger. One test for weak instruments in the case of
a single endogenous explanatory variable is an F-test of the null hypothesis
that the coe¢ cients of the instruments are all zero in the rst stage regres-
sion of TSLS. The expected value of the F-statistic is larger when there is
more information content. The rule of thumb according to Stock and Watson
(2010) is currently to reject the null hypothesis if the rst stage F-statistic is
greater than 10. This rule of thumb exists because when the expected value
of F-statistic is equal to 10, the relative bias of TSLS to OLS is approxi-
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mately just over 10% - small enough for many applications to accept. Given
the importance of strong instruments to the validity of our results, we report
this test results in our regression tables.
The third assumption requires our quota instruments to have no direct
e¤ects on corruption other than through their e¤ects on the share of women
in parliament. Formally, we require
Cov(Zit; uit) = 0 (3.6)
If however this assumption does not hold, the TSLS estimator is inconsistent.
Moreover, if the instrument is not exogenous, it cannot identify the exogenous
variation in the share of women parliamentarians. In such a case, we cannot
derive a valid causal inference of the e¤ect of female share in parliament on
corruption.
In the case of an overidentied model, we report the results from our
exogeneity tests of our excluded instruments (that is, our instrumental vari-
ables) using the overidentifying restrictions Hansen J-test. This is a test of
the joint null hypothesis that: i) the instruments are valid instruments, that
is, uncorrelated with the error term; ii) the excluded instruments are cor-
rectly excluded from the estimated equation. This statistic is consistent in
the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. This test is, however,
not designed for a just-identied model. As such, we will perform another
exogeneity test for our just-identied model following Kotsadam and Nerman
(2012).
Kotsadam and Nerman (2012) point out that quotas may not be exoge-
nous if the attitudes towards women in politics di¤er accross quota and non-
quota countries before the adoption of quotas. Following their method, we
test for di¤erences in the share of women in parliament prior to the adoption
of quotas by estimating the following equation:
Femit = 0 + 1Qi + 2t+ 3t
2 + 4Wit + it (3.7)
where Qi is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for countries which adopt
quotas at some point in time, and 0 otherwise; t is the time trend andWit is a
set of control variables. We only use the periods before any quota adoption. If
our estimation of 1 is not statistically signicantly di¤erent from zero, quota
adoption is not associated with the pre-quota share of women in parliament.
In such a case, we may conclude that quotas are reasonably exogenous.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 present our results from estimating equation (3.7) for
our full sample and our regional samples respectively. Our exogeneity test
for the full sample reveals no statistically signicant correlation between the
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pre-quota share of women in parliament and the quota adoption. Thus, we
conclude that the exogeneity assumption of quotas appears to be (reasonably)
valid based on this test. However, when we perform the same exogeneity
test for our regional samples, the pre-quota share of women in parliament is
statistically and quantitatively signicant in Europe. Consequently, quotas
do not appear to be plausibly exogenous for Europe and our TSLS estimators
for this region are likely to be inconsistent. For other regions, quotas appear
to be plausibly exogenous.
Table 3.7: Exogeneity Test - Full Sample
(1) (2)
VARIABLES % Women in Parliament
Quota country -0.974 -0.465
(1.526) (0.805)
F statistics: Controls N/A (11,115)=18.83
(p=0.00)
Observations 1,980 1,980
Adjusted R-squared 0.051 0.539
Controls No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.8: Exogeneity Test - Regional
Africa Asia Europe Latin America OECD
VARIABLES % Women in Parliament
Quota country (without controls) 0.649 2.827 -9.266** -3.402 -5.830
(1.354) (2.657) (4.396) (3.262) (5.535)
Quota country (with controls) 0.703 1.031 -4.897*** -1.661 -2.226
(1.147) (0.747) (1.537) (1.328) (1.768)
Observations 558 578 371 397 362
Adjusted R-squared (without controls) 0.092 0.031 0.295 0.169 0.261
Adjusted R-squared (with controls) 0.322 0.738 0.718 0.614 0.719
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Next, in initial exploratory investigation, we nd in that in some regional
regressions, our instruments tend to be weak. In order to counter the pos-
sibility of invalid inferences due to the presence of weak instruments, we
include additional hypothesis tests designed for the weak instruments case.
These tests are: the Conditional Likelihood Ratio (CLR)-test, the Anderson-
Rubin (AR)-test and the K-J-test. All these tests are implemented by the
Stata command weakiv developed by Finlay et al. (2014) which builds on
and extends the command rivtest developed by Finlay et al. (2009).
The AR-test is a joint test of the structural parameter and the exogene-
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ity of the instruments. The structural parameter test is a test of the null
hypothesis that the coe¢ cient of the instrumented variable, that is, womens
share in parliament in our case, is zero. The AR-statistic can be decomposed
into the K-statistic which tests only the structural parameter, assuming the
exogeneity conditions are satised; and the J-statistic which tests only the
exogeneity conditions. This J-statistic is evaluated at the null hypothesis,
as opposed to the Hansen J-statistic, which is evaluated at the parameter
estimate. The weight of K in our K-J test is 0.8.
The CLR-test is a similar test which tests the structural parameter and
the exogeneity conditions simultaneously. In the linear IV model under ho-
moskedasticy, the CLR-statistic combines the K-statistic and the J-statistic
in the most e¢ cient way. It has good power properties but it has better power
in the weak identication case (Moreira, 2003). The CLR-test has an impor-
tant advantage over the K-test. The K-test can lose power in some regions
of the parameter space when the objective function has an inection point or
local extremum; the CLR-test does not have this issue. The CLR-test is the
most powerful for the linear model under homoskedasticity (within a class of
invariant similar tests); however, this result still needs to be proved for other
types of IV estimators (Finlay et al., 2009). Therefore, we report the results
from these three tests. In the case of a just-identied model, however, the
weakiv routine only reports the results from the AR-test.
Further Econometric Issues
There is also a possibility that the error term is heteroskedastic and seri-
ally correlated for a given country. To account for both possibilities, in all
our estimations we compute standard errors clustered by country. These
clustered standard errors allow for heteroskedasticity and for arbitrary serial
correlation within a country, while treating the errors as uncorrelated across
countries.
Next, in order to avoid having our sample size reduced due to some miss-
ing data for our control variables; we include missing dummies for each of
our control variables where appropriate.
3.4.2 Results
We will present our second stage results from estimating structural equation
(3.4) to identify the e¤ect of womens share in parliament on corruption
and our rst stage results from estimating reduced form equation (3.3) to
identify the e¤ect of our instrument(s) on womens share in parliament. In
both equations, country xed e¤ects, year xed e¤ects and country-specic
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time trends are included. We will analyse di¤erent regressions using di¤erent
sets of instrument(s). We will also present our results for full sample and for
regional samples.
Instrumental Variable: Quotas
In this analysis, we will identify the e¤ect of womens share in parliament on
corruption using a single instrument, Quotas (of any type). Tables 3.9 and
3.10 present our results for full sample and regional samples respectively.
Table 3.9: TSLS Corruption Regressions (IV: Quotas (of any type)) - Full Sample
Second Stage
(1) (2)
VARIABLES
% Women in parliament 0.0319 0.0333
(0.0254) (0.0309)
Chi-squared-statistic: Controls N/A (11)=16.66
(p=0.12)
AR (p-value) 0.20 0.27
Observations 3,397 3,397
Number of countries 133 133
First Stage
(1) (2)
VARIABLES % Women in parliament
Quotas 3.771*** 3.046***
(0.696) (0.571)
F-statistic: Excluded instruments (1, 132)=29.39 (1, 132)=28.42
(p=0.00) (p=0.00)
F-statistic: Controls N/A (11, 132)=7.59
(p=0.00)
Observations 3,486 3,486
Number of countries 133 133
Adjusted R-squared 0.730 0.776
Country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Country-Specic Time Trends Yes Yes
Controls No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Full Sample Both rst stage regressions, with and without controls, pro-
duce similar results regarding the e¤ect of quotas on womens share in parlia-
ment. Quotas yield a statistically signicant increase in the share of women
in parliament by between 3 to 3.8 percentage points. The adoption of quotas
therefore generates an increase in womens share in parliament by roughly
one-third of a standard deviation. We also check for the relevance of quotas
by conducting an F-test for the null hypothesis that the quotas coe¢ cient is
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zero; we report the F-statistic value corresponding to each model. We nd
that the F-statistic values for all models are always greater than 10 - the
rule of thumb for strong instruments according to Stock and Watson (2010).
Quotas therefore appears to be a strong instrument for womens share in
parliament. The second stage regressions yield an unexpected positive cor-
relation between womens share in parliament and corruption. However, this
correlation is not statistically signicant. Adding controls yields similar re-
sults.
Our results di¤er signicantly from a similar study by Jha and Sarangi
(2015) which also uses an IV approach. In their study, Jha and Sarangi (2015)
nd that womens share in parliament has a negative correlation with cor-
ruption which is highly statistically and quantitatively signicant. Moreover,
their IV coe¢ cients are even larger in absolute terms than their OLS coe¢ -
cients. The di¤erences between our results and theirs are mainly attributed
to the di¤erent instruments used and di¤erent sample sizes. Judging from
the F-statistic of the excluded instrument(s) alone, our instruments appear
to be much stronger than theirs. Although, we cannot perform the overiden-
tication test in the presence of an exactly identied model, our exogeneity
test (in Section 4.1.1) conrms that our Quotas instrument appears to be
plausibly exogeneous.
In terms of the sample size, our sample consists of 3,397 observations while
theirs consists of 81 to 111 observations. This is due to our use of panel data
of 133 countries for the period 1984 to 2013 and their use of cross-section
data for a single year. They justify their cross-section analysis by claiming
that a panel study of corruption is di¢ cult because corruption indices vary
little over time. We check their claim by computing the standard deviation
of our corruption index between countries (1.13) and within countries (0.75).
The extent of this within country variation suggests the use of panel data in
our study of corruption is justied afterall; it also allows us to study the links
between womens share in parliament in corruption by taking into account
the variation both across countries and over time.
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Regional Our rst stage results show that quotas yield a statistically sig-
nicant increase in womens share in parliament for all regions; these cor-
relations are robust to the inclusion of controls (the coe¢ cients are not re-
ported). However, the F-test of the excluded instruments suggest that quotas
are strong instruments only for Asia, Europe and the OECD. Moreover, our
second stage results suggest that increasing womens share in parliament may
cause higher corruption in Africa, Europe and the OECD; these e¤ects are
quantitatively signicant in these three regions and robust to the inclusion
of controls. The quantitative e¤ect of womens share in parliament on cor-
ruption is the largest for the OECD. In the OECD, increasing womens share
in parliament by a standard deviation (about 11 percentage points) yields
an increase in corruption index by about 1.3 standard deviations. For Eu-
rope and the OECD, the coe¢ cients of womens share in parliament are also
statistically signicant. However, our exogeneity test of quotas reveals that
Quotas (of any type) is not plausibly exogenous for Europe. This implies
the causal inference for Europe derived from this regression is not likely to
be valid. Given the positive e¤ects are contrary to our expectations, these
ndings motivate a more detailed investigation in terms of di¤erent types of
quotas and the dynamic specication of the quota e¤ect.
Instrumental Variables: Party Quotas, Legislative Quota Sizes, Re-
served Seats Quota Sizes
In this analysis, we instrument womens share in parliament using party
quota dummies, legislative quota sizes, reserved seats quota sizes. The size
of party quotas is not included because of the measurement issue as dis-
cussed in the earlier section. In addition, to model the dynamic e¤ects of
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quotas, we create di¤erent variables for each type of quotas according to
the election periods in which the quotas were applied, in chronological or-
der. For example, party quota 1 refers to the party quota adopted in the
rst election period; party quota 2 for the second election period, and so on.
Party quota 1 dummy takes the value 1 in the rst election period the quota
was implemented and 0 otherwise; party quota 2 dummy takes the value 1
in the second election period the quota was implemented and 0 otherwise;
and so on. We apply the same method for legislative quotas and reserved
seats quotas except that we use the size of quotas instead of dummies. The
purpose of such modelling is to model the gradual e¤ects of quotas. This is
especially important as we use the country-specic time trends model which
may capture both the dynamic quota e¤ects and the pre-existing trends. As
Angrist and Pischke (2014) highlight, the country-specic time trends model
may generate imprecise and inconclusive results especially when the e¤ects
of the treatment emerge gradually. The solution for this is to model the
dynamic e¤ects of our treatment (that is, quotas) as in Wolfers (2006) to
generate more directly interpretable ndings. Tables 3.11 and 3.12 present
our results for full sample and regional samples respectively.
Table 3.11: TSLS Corruption Regressions (IVs: Party Quotas, Legislative Quota Sizes and Reserved Seats
Quota Sizes) - Full Sample
Second Stage
(1) (2)
VARIABLES
% Women in parliament 0.00325 -0.00369
(0.0158) (0.0184)
Chi-squared-statistic: Controls N/A (11)=19.02 (p=0.06)
Hansen J (p-value) 0.15 0.11
CLR (p-value) 0.08 0.11
AR (p-value) 0.12 0.13
K-J (p-value) 0.13 0.19
Observations 3,264 3,264
Number of countries 130 130
First Stage
(1) (2)
VARIABLES % Women in Parliament
Party quota 1 2.933*** 2.439***
(0.740) (0.649)
Party quota 2 3.816*** 3.067***
(0.954) (0.824)
Party quota 3 4.668*** 3.716***
(1.045) (0.897)
Party quota 4 4.768*** 4.071***
(1.333) (1.181)
Party quota 5 5.037*** 4.707***
(1.761) (1.498)
Party quota 6 6.341*** 6.195***
(2.186) (1.807)
Party quota 7 5.480** 5.580**
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(2.492) (2.168)
Party quota 8 4.381 5.473*
(3.546) (2.879)
Party quota 9 6.067 8.049***
(3.948) (3.034)
Legislative quota size 1 0.189*** 0.174***
(0.0457) (0.0384)
Legislative quota size 2 0.300*** 0.301***
(0.0476) (0.0419)
Legislative quota size 3 0.373*** 0.377***
(0.0540) (0.0524)
Legislative quota size 4 0.386*** 0.398***
(0.0521) (0.0477)
Reserved seats quota size 1 0.472** 0.418**
(0.192) (0.190)
Reserved seats quota size 2 0.464*** 0.402***
(0.111) (0.116)
Reserved seats quota size 3 0.740*** 0.564***
(0.130) (0.151)
Reserved seats quota size 4 0.767*** 0.640***
(0.101) (0.0996)
Reserved seats quota size 5 0.957*** 0.825***
(0.0819) (0.0986)
Reserved seats quota size 6 1.029*** 0.849***
(0.0353) (0.0856)
F-statistic: Excluded instruments (19, 130)=115.24 (19, 130)=13.52
(p=0.00) (p=0.00)
F-statistic N/A (11, 130)=5.55
(p=0.00)
Observations 3,354 3,354
Number of countries 131 131
Adjusted R-squared 0.754 0.800
Country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Country-Specic Time Trends Yes Yes
Controls No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The p-values for the CLR, AR and K-J statistics are against the joint null hypothesis that the
coe¢ cient of the endogenous variable, that is, the womens share in parliament, is zero and that the
instruments are exogenous. The p-value for the Hansen J-statistic is againts the null hypothesis that the
instruments are valid. For the case of a single instrument, only AR-test results are reported.
Full Sample Our rst stage results show that party quotas, legislative
quota sizes and reserved seats quota sizes are positively correlated with
womens share in parliament. These correlations are also statistically sig-
nicant in regressions with and without controls. For all types of quotas, the
quota coe¢ cients are generally larger in absolute terms for the later election
periods than for the earlier ones. This suggest that the quantitative e¤ect of
all types of quotas on womens share in parliament is steadily increasing the
longer the quotas have been applied. As expected, the size of reserved seats
quotas is more quantitatively signicant than the size of legislative quotas.
This is because reserved seats quotas are more strongly enforced than the leg-
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islative quotas. Additionally, our F-tests also suggest that our instruments
are strong instruments.
Our ndings concerning the e¤ectiveness of reserved seats quotas are con-
sistent with the ndings of Tripp and Kang (2008). However, the ndings
of Tripp and Kang (2008) concerning the e¤ectiveness of legislative quotas
di¤er from ours. Specically, Tripp and Kang (2008) nd that legislative
quotas are not statistically signicant in explaining the increase in womens
share in parliament. Similarly, a study by Chen (2010) also nds that while
party quotas are statistically signicant in explaining womens share in par-
liament; legal quotas (including both legislative quotas and reserved seats
quotas) are not. Both studies, however, cover a shorter estimation period
than our study. Moreover, our methods are di¤erent from theirs. Tripp and
Kang (2008) use cross-section OLS; while Chen (2010) use rst-di¤erencing
between two time periods. Additionally, our ndings concerning the e¤ect
of the legislative quota size are supported by two other studies. Kotsadam
and Nerman (2012) and Schwindt-Bayer (2009) nd a positive and statisti-
cally signicant correlation between legislative quota size and womens share
in parliament. Our ndings relating to the duration of legislative quotas is
also consistent with the results from these two studies. To the best of our
knowledge, there are no existing studies that include the duration of di¤erent
types of quotas in their analysis.
Our second stage results show that all models yield no statistically sig-
nicant correlation between womens share in parliament and corruption. In
addition, the Hansen J-test results indicate that our instruments are plau-
sibly exogenous. Hence, our results suggest that increasing womens share
in parliament does not a¤ect corruption signicantly. Our conclusion here
is also similar to the conclusion we derive from our second stage regressions
with the just-identied model (that is, with Quotas (of any type) as the only
instrumental variable).
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Regional Our second stage results show that womens share in parliament
is not statistically signicant in all regressions except in Latin America (with-
out controls). However, our F-tests of excluded instruments show that our
instruments are weak instruments for for Latin America. Moreover, the hy-
pothesis tests which are robust to weak instruments reveal no statistically
signicant correlation between womens share in parliament and corruption
in this region. Notably, the model with dynamic quota e¤ects and di¤er-
ent quota types no longer display large positive and statistically signicant
womens share in parliament coe¢ cient estimates for Europe and OECD
which we reported in Table 3.10. Those unexpected results, therefore, do
not survive in our preferred specication.
Interestingly, Africa is the only region where we nd a negative correlation
between womens share in parliament and corruption which is robust to the
inclusion of controls. Although this correlation is not statistically signicant,
it is quantitatively signicant. Increasing womens share in parliament in
Africa by one standard deviation (8.58 percentage points) leads to a decrease
in corruption index by 13% to 20% of a standard deviation. From the regional
rst stage regressions, we note that out of the three types of quotas, reserved
seats quotas have the strongest quantitative e¤ects in Africa (the coe¢ cients
are not reported). Thus, the results for Africa seem to be driven by the
reserved seats quotas. Owing to this reason, we will next focus on the e¤ect
of womens share in parliament, instrumented by reserved seats quotas, on
corruption in Africa. As Asia and Africa are the only two regions which have
adopted reserved seats quotas in our sample, we will report our results for
each region.
Instrumental Variables: Reserved Seats Quota Sizes
Africa and Asia For Africa, our sample consists of three countries which
had adopted only reserved seats quotas and nine countries which had adopted
no quotas at all. For Asia, our sample consists of four countries which had
adopted only reserved seats quotas and 16 countries which had adopted no
quotas at all. Table 3.13 presents our results.
The F-statistic values of our excluded instruments in our rst stage results
suggest that reserved seats quotas are strong instruments for womens share
in parliament in both regions. From our second stage results, we nd that
womens share in parliament is negatively correlated with corruption in both
regions; this correlation is only statistically signicant for Africa when no
controls are included. However, the quantitative e¤ects of womens share in
parliament in Africa is quite large in regressions with and without controls.
Increasing womens share in parliament in Africa by one standard deviation
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(8.58 percentage points) yields a decrease in the corruption index by about
30% (with controls) to 70% (without controls) of a standard deviation. The
womens share in parliament coe¢ cients in Africa are larger in absolute terms
compared with those from the OLS regressions and the TSLS regressions
(using di¤erent types of quotas as instruments).
Table 3.13: TSLS Corruption Regressions (IV: Reserved Seats Quota Sizes) - Africa and Asia
Second Stage
Africa Asia
VARIABLES
% Women in parliament (without controls) -0.0853** -0.00266
(0.0344) (0.0192)
% Women in parliament (with controls) -0.0390 -0.0230
(0.0386) (0.0191)
Chi-squared-statistic: Controls (11)=1223.03 (10)=725.43
(p=0.00) (p=0.00)
Hansen J (without controls) (p-value) 0.92 0.46
Hansen J (with controls) (p-value) 0.78 0.71
CLR (without controls) (p-value) 0.92 0.88
CLR (with controls) (p-value) 0.92 0.60
AR (without controls) (p-value) 0.69 0.59
AR (with controls) (p-value) 0.93 0.73
K-J (without controls) (p-value) 0.92 0.89
K-J (with controls) (p-value) 0.91 0.60
Observations 297 471
Number of countries 12 20
First Stage
VARIABLES % Women in Parliament
F-statistic: Excluded instruments (without controls) (6,11)=26.06 (6,19)=2538.49
(p=0.00) (p=0.00)
F-statistic: Excluded instruments (with controls) (6,11)=14.56 (6,19)=260.59
(p=0.00) (p=0.00)
F-statistic: Controls (11,11)=51.52 (11,19)=376.24
(p=0.00) (p=0.00)
Observations 305 487
Number of countries 12 20
Adjusted R-squared (without controls) 0.714 0.799
Adjusted R-squared (with controls) 0.769 0.820
Country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Country-Specic Time Trends Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dynamic quota e¤ects are included in the rst stage regressions.
However, we note that our results for Africa focus on the only three
African countries which adopted reserved seats quotas alone during our es-
timation period; these countries are Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Two of
these countries - Somalia and Sudan - had also experienced a long period of
civil war during our estimation period. As a robustness check, we estimate
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the same equation for both regions with an increased sample size to include
all countries which had adopted both reserved seats quotas and other types
of quotas and countries which had adopted no quotas at all. This increased
sample size includes an additional ve African countries and one Asian coun-
try. Table 3.14 presents our results.
Table 3.14: TSLS Corruption Robustness Regressions (IV: Reserved Seats Quota Sizes) - Africa and Asia
Second Stage
Africa Asia
VARIABLES
% Women in parliament (without controls) -0.0404** -0.00380
(0.0197) (0.0214)
% Women in parliament (with controls) -0.0349 -0.0285
(0.0221) (0.0197)
Chi-squared-statistic: Controls (11)=150.81 (10)=581.12
(p=0.00) (p=0.00)
Hansen J (without controls) (p-value) 0.72 0.42
Hansen J (with controls) (p-value) 0.73 0.75
CLR (without controls) (p-value) 0.27 0.67
CLR (with controls) (p-value) 0.35 0.46
AR (without controls) p-value 0.32 0.53
AR (with controls) p-value 0.56 0.67
K-J (without controls) (p-value) 0.23 0.74
K-J (with controls) (p-value) 0.31 0.41
Observations 462 499
Number of countries 18 21
First Stage
VARIABLES % Women in Parliament
F-statistic: Excluded instruments (without controls) (6,17)=15.43 (6,20)=1151.44
(p=0.00) (p=0.00)
F-statistic: Excluded instruments (with controls) (6,17)=17.67 (6,20)=109.40
(p=0.00) (p=0.00)
F-statistic: Controls (11,17)=19.54 (11,20)=48.35
(p=0.00) (p=0.00)
Observations 470 515
Number of countries 18 21
Adjusted R-squared (without controls) 0.797 0.751
Adjusted R-squared (with controls) 0.832 0.801
Country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Country-Specic Time Trends Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dynamic quota e¤ects are included in the rst stage regressions.
Table 3.14 shows that including countries which had adopted both re-
served seats quotas and other types of quotas does not change our qual-
itative results. Although the womens share in parliament coe¢ cient for
Africa without controls is reduced in magnitude by more than a half, it is
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still quantitatively and statistically signicant. When controls are included,
the coe¢ cient of womens share in parliament is similar in magnitude even
though it loses its statistical signicance. Thus, we nd some evidence that
increasing womens share in parliament in Africa reduces corruption.
3.4.3 Robustness Checks
In this section, we perform a sequence of robustness checks to investigate if
our results are sensitive to: (i) including PR-List variable as an additional
instrument or control; (ii) using Quotas (of any type) with their dynamic
e¤ects as instruments; (iii) using rst-di¤erencing instead of the xed e¤ects
method; (iv) di¤erentiating between strong and weak legislative quotas; (v)
using only legislative quotas and reserved seats quotas as instruments. Table
3.15 presents our results. To conserve space, we report only the coe¢ cient
estimates for womens share in parliament and omit the diagnostic statistics.
Table 3.15: TSLS Corruption Robustness Regressions - Full Sample
Second Stage
VARIABLES (1) (2)
PR-List
% Women in parliament 0.0274 0.0246
(0.0250) (0.0296)
First-Di¤erencing
% Women in parliament -0.00292 -0.00249
(0.00700) (0.00726)
Quotas (of any type) with dynamic e¤ects
% Women in parliament 0.0328* 0.0290
(0.0184) (0.0220)
Strong & weak legislative quotas
with dynamic e¤ects
% Women in parliament 0.00620 -0.000176
(0.0148) (0.0175)
Legislative quotas & reserved seats quotas
with dynamic e¤ects
% Women in parliament -0.0254 -0.0308
(0.0222) (0.0244)
Country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Country-Specic Time Trends Yes Yes
Controls No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Proportional Representation (PR)-List
We perform a robustness check by including PR-List variable in our analysis
as an additional instrument or control. We have identied a few versions
of the PR variable: i) PR-List; ii) PR-List & PR-Single Transferable Vote
(STV); iii) Mixed-PR (a combination of PR and Majoritarian). In order to
determine which PR variable is the most appropriate for our analysis, we
have regressed each PR variable - together with other explanatory variables
against corruption as the dependent variable. We nd that PR-List has the
strongest association with corruption. Including PR-STV (version 2) does
not a¤ect this correlation signicantly; further including Mixed-PR (version
3) results in a weak correlation between our PR variable and corruption. As
PR-List is the variable most often used in a related literature, we use the PR-
List dummies in our analysis. The PR-List dummy variable takes the value
1 when PR-List was adopted and 0 otherwise. Moreover, data on electoral
systems is often only available for the later period of our sample. In order to
avoid excessive data loss in our sample, we assume that the electoral system
in the earlier period is the same as the electoral system in the later period.
This seems to be a resonable assumption given typically strong persistence
in electoral systems.
We conduct our robustness check here by including PR-List in the TSLS
regressions with a single instrument, that is, Quotas (of any type). We
nd that including PR-List as an additional instrument weakens our set of
instruments and does not alter our results dramatically. We also conduct
a further robustness check by including PR-List as an additional control
instead; our results also do not change signicantly (results are not reported).
Therefore, we conclude that our results are robust to the inclusion of PR as
either an additional instrument or as an additional control.
Dynamic E¤ects of Quotas (of Any Type)
We investigate the e¤ect of using the dynamic e¤ects of Quotas (of any type)
as instruments in these regressions and nd no major changes in our results.
The magnitudes of the coe¢ cient estimates are very similar to those reported
in the corresponding regressions without dynamic e¤ects in Table 3.9.
TSLS First-Di¤erencing (FD)
We estimate our TSLS regressions with rst-di¤erencing (FD) instead of xed
e¤ects (FE) for the just-identied model. That is, we estimate the following
structural corruption equation:
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Corrit = 0 + 1\Femit + 2Wit + t + it+uit (3.8)
There are some similarities and di¤erences between FD and FE as explained
by Wooldridge (2012). With two time periods, FD and FE estimators are
equivalent; with more than two time periods, they are not. FE is more
e¢ cient than FD when the error terms are serially uncorrelated; FE estimator
is more often used than FD estimator as the unobserved e¤ects model is
normally stated with serially uncorrelated idiosyncratic errors. Nonetheless,
Wooldridge (2012) highlights the di¢ culty to test whether the error terms
are serially uncorrelated after FE estimation. Hence, we apply FD here to
see if our results are sensitive to this di¤erent specication. As we can see
from our results, applying FD instead of FE does not alter our main results.
Strong Legislative Quotas and Weak Legislative Quotas
We also investigate the e¤ects of di¤erentiating between strong and weak
legislative quotas in our regressions with di¤erent types of quotas and their
dynamic e¤ects. As mentioned in our earlier section, we dene legislative
quotas as strong if the quotas have both a placement mandate and a strong
enforcement mechanism following Schwindt-Bayer (2009).
Our rst-stage results conrm our prediction and Schwindt-Bayers (2009)
nding that the design of quotas matters. From the rst stage regressions
(results are not reported), we nd that strong legislative quotas are generally
more e¤ective in increasing womens share in parliament than weak legislative
quotas. This is especially true for the rst election period the legislative
quotas were adopted; the e¤ect of strong legislative quotas is between 2.8 to
3.9 times the e¤ect of weak legislative quotas. Weak quotas, however, still
have statistically signicant positive e¤ects on womens share in parliament.
Our second stage results show that there are no signicant changes to our
main results as a consequence of using this specication.
Legislative Quotas and Reserved Seats Quotas
In this robustness check, we model voluntary party quotas as equivalent to
no quotas on the basis they are not legally enforceable. Using only legislative
quotas and reserved seats quotas with dynamic e¤ects as our instruments,
we nd that our instruments become weaker. Although the coe¢ cients of
womens share in parliament are negative, they are still not statistically sig-
nicant.
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3.5 Conclusion
There has been much evidence suggesting that increasing womens share
in parliament leads to lower corruption. However, this evidence tends to be
derived from cross-section studies which are likely to su¤er from bias resulting
from their inability to control for unoberved heterogeneity. Our panel study
has allowed us to control for this source of bias. Using OLS and controlling
for country xed e¤ects and country-specic time trends, we do not nd a
statistically signicant e¤ect of womens share in parliament on corruption.
Our results therefore suggest that the previous cross-country OLS results are
likely to be biased downwards due to the unobserved heterogeneity.
However, even after controlling for this unobserved heterogeneity, our
xed e¤ects OLS estimations may still su¤er from bias resulting from other
sources of the endogeneity of womens share in parliament variable. Further
applying TSLS to our panel data has allowed us to control for this source
of bias. Specically, using quotas - in the form of party quotas, legislative
quotas and reserved seats quotas - as instruments for womens share in par-
liament has enabled us to isolate the exogenous variation in the womens
share in parliament variable that is not correlated with corruption. Using
valid instruments is crucial in order to derive valid causal inference from the
TSLS method. We have shown in our results that our quota instruments
appear to be reasonably valid; that is they are relevant and plausibly ex-
ogenous. Our rst stage TSLS results suggest that quotas are e¤ective in
increasing womens share in parliament. The e¤ect of quotas also appears to
be stronger the longer they have been implemented. Nevertheless, our second
stage TSLS regressions yield no statistically signicant correlation between
womens share in parliament and corruption in our full sample. Thus, our
TSLS results are consistent with our xed e¤ects OLS results.
Applying TSLS to our regional samples, however, reveals a statistically
and quantitatively signicant negative relationship between womens share in
parliament and corruption in Africa. This results for Africa are also consis-
tent with our xed e¤ects OLS results for Africa; although we nd a stronger
e¤ect using TSLS. The e¤ect of womens share in parliament in Africa is
stronger when we instrument womens share in parliament in Africa by using
reserved seats quotas - the quotas which have the most powerful impact on
female share in parliament in Africa. We therefore conclude that increas-
ing womens share in parliament may lead to signicantly lower corruption
in Africa. We nd no such conclusive ndings for other regions. Notably,
Africa is the most corrupt, the least democratic and the least developed re-
gion with the fewest economic and social rights for women. Furthermore,
reserved seats quotas are mostly adopted in Africa.
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We also nd that our results are robust to: (i) including PR-List as an
additional instrument; (ii) using FD instead of FE; (iii) using Quotas (of any
type) with their dynamic e¤ects as instruments; (iv) di¤erentiating between
strong and weak legislative quotas in our set of instruments; and (v) using
only legislative quotas and reserved seats as instruments.
We do not rule out completely the possibility of omitted variable bias in
our study. We have tried to control for this bias by including a set of control
variables, namely democracy, womens political rights, womens social rights,
womens economic rights, economic development and communism. However,
as we point out in our earlier section, these variables are potentially endoge-
nous. Hence, this must be kept in mind when interpreting our results with
controls. Furthermore, as Angrist and Pischke (2014) highlight, including
country-specic time trends potentially generates imprecise and inconclusive
results especially when the treatment emerges gradually. We have, however,
modelled the dynamic e¤ects of our instruments (that is, quotas) to resolve
this issue, following Wolfers (2006).
Notwithstanding many studies on gender and corruption to date, there
has been limited evidence for the causal e¤ect of womens share in politics
and corruption. Overall, our results suggest that increasing womens share
in parliament, in general, does not lead to lower corruption except in the
specic case of Africa with reserved seats quotas. There is scope for future
research to investigate the causes of this regional heterogeneity.
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Appendices
A List of Countries
Region Country
Africa Algeria Malawi
Angola Mali
Botswana Morocco
Burkina Faso Mozambique
Cameroon Namibia
Congo Niger
Côte dIvoire Nigeria
Congo, D. R. Senegal
Egypt Sierra Leone
Ethiopia Somalia
Gabon South Africa
Gambia Sudan
Ghana Togo
Guinea Tunisia
Guinea-Bissau Uganda
Kenya Tanzania
Liberia Zambia
Libya Zimbabwe
Madagascar
Latin America and Caribbean Argentina Haiti
Bahamas Guyana
Bolivia Honduras
Brazil Jamaica
Canada Mexico
Chile Nicaragua
Colombia Panama
Costa Rica Paraguay
Cuba Peru
Dominican Rep. Suriname
Ecuador Trinidad and Tobago
El Salvador Uruguay
Guatemala Venezuela
Asia Armenia Malaysia
Azerbaijan Mongolia
Bahrain Myanmar
Bangladesh Oman
China Pakistan
Cyprus Philippines
Korea, North Qatar
India Republic of Korea
Indonesia Singapore
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Iran Sri Lanka
Iraq Syria
Israel Thailand
Japan Turkey
Jordan Viet Nam
Kazakhstan Yemen
Lebanon Papua New Guinea
Europe Albania Lithuania
Austria Luxembourg
Belarus Malta
Belgium Moldova
Bulgaria Netherlands
Croatia Norway
Czech Republic Poland
Denmark Portugal
Estonia Romania
Finland Russia
France Serbia
Germany Slovakia
Greece Slovenia
Hungary Spain
Iceland Sweden
Ireland Switzerland
Italy Latvia
United Kingdom
OECD Australia Japan
Austria Korea
Belgium Luxembourg
Canada Mexico
Chile Netherlands
Czech Republic New Zealand
Denmark Norway
Estonia Poland
Finland Portugal
France Slovakia
Germany Slovenia
Greece Spain
Hungary Sweden
Iceland Switzerland
Ireland Turkey
Israel United Kingdom
Italy USA
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B Countries and Years of Quota Adoptions
No Country Party Legislative Reserved seats No quota
With info No info Weak Strong
1 Albania 2001-2008 2009-2013 1984-2000
2 Algeria 2002-2011 2012-2013 1984-2001
3 Angola 2008-2013 1984-2007
4 Argentina 2001-2013 1993-2013 1984-1992
5 Armenia 1995-1998 1999-2006 2007-2013 1984-1994
6 Australia 1996-2013 1984-1995
7 Austria 1986-2013 1984-1985
8 Azerbaijan 1984-2013
9 Bahamas 1984-2013
10 Bahrain 1984-2013
11 Bangladesh 1973-2000; 2001-2004
2005-2013
12 Belarus 1984-2013
13 Belgium 1985-2006 1999-2006 2007-2013 1984
14 Bolivia 2002-2013 1997-2013 1984-1996
15 Botswana 1994-2013 1984-1993
16 Brazil 1986-1997 1998-2013 1984-1985
17 Bulgaria 1984-2013
18 Burkina Faso 2002-2011 2012-2013 1984-2001
19 Cameroon 1997-2013 1984-1996
20 Canada 1988-2013 1984-1987
21 Chile 1990-2013 1984-1989
22 China 2008-2013 1984-2007
23 Colombia 1984-2013
24 Congo 1984-2013
25 Congo, D. R. 2011-2013 1984-2010
26 Costa Rica 1998-2013 1998-2001 2002-2013 1984-1997
27 Côte dIvoire 2011-2013 1984-2010
28 Croatia 2000-2013 1984-1999
29 Cuba 1984-2013
30 Cyprus 2001-2013 1991-2000 1984-1990
31 Czech Republic 1996-2013 1984-1995
32 Denmark 1987-1993 1984-1986;
1994-2013
33 Dominican Rep. 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2013 1984-1993
34 Ecuador 1998-2013
35 Egypt 2011-2013 1979-1986; 1987-2009
2010
36 El Salvador 1994-2013 1984-1993
37 Estonia 1984-2013
38 Ethiopia 2005-2013 1984-2004
39 Finland 1984-2013
40 France 1997-2001 2002-2013 1984-1996
41 Gabon 1984-2013
42 Gambia 1984-2013
43 Germany 1987-2013 1984-1986
44 Ghana 2000-2007 1992-1999; 1984-1991
2008-2013
45 Greece 1996-2013 2012-2013 1984-1995
46 Guatemala 2003-2013 1984-2002
47 Guinea 2013 1984-2012
48 Guinea-Bissau 1984-2013
49 Guyana 2001-2013 1984-2000
50 Haiti 2000-2010 1991-1999 1984-1990;
2011-2013
51 Honduras 2001-2013 1984-2000
52 Hungary 2002-2013 1984-2001
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53 Iceland 1999-2013 1984-1998
54 India 1996-2008 2009-2013 1984-1995
55 Indonesia 2004-2013 1984-2013
56 Iran 1984-2013
57 Iraq 2005-2009 2010-2013 1984-2004
58 Ireland 1992-2013 1984-1991
59 Israel 1999-2013 1984-1998
60 Italy 1987-2013 1994-1995 1984-1986
61 Jamaica 1984-2013
62 Japan 1984-2013
63 Jordan 2003-2013 1984-2002
64 Kazakhstan 1984-2013
65 Kenya 2002-2013 1997-2013 1984-1996
66 Korea, North 1998-2008 1984-1997;
2009-2013
67 Korea, South 2000-2003 2004-2011 2012-2013 1984-1999
68 Latvia 1984-2013
69 Lebanon 1984-2013
70 Liberia 2005-2010 1984-2004;
2011-2013
71 Libya 2012-2013 1984-2011
72 Lithuania 1996-2013 1984-1995
73 Luxembourg 2004-2013 1994-2003 1984-1993
74 Madagascar 1984-2013
75 Malawi 2004-2013 1984-2003
76 Malaysia 1984-2013
77 Mali 2007-2013 2002-2006 1984-2001
78 Malta 2003-2013 1984-2002
79 Mexico 1994-2013 2003-2013 1984-1993
80 Moldova 2005-2008 1984-2004;
2009-2013
81 Mongolia 2012-2013 1984-2011
82 Morocco 1993-2010 2011-2013 2002-2013 1984-1992
83 Mozambique 1999-2013 1984-1998
84 Myanmar 1984-2013
85 Namibia 1999-2013 1984-1998
86 Netherlands 1989-2013 1984-1988
87 New Zealand 1984-2013
88 Nicaragua 2001-2013 1990-2000 1984-1989
89 Niger 1989-2013 2004-2013 1984-1988
90 Nigeria 1984-2013
91 Norway 1977-2013
92 Oman 1984-2013
93 Pakistan 1973-1989; 1990-2001
2002-2013
94 Panama 1984-2013
95 Papua New Guinea 1984-2013
96 Paraguay 2003-2013 1984-2002
97 Peru 2000-2013 1984-2013
98 Philippines 1984-2013
99 Poland 2001-2010 2011-2013 1984-2000
100 Portugal 2005-2008 2009-2013 1984-2004
101 Qatar 1984-2013
102 Romania 2004-2013 1984-2003
103 Russia 1984-2013
104 Senegal 1998-2011 2012-2013 1984-1997
105 Serbia 2007-2013 1984-2006
106 Sierra Leone 1984-2013
107 Singapore 1984-2013
108 Slovakia 2002-2013 1994-2001 1984-1993
109 Slovenia 1992-2013 2008-2013 1984-1991
110 Somalia 2004-2013 1984-2003
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111 South Africa 1994-2013 1984-1993
112 Spain 1989-2007 2008-2013 1984-1988
113 Sri Lanka 1984-2013
114 Sudan 2005-2013 1984-2004
115 Suriname 1984-2013
116 Sweden 1973-2013
117 Switzerland 1987-2013 1984-1986
118 Syria 1984-2013
119 Tanzania 2000-2013 1990-1999 1975-2013
120 Thailand 2006-2013 2001-2005 1984-2000
121 Togo 1984-2013
122 Trinidad and Tobago 1984-2013
123 Tunisia 2004-2010 2011-2013 1984-2003
124 Turkey 1995-2013 1984-1994
125 Uganda 1989-2013 1984-1988
126 United Kingdom 1997-2000; 1984-1996;
2005-2013 2001-2004
127 Uruguay 1984-2013
128 USA 1984-2013
129 Venezuela 2000-2004 1993-1997 1998-1999 1984-1992;
2005-2013
130 Viet Nam 1984-2013
131 Yemen 1984-2013
132 Zambia 1984-2013
133 Zimbabwe 2000-2013 1984-1999
Sources: Quota Project (2015), Chen (2010), Krook (2009), Krook (2006) and Dahlerup (2006b)
Notes: "Party", "Legislative" and "Reserved Seats" refer to di¤erent types of quotas.
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C Countries and Legislative Quota Sizes
No Country Year Quota size (%)
1 Albania 2009-2013 30
2 Angola 2008-2013 30
3 Argentina 1993-2013 30
4 Armenia 1999-2006 5
2007-2013 15
5 Belgium 1999-2006 33
2007-2013 50
6 Bolivia 1997-2013 30
7 Brazil 1998-2013 30
8 Burkina Faso 2012-2013 30
9 Congo, DR 2011-2013 50
10 Costa Rica 1998-2001 40
2002-2013 40
11 Dominican Republic 1998-2001 25
2002-2013 33
12 Ecuador 1998-2001 20
2002-2005 30
2006-2008 35
2009-2013 50
13 France 2002-2013 50
14 Greece 2012-2013 33
15 Guinea 2013 30
16 Guyana 2001-2013 33
17 Honduras 2001-2012 30
2013 40
18 Indonesia 2004-2013 30
19 Iraq 2005-2009 25
20 Korea, North 1998-2008 20
21 Korea, South 2004-2013 30
2008-2011 30
2012-2013 30
22 Liberia 2005-2010 30
23 Libya 2012-2013 50
24 Mexico 2003-2011 30
2012-2013 40
25 Mongolia 2012-2013 20
26 Peru 2000 25
2001-2013 30
27 Poland 2011-2013 35
28 Portugal 2009-2013 33
29 Senegal 2012-2013 50
30 Serbia 2007-2013 30
31 Slovenia 2008-2013 35
32 Spain 2008-2013 40
33 Tunisia 2011-2013 50
34 Venezuela 1998-1999 30
Sources: Quota Project (2015), Krook (2009)
Notes: Egypt and Italy had legislative quotas but there is no information available on the size of their
legislative quotas.
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D Countries and Reserved Seats Quota Sizes
No Country Year Quota size (%)
1 Algeria 2012-2013 20
2 Bangladesh 1973-1978 5
1979-2000 10
2005-2010 13
2011-2013 14
3 China 2008-2013 22
4 Egypt 1979-1986 8
2010 13
5 Iraq 2010-2013 25
6 Jordan 2003-2009 5
2010-2013 10
7 Kenya 1997-2012 3
2013 14
8 Morocco 2002-2010 9
2011-2013 15
9 Niger 2004-2013 10
10 Pakistan 1973-1984 3
1985-1989 8
2002-2013 18
11 Somalia 2004-2011 12
2012-2013 30
12 Sudan 2005-2009 13
2010-2013 25
13 Uganda 1989-1995 13
1996-2000 14
2001-2013 18
14 Tanzania 1975-1979 7
1980-1994 6
1995-1999 15
2000-2004 20
2005-2013 30
Sources: Quota Project (2015), Krook (2009)
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E Countries and Electoral Systems
No Country PR-List PR-STV Mixed Non-PR No info
1 Albania 2009-2013 1992-2008 1984-1991
2 Algeria 2012-2013 1984-2011
3 Angola 2012-2013 1984-2011
4 Argentina 1984-2013
5 Armenia 1995-2013 1984-1994
6 Australia 1984-2013
7 Austria 1984-2013
8 Azerbaijan 2010-2013 1984-2009
9 Bahamas 1984-2013
10 Bahrain 2010-2013 1984-2009
11 Bangladesh 1991-2013 1984-1990
12 Belarus 2012-2013 1984-2011
13 Belgium 1984-2013
14 Bolivia 1984-1996 1997-2013
15 Botswana 2009-2013 1984-2008
16 Brazil 1984-2013
17 Bulgaria 1991-2008 2009-2013 1984-1990
18 Burkina Faso 2012-2013 1984-2011
19 Cameroon 2013 1984-2012
20 Canada 1984-2013
21 Chile 1984-2013
22 China 2013 1984-2012
23 Colombia 1984-2013
24 Congo 1984-1997; 1998-2011
2012-2013
25 Congo, D. R. 2011-2013 1984-2010
26 Costa Rica 1984-2013
27 Côte dIvoire 2011-2013 1984-2010
28 Croatia 2000-2013 1992-1996 1997-1999 1984-1991
29 Cuba 2013 1984-2012
30 Cyprus 1985-2013 1984
31 Czech Republic 1996-2013 1984-1995
32 Denmark 1984-2013
33 Dominican Rep. 1984-2013
34 Ecuador 1984-1997; 1998-2001
2002-2013
35 Egypt 2011-2013 1984-2010
36 El Salvador 1985-2013 1984
37 Estonia 1992-2013 1984-1991
38 Ethiopia 2010-2013 1984-2009
39 Finland 1984-2013
40 France 1986-1987 1988-2013
41 Gabon 2011-2013 1984-2010
42 Gambia 2012-2013 1984-2011
43 Germany 1990-2013 1984-1989
44 Ghana 2004-2013 1984-2003
45 Greece 1984-2006; 2007-2011
2012-2013
46 Guatemala 1984-2013
47 Guinea 2013 1984-2012
48 Guinea-Bissau 1999-2013 1984-1998
49 Guyana 2011-2013 1984-2010
50 Haiti 2010-2013 1984-2009
51 Honduras 1984-2013
52 Hungary 1990-2013 1984-1989
53 Iceland 1984-2013
54 India 1984-2013
55 Indonesia 1999-2013 1984-1998
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56 Iran 2012-2013 1984-2011
57 Iraq 2010-2013 1984-2009
58 Ireland 1984-2013
59 Israel 1984-2013
60 Italy 1984-1993; 1994-2005
2006-2013
61 Jamaica 1984-2013
62 Japan 1996-2013 1984-1995
63 Jordan 2013 1984-2012
64 Kazakhstan 2012-2013 1984-2011
65 Kenya 1997-2013 1984-1996
66 Korea, North 2009-2013 1984-2008
67 Korea, South 1988-2013 1984-1987
68 Latvia 1993-2013 1984-1992
69 Lebanon 2009-2013 1984-2008
70 Liberia 2005-2013 1984-2004
71 Libya 2012-2013 1984-2011
72 Lithuania 1992-2013 1984-1991
73 Luxembourg 1984-2013
74 Madagascar 1993-1997 1998-2006; 2007-2012
2013
75 Malawi 1994-2013 1984-1993
76 Malaysia 2013 1984-2012
77 Mali 1992-2013 1984-1991
78 Malta 1984-2013
79 Mexico 2000-2013 1984-1999
80 Moldova 1998-2013 1984-1997
81 Mongolia 2012-2013 1996-2011 1984-1995
82 Morocco 2011-2013 1984-2010
83 Mozambique 2009-2013 1984-2008
84 Myanmar 2010-2013 1984-2009
85 Namibia 2009-2013 1984-2008
86 Netherlands 1984-2013
87 New Zealand 1996-2013
88 Nicaragua 1990-2013 1984-1989
89 Niger 1993-2008; 1984-1992;
2011-2013 2009-2010
90 Nigeria 1984-2013
91 Norway 1984-2013
92 Oman 1984-2010
93 Pakistan 1984-2013
94 Panama 1989-2013 1984-1988
95 Papua New Guinea 2012-2013 1984-2011
96 Paraguay 1993-2013 1989-1992 1984-1988
97 Peru 1984-2013
98 Philippines 1998-2013 1987-1997 1984-1986
99 Poland 1991-2013 1984-1990
100 Portugal 1984-2013
101 Qatar 2013 1984-2012
102 Romania 1990-2007 2008-2013 1984-1989
103 Russia 2011-2013 1984-2010
104 Senegal 2001-2013 1984-2000
105 Serbia 2007-2013 1984-2006
106 Sierra Leone 1996-2001 1984-1995
107 Singapore 2011-2013 1984-2010
108 Slovakia 1994-2013 1984-1993
109 Slovenia 1992-2013 1984-1991
110 Somalia 2012-2013 1984-2011
111 South Africa 2009-2013 1984-2008
112 Spain 1984-2013
113 Sri Lanka 1989-2013 1984-1988
114 Sudan 2010-2013 1986-1991 1984-1985;
142
1992-2009
115 Suriname 1991-2013 1984-1990
116 Sweden 1984-2013
117 Switzerland 1984-2013
118 Syria 2012-2013 1984-2011
119 Tanzania 2010-2013 1984-2009
120 Thailand 2001-2013 1984-2000
121 Togo 2013 1984-2012
122 Trinidad and Tobago 1984-2013
123 Tunisia 2011-2013 1984-2010
124 Turkey 1984-1986; 1987-1994
1995-2013
125 Uganda 2011-2013 1984-2010
126 United Kingdom 1984-2013
127 Uruguay 1989-2013 1984-1988
128 USA 1984-2013
129 Venezuela 1984-1992 1993-2013
130 Viet Nam 2011-2013 1984-2010
131 Yemen 2003-2013 1984-2002
132 Zambia 2011-2013 1984-2010
133 Zimbabwe 2013 1984-2012
Sources: Bormann & Golder (2013), Inter-Parliamentary Union (2014a)
Notes: "PR-List" refers to Proportional Representation-List; "PR-STV" refers to Proportional Repre-
sentation - Single Transferable Vote; "Mixed" refers to a combination of Majoritarian and Proportional
Representation; "Non-PR" refers to Majoritarian/Plurality.
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Conclusion
The main objectives of this thesis have been: (i) to develop a theoretical
model showing the links between womens share in the government, corrup-
tion and development; (ii) to develop a theoretical model showing the links
between pollution, corruption and development; and (iii) to investigate em-
pirically the causal e¤ect of womens share in parliament on corruption. The
theoretical analyses are formulated in a dynamic general equilibrium frame-
work. This framework has allowed us to show the feedback interactions in a
single unied model between corruption, development and womens share in
the government; and between corruption, development and pollution. To the
best of our knowledge, such theoretical models have not been constructed to
date. Next, we have carried out an empirical investigation of the causal e¤ect
of womens share in parliament on corruption by: (i) exploiting panel data
from 133 countries for the period 1984 to 2013 using a xed e¤ects model;
and (ii) instrumenting for womens share in parliament using gender quotas
in the form of party quotas, legislative quotas and reserved seats quotas in
TSLS regressions. Panel data have allowed us to control for unobserved het-
erogeneity across countries and over time. Instrumenting for womens share
in parliament has further allowed us to isolate the exogenous variation for the
womens share in the parliament variable. We have also shown that gender
quotas are both relevant and plausibly exogenous. As such, they are reason-
ably valid instruments for womens share in parliament. Thus, we can rely on
the TSLS results to establish causality. In addition to analysing a full sample,
we have analysed subsamples to investigate regional heterogeneity. Again,
to the best of our knowledge, our study is the rst empirical investigation of
the links between womens share in parliament and corruption using TSLS
and covering such a large panel dataset. Most of the previous comparable
studies have relied heavily on single period cross-country studies which are
susceptible to biases resulting from unobserved heterogeneity, reverse causal-
ity and other sources of the endogeneity of womens share in parliament. In
terms of the results for each chapter we can state the following.
In Chapter 1, we developed a theoretical model in a dynamic general
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equilibrium framework, showing why and how increasing womens share in
the government may lower corruption. Without assuming any gender dif-
ferences in moral attitudes towards corruption, our model has shown that
female bureaucrats are less corrupt than male bureaucrats when they are
more wage-discriminated against in the private sector than in the public
sector. Our analysis has also shown the existence of the two-way causality
between corruption and development in which lower corruption and higher
development further reduces the female bureaucratsincentives to be corrupt.
These interactions create the possibility of a corruption-induced poverty trap
and corruption-dependent threshold e¤ects. As a result, our model has gen-
erated multiple (history-dependent) equilibria. The model thus presented a
situation in which the initial conditions essentially determine the limiting
outcomes of the economy. Equally important, our model has also shown that
increasing female participation in the public sector (if it is large enough)
can potentially help an economy escape from the corruption-induced poverty
trap. Our results imply that a policy to increase female participation in the
public sector is more e¤ective in reducing corruption if the government is a
more gender-equal employer than the private sector. We have not included
the interaction between gender discrimination and economic development in
our analysis due to the complex relationship between discrimination and de-
velopment. While development reduces discrimination in some countries by
increasing the spread of knowledge and altering the economys structure, it
does not a¤ect discrimination signicantly in others. Moreover, some aspects
of gender inequality - such as political participation and son preference - seem
to be persistent even in the developed economies. Up to now, there are a
few studies exploring the channels through which development interacts with
gender discrimination from a macroeconomic perspective. It will be a fruitful
future research avenue to analyse the interaction between discrimination and
development in the context of gender and corruption. Another interesting fu-
ture research avenue is the disproportionate impact of corruption on women
which has been suggested by Nyamu-Musembi (2007). There is also a scope
for research which investigate how other possible determinants of gender dif-
ferences in corrupt behaviour - such as gender di¤erences in risk aversion
and corrupt opportunities - interact with corruption and development in a
macroeconomic framework.
In Chapter 2, we presented a theoretical analysis of the inter-connections
between pollution, corruption and economic development. We nd that pol-
lution reduces economic development by way of reducing health and pro-
ductivity of workers, especially the low income workers. Moreover, the rela-
tionship between economic development and pollution is represented by an
inverse U-shaped EKC. As a result of this relationship pattern, the total
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impact of corruption on pollution may not be determined in a straightfor-
ward manner. Corruption has a clear positive direct e¤ect on pollution.
Corruption directly increases pollution by decreasing the strictness of envi-
ronmental regulations and/or lowering the e¤ectiveness of the environmental
regulations. Also, corruption indirectly a¤ects pollution through its negative
e¤ect on development. Moreover, whether corruption has positive or nega-
tive indirect e¤ects on pollution depends on where the economy is located in
its EKC. Before the turning point of the EKC, increasing development also
increases pollution. After the turning point, increasing development reduces
pollution. Therefore, the total e¤ect of corruption on pollution is largely
determined by the economys level of income. We have shown through our
analysis that the impact of eliminating corruption in reducing pollution is
greater when the economys income is above the income level at the turning
point of the EKC. Moreover, reducing corruption in poor countries may re-
sult in higher pollution. Similar to our analysis in Chapter 1, our model has
also revealed that the feasibility of transition between development regimes
determines the overall evolution of the economy, resulting in the possibility
of a corruption-induced poverty trap and corruption-dependent threshold ef-
fects. Consequently, our model has again presented a situation in which the
initial conditions essentially determine the limiting outcomes of the econ-
omy. Taking into account all of the above, we propose that a policy to
reduce pollution should not be substituted with a policy to foster economic
development. This is especially important for poor countries where reducing
corruption may result in higher pollution. Given much evidence that the
poor tend to be more exposed to pollution and also more susceptible to the
negative health e¤ects of pollution, the government should also target some
of its policy initiatives towards the poor. As research on this topic is still
relatively new, there is plenty of scope for future research investigating the
direct and indirect e¤ects of corruption on pollution. There is also a scope
for exploring the relationship between pollution and health inequality in the
context of corruption and development.
In Chapter 3, we investigated empirically the causal e¤ect of womens
share in parliament on corruption. The existing evidence showing a negative
correlation between womens share in parliament and corruption tends to be
derived from single period cross-section studies which are likely to su¤er from
bias resulting from unobserved heterogeneity, reverse causality and other
sources of the endogeneity of womens share in parliament variable. Using
panel data and instrumenting for womens share in parliament using gender
quotas have allowed us to control for these potential sources of bias. We
have shown that gender quotas are reasonably valid instruments, that is,
they are relevant and exogenous. This has given us more condence in the
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validity of the causal e¤ect derived from the TSLS regressions. Our full
sample regressions yield no statistically signicant e¤ect of womens share
in parliament on corruption. In our regional sample regressions, we nd a
statistically and quantitatively signicant negative e¤ect of womens share in
parliament in Africa, using reserved seats quotas as instruments. We nd no
such conclusive ndings in other regions. Our results therefore suggest that
the previous cross-country studies must be interpreted with much caution.
Our results also reveal the existence of regional heterogeneity. There is clearly
scope for further research to explore the causes of this regional heterogeneity
which is not well understood.
Finally, despite nding a theoretical mechanism explaining one possible
reason why increasing womens share in politics may lead to lower corruption
in Chapter 1, we have di¢ culty in nding a negative e¤ect of womens share
in politics on corruption in our empirical investigation in Chapter 3. In the
rst chapter, we have suggested that the lower gender wage gap in the public
sector compared to the private sector is one possible reason why women in
the public sector are less corrupt than their male counterparts. However, our
attempts to test this specic hypothesis were thwarted by data constraints.
Existing panel data on the public-private sector gender wage gap are highly
incomplete; there are only a very few countries and years for which published
data are available on public sector wages by sex. Therefore, careful empir-
ical investigation of this wage-gap mechanism must await appropriate data
collection.
147
References
Acemoglu, D. and Verdier, T. (1998). Property Rights, Corruption and the
Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach. The Economic
Journal, 108(450):13811403.
Ades, A. and Tella, R. D. (1997). National Champions and Corruption:
Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic. The Economic Journal,
107(443):10231042.
Aguayo-Rico, A., Guerra-Turrubiates, I. A., and Montes, R. (2005). Em-
pirical Evidence of the Impact of Health on Economic Growth. Issues in
Political Economy, 14:117.
Alatas, V., Cameron, L., and Chaudhuri, A. (2009). Gender, Culture, and
Corruption: Insights from an Experimental Analysis. Southern Economic
Journal, 75(3):663680.
Alhassan-Alolo, N. (2007). Gender and Corruption: Testing the New Con-
sensus. Public Administration and Development, 237:227237.
Anand, S. and Ravallion, M. (1993). Human Development in Poor Coun-
tries: On the Role of Private Incomes and Public Services. The Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 7(1):133150.
Andreoni, J. and Levinson, A. (2001). The Simple Analytics of the Environ-
mental Kuznets Curve. Journal of Public Economics, 80(2):269286.
Angrist, J. D. and Pischke, J. S. (2009). Mostly Harmless Econometrics.
Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.
Angrist, J. D. and Pischke, J.-S. (2014). MasteringMetrics: The Path from
Cause to E¤ect. Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.
Araujo, C. and Garcia, A. I. (2006). Latin America: the Experience and
the Impact of Quotas in Latin America. In Dahlerup, D., editor, Women,
Quotas and Politics, chapter 4, pages 83111. Routledge, New York.
148
Armantier, O. and Boly, A. (2010). Can Corruption Be Studied in the Lab?
Retrieved April 25, 2013, from http://www.amaboly.com/completed\
_files/CanCorruptionBeStudiedintheLabArmantier\&Boly.pdf.
Arrow, K., Bolin, B., Costanza, R., Dasgupta, P., Folke, C., Holling, C. S.,
Jansson, B.-O., Levin, S., Mäler, K.-G., Perrings, C., et al. (1995). Eco-
nomic Growth, Carrying Capacity, and the Environment. Ecological Eco-
nomics, 15(2):9195.
Arulampalam, W., Booth, A., and Bryan, M. (2007). Is There a Glass Ceiling
over Europe? Exploring the Gender Pay Gap across theWage Distribution.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 60(2):163186.
Aslam, M. and Kingdon, G. (2009). Public-Private Sector Segmentation in
the Pakistani Labour Market. Journal of Asian Economics, 20(1):3449.
Ballington, J. and Dahlerup, D. (2006). Gender Quotas in Post-Conict
States: East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq. In Dahlerup, D., editor,
Women, Quotas and Politics, chapter 10, pages 249258. Routledge, New
York.
Bardhan, P. (1997). Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues. Jour-
nal of Economic Literature, 35(3):13201346.
Barón, J. D. and Cobb-Clark, D. A. (2010). Occupational Segregation and
the Gender Wage Gap in Private- and Public-Sector Employment: A Dis-
tributional Analysis. Economic Record, 86(273):227246.
Becker, G. and Stigler, G. (1974). Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Com-
pensation of Enforces. The Journal of Legal Studies, 3(1):118.
Becker, G. S. (1971). The Economics of Discrimination. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 2nd edition.
Bell, M. L. and Ebisu, K. (2012). Environmental Inequality in Exposures to
Airborne Particulate Matter Components in the United States. Environ-
mental Health Perspectives, 120(12):1699.
Bell, M. L., ONeill, M. S., Cifuentes, L. A., Braga, A. L., Green, C., Nweke,
A., Rogat, J., and Sibold, K. (2005). Challenges and Recommendations
for the Study of Socioeconomic Factors and Air Pollution Health E¤ects.
Environmental Science & Policy, 8(5):525533.
Bidani, B. and Ravallion, M. (1997). Decomposing Social Indicators Using
Distributional Data. Journal of Econometrics, 77(1):125139.
149
Bimonte, S. (2002). Information Access, Income Distribution, and the Envi-
ronmental Kuznets Curve. Ecological Economics, 41(1):145156.
Biswas, A. K., Farzanegan, M. R., and Thum, M. (2012). Pollution, Shadow
Economy and Corruption: Theory and Evidence. Ecological Economics,
75:114125.
Bjarnegaard, E. (2008). Gender and Corruption - Reversing the Causal Di-
rection. American Political Science Annual Meeting Paper.
Blackburn, K. (2012). Corruption and Development: Explaining the Evi-
dence. The Manchester School, 80(4):401428.
Blackburn, K., Bose, N., and Haque, M. E. (2006). The Incidence and Per-
sistence of Corruption in Economic Development. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 30(12):24472467.
Blackburn, K., Bose, N., and Haque, M. E. (2010). Endogenous Corruption
in Economic Development. Journal of Economic Studies, 37(1):425.
Blackburn, K. and Forgues-Puccio, G. F. (2007). Distribution and De-
velopment in a Model of Misgovernance. European Economic Review,
51(6):15341563.
Blackburn, K. and Forgues-Puccio, G. F. (2011). Foreign Aid - A Fillip for
Development or a Fuel for Corruption? Development Research Working
Paper Series 09/2011. Retrieved March 29, 2013, from Institute for Ad-
vanced Development Studies website: http://www.inesad.edu.bo/pdf/
wp2011/wp09_2011.pdf.
Blackburn, K. and Sarmah, R. (2008). Corruption, Development and De-
mography. Economics of Governance, 9(4):341362.
Bloom, D. E., Canning, D., and Sevilla, J. (2004). The E¤ect of Health on
Economic Growth: A Production Function Approach.World Development,
32(1):113.
Bormann, N.-C. and Golder, M. (2013). Democratic Electoral Systems
around the World, 19462011. Electoral Studies, 32(2):360369.
Bovenberg, A. L. and Sjak, S. (1995). Environmental Quality and Pollution-
Augmenting Technological Change in a Two-Sector Endogenous Growth
Model. Journal of Public Economics, 57:369391.
150
Branisa, B. and Ziegler, M. (2011). Reexamining the Link between Gen-
der and Corruption: The Role of Social Institutions. Proceedings of the
German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011, No. 15. Leib-
niz Information Centre for Economics. Retrieved March 26, 2013, from
EconStor website: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48324.
Brown, P., Mayer, B., Zavestoski, S., Luebke, T., Mandelbaum, J., and Mc-
Cormick, S. (2003). The Health Politics of Asthma: Environmental Justice
and Collective Illness Experience in the United States. Social Science &
Medicine, 57(3):453464.
Brunekreef, B. and Holgate, S. T. (2002). Air Pollution and Health. The
Lancet, 360(9341):12331242.
Callister, D. J. (1999). Corrupt and Illegal Activities in the Forest Sec-
tor: Current Understandings and Implications for the World Bank.
Background Paper for the 2002 Forest Strategy. Retrieved March 31,
2014, from World Bank website: http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/EXTFORESTS/Resources/985784-1217874560960/Callister.pdf.
Carson, R. T., Jeon, Y., and McCubbin, D. R. (1997). The Relationship
between Air Pollution Emissions and Income: US Data. Environment and
Development Economics, 2(04):433450.
Caul, M. (2001). Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender
Quotas: A CrossNational Analysis. Journal of Politics, 63(4):12141229.
Center for Systemic Peace (2014). Polity IV Projects Revised Com-
bined Polity Score. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.
html (accessed October 1, 2014).
Chatterji, M., Mumford, K., and Smith, P. N. (2007). The Public-Private
Sector Wage Di¤erential: Gender, Workplaces and Family Friendliness.
Retrieved April 25, 2013, from http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~pns2/
MumfordEJspecial.pdf.
Chen, L.-J. (2010). Do Gender Quotas Inuence Womens Representation
and Policies? The European Journal of Comparative Economics, 7(1):13
60.
Childs, S. and Krook, M. L. (2006). Should Feminists Give Up on Critical
Mass? A Contingent Yes. Politics & Gender, 2(04):522530.
151
Cingranelli, D. L., Richards, D. L., and Clay, K. C. (2014). The CIRI Human
Rights Dataset - Version 2014.04.14. http://www.humanrightsdata.com/
(accessed August 23, 2014).
Cole, M. A. (2007). Corruption, Income and the Environment: An Empirical
Analysis. Ecological Economics, 62(3-4):637647.
Cole, M. A., Elliott, R. J. R., and Fredriksson, P. G. (2006). Endogenous
Pollution Havens: Does FDI Inuence Environmental Regulations? Scan-
dinavian Journal of Economics, 108(1):157178.
Cole, M. A., Rayner, A. J., and Bates, J. M. (1997). The Environmental
Kuznets Curve: An Empirical Analysis. Environment and Development
Economics, 2(4):401416.
Croll, E. (2000). Endangered Daughters: Discrimination and Development
in Asia. Routledge, London.
Dahlerup, D. (1988). From A Small to A Large Minority: Women in Scan-
dinavian Politics. Scandinavian Political Studies, 11(4):275298.
Dahlerup, D. (2006a). Introduction. In Dahlerup, D., editor,Women, Quotas
and Politics, chapter 1, pages 331. Routledge, New York.
Dahlerup, D., editor (2006b). Women, Quotas and Politics. Routledge, New
York.
Damania, R., Fredriksson, P. G., and List, J. A. (2003). Trade Liberalization,
Corruption, and Environmental Policy Formation: Theory and Evidence.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 46(3):490512.
Daoud, Y. and Shanti, R. (2012). Private-Public Sector Employment Choice
and Wage Di¤erential in Palestine: A Gender Perspective. Retrieved
March 29, 2013, from SSRN website: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2136708.
Dasgupta, S., Laplante, B., Wang, H., and Wheeler, D. (2002). Confronting
the Environmental Kuznets Curve. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,
16(1):147168.
Deaton, A. (2003). Health, Inequality, and Economic Development. Journal
of Economic Literature, 41:113158.
152
Devlin, C. and Elgie, R. (2008). The E¤ect of Increased Womens Repre-
sentation in Parliament: The Case of Rwanda. Parliamentary A¤airs,
61(2):237254.
Dinda, S. (2004). Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis: A Survey.
Ecological Economics, 49(4):431455.
Dollar, D., Fisman, R., and Gatti, R. (2001). Are Women Really the "Fairer"
Sex? Corruption and Women in Government. Journal of Economic Be-
havior & Organization, 46(4):423429.
Eagly, A. and Crowley, M. (1986). Gender and Helping Behavior: A Meta-
Analytic Review of the Social Psychological Literature. Psychological Bul-
letin, 100(3):283308.
Easterly, W. (2006). Reliving the 1950s: The Big Push, Poverty Traps,
and Takeo¤s in Economic Development. Journal of Economic Growth,
11(4):289318.
Echazu, L. (2010). Corruption and the Balance of Gender Power. Review of
Law and Economics, 6(1):5974.
Eckel, C. and Grossman, P. (1998). Are Women Less Selsh than Men?:
Evidence from Dictator Experiments. The Economic Journal, 108:726
735.
Esarey, J. and Chirillo, G. (2013). "Fairer Sex" or Purity Myth? Corruption,
Gender, and Institutional Context. Politics & Gender, 9(04):361389.
Ezzati, M., Kammen, D. M., and Division, E. M. (2002). The Health Im-
pacts of Exposure to Indoor Air Pollution from Solid Fuels in Developing
Countries: Knowledge, Gaps, and Data Needs. Environmental Health Per-
spectives, 110(11):10571068.
Ezzati, M., Singer, B. H., and Kammen, D. M. (2001). Towards an Integrated
Framework for Development and Environment Policy: The Dynamics of
Environmental Kuznets Curves. World Development, 29(8):14211434.
Ezzati, M., Utzinger, J., Cairncross, S., Cohen, A. J., and Singer, B. H.
(2005). Environmental Risks in the Developing World: Exposure Indica-
tors for Evaluating Interventions, Programmes, and Policies. Journal of
Epidemiology and Community Health, 59(1):1522.
Farzin, Y. H. and Bond, C. A. (2006). Democracy and Environmental Qual-
ity. Journal of Development Economics, 81(1):213235.
153
Feige, E. L. (1997). Underground Activity and Institutional Change: Pro-
ductive, Protective and Predatory Behavior in Transition Economies. In
Nelson, J. M., Tilly, C., and Walker, L., editors, Transforming Post-
Communist Political Economies, pages 2135. National Academy Press,
Washington, DC.
Finlay, K., Magnusson, L., and Scha¤er (2009). Implementing Weak-
Instrument Robust Tests for a General Class of Instrumental Variables
Models. Stata Journal, 9(3):398.
Finlay, K., Magnusson, L., and Scha¤er, M. E. (2014). WEAKIV: Stata Mod-
ule to PerformWeak-Instrument-Robust Tests and Condence Intervals for
Instrumental-Variable (IV) Estimation of Linear, Probit and Tobit Mod-
els. https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s457684.html (accessed
June 12, 2015).
Fisher, W. A., Fisher, J. D., and Harman, J. (2003). The Information-
Motivation-Behavioral Skills Model: A General Social Psychological Ap-
proach to Understanding and Promoting Health Behavior. In J., S. and
Wallston, K., editors, Social Psychological Foundations of Health and Ill-
ness, chapter 4, pages 82106. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Malden, MA.
Franceschet, S. and Piscopo, J. M. (2008). Gender Quotas and Womens
Substantive Representation: Lessons from Argentina. Politics & Gender,
4(03):393425.
Fredidenwall, L., Dahlerup, D., and Skjeie, H. (2006). The Nordic Countries:
An Incremental Model. In Dahlerup, D., editor, Women, Quotas and
Politics, chapter 3, pages 5582. Routledge, New York.
Fredriksson, P. G. and Svensson, J. (2003). Political Instability, Corruption
and Policy Formation: The Case of Environmental Policy. Journal of
Public Economics, 87(7-8):13831405.
Fredriksson, P. G., Vollebergh, H. R., and Dijkgraaf, E. (2004). Corruption
and Energy E¢ ciency in OECD Countries: Theory and Evidence. Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management, 47(2):207231.
Freeman, R. B. (1987). How Do Public Sector Wages and Employment
Respond to Economic Conditions? In Wise, D. A., editor, Public Sector
Payrolls, pages 183216. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
154
Fuller, S. (2005). Public Sector Employment and Gender Wage Inequalities
in British Columbia: Assessing the E¤ects of a Shrinking Public Sector.
The Canadian Journal of Sociology, 30(4):405439.
Gangadharan, L. and Valenzuela, M. R. (2001). Interrelationships be-
tween Income, Health and the Environment: Extending the Environmental
Kuznets Curve Hypothesis. Ecological Economics, 36(3):513531.
Gërxhani, K. (2007). Explaining Gender Di¤erences in Tax Evasion: The
Case of Tirana, Albania. Feminist Economics, 13(2):119155.
Glinskaya, E. and Lokshin, M. (2007). Wage Di¤erentials between the Pub-
lic and Private Sectors in India. Journal of International Development,
19(3):333355.
Glover, S. and Bumpus, M. (1997). Re-Examining the Inuence of Indi-
vidual values on Ethical Decision Making. Journal of Business Ethics,
16(12/13):13191329.
Goel, R. and Rich, D. (1989). On the Economic Incentives for Taking Bribes.
Public Choice, 61(3):269275.
Goertzel, T. (1983). The Gender Gap: Sex, Family Income, and Political
Opinions in the Early 1980s. Journal of Political and Military Sociology,
11:209222.
Goetz, A. M. (2007). Political Cleaners: Women as the New Anti-Corruption
Force? Development and Change, 38(1):87105.
Gornick, J. and Jacobs, J. (1998). Gender, the Welfare State, and Public
Employment: A Comparative Study of Seven Industrialized Countries.
American Sociological Review, 63(5):688710.
Gorodnichenko, Y. and Sabirianova Peter, K. (2007). Public Sector Pay
and Corruption: Measuring Bribery from Micro Data. Journal of Public
Economics, 91:963991.
Gottfredson, M. R. and Hirschi, T. (1990). A General Theory of Crime.
Stanford University Press, Stanford.
Gra¤ Zivin, J. and Neidell, M. (2012). The Impact of Pollution on Worker
Productivity. American Economic Review, 102:36523673.
155
Grimes, M. (2008). Contestation or Complicity: Civil Society as Anti-
dote or Accessory to Political Corruption. QoG Working Paper Series
2008:8. Retrieved April 11, 2013, from The Quality of Government In-
stitute - University of Gothenburg website: http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/
digitalAssets/1350/1350640_2008_8_grimes.pdf.
Grimes, M. and Wängnerud, L. (2012). Good Government in Mexico:
The Relevance of the Gender Perspective. QoG Working Paper Series
2012:11. Retrieved March 29, 2013, from The Quality of Government
Institute - University of Gothenburg website: http://www.qog.pol.gu.
se/digitalAssets/1384/1384935_2012_11_grimes_w--ngnerud.pdf.
Grossman, G. M. and Krueger, A. B. (1995). Economic Growth and the
Environment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(2):353377.
Grossman, G. M. and Krueger, A. B. (1996). The Inverted-U: What Does It
Mean? Environment and Development Economics, 1(01):119122.
Gunderson, M. (1979). Earnings Di¤erentials between the Public and Private
Sectors. Canadian Journal of Economics, 12(2):228242.
Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., and Alonso-Terme, R. (2002). Does Corruption
A¤ect Income Inequality and Poverty? Economics of Governance, 3:23
45.
Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., and Tiongson, E. (2001). Corruption and the Pro-
vision of Health Care and Education Services. In Jain, A. K., editor, The
Political Economy of Corruption, chapter 6, pages 111141. Routledge,
London.
Gwynn, R. C. and Thurston, G. D. (2001). The Burden of Air Pollution:
Impacts among Racial Minorities. Environmental Health Perspectives,
109(Suppl 4):501506.
Gyimah-Brempong, K. (2002). Corruption, Economic Growth, and Income
Inequality in Africa. Economics of Governance, pages 183209.
Gyimah-Brempong, K. and Wilson, M. (2004). Health Human Capital and
Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan African and OECD countries. The
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 44(2):296320.
Hanna, S. (1996). Designing Institutions for the Environment. Environment
and Development Economics, 1(01):122125.
156
Hettige, H., Lucas, R. E., and Wheeler, D. (1992). The Toxic Intensity of In-
dustrial Production: Global Patterns, Trends, and Trade Policy. American
Economic Review, 82(2):47881.
Hou, J. W. (1993). Public-Private Wage Comparison: A Case Study of
Taiwan. Journal of Asian Economics, 4(2):347362.
Inter-Parliamentary Union (1995). Woman in Parliaments, 1945-1995: A
World Statistical Survey. Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva.
Inter-Parliamentary Union (2013). Woman in Parliament in 2013: the Year
in Review. Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva.
Inter-Parliamentary Union (2014). PARLINE Database on National Parlia-
ments. http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp (accessed
October 1, 2014).
Ivanova, K. (2011). Corruption and Air Pollution in Europe. Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers, 63(1):4970.
Jaimovich, E. and Rud, J. P. (2014). Excessive Public Employment and Rent-
Seeking Traps. Journal of Development Economics, 106(0):144 155.
Jha, C. K. and Sarangi, S. (2015). Women and Corruption: What Positions
Must They Hold to Make a Di¤erence? Retrieved 2015, June 17, from
SSRN website: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2434912orhttp://dx.doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.2434912.
Jin, Y., Ma, X., Chen, X., Cheng, Y., Baris, E., and Ezzati, M. (2006).
Exposure to Indoor Air Pollution from Household Energy Use in Rural
China: The Interactions of Technology, Behavior, and Knowledge in Health
Risk Management. Social Science & Medicine, 62(12):316176.
John, A. and Pecchenino, R. (1994). An Overlapping Generations Model
of Growth and the Environment. The Economic Journal, 104(427):1393
1410.
Jones, L. E. andManuelli, R. E. (2001). Endogenous Policy Choice: The Case
of Pollution and Growth. Review of Economic Dynamics, 4(2):369405.
Kampa, M. and Castanas, E. (2008). Human Health E¤ects of Air Pollution.
Environmental Pollution, 151(2):362367.
157
Keefer, P. and Knack, S. (1997). Why Dont Poor Countries Catch Up? A
Cross-National Test of an Institutional Explanation. Economic Inquiry,
35:590602.
Kolberg, J. E. (1991). The Gender Dimension of the Welfare State. Interna-
tional Journal of Sociology, 21(2):119148.
Kotsadam, A. and Nerman, M. (2012). The E¤ects of Gender Quotas in Latin
American National Elections. Retrieved October 1, 2014, from University
of Gothenburg website: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/28772.
Krook, M. L. (2006). Reforming Representation: The Di¤usion of Candidate
Gender Quotas Worldwide. Politics & Gender, 2(03):303327.
Krook, M. L. (2009). Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate
Selection Reform Worldwide. Oxford University Press, New York.
Krook, M. L. (2013). Electoral Gender Quotas: A Conceptual Analysis.
Comparative Political Studies, XX(X):126.
Kunovich, S. and Paxton, P. (2005). Pathways to Power: The Role of Political
Parties in Womens National Political Representation. American Journal
of Sociology, 111(2):505552.
Lambsdor¤, J. G. and Frank, B. (2011). Corrupt Reciprocity - Experimental
Evidence on A Mens Game. International Review of Law and Economics,
31(2):116125.
Leitão, A. (2010). Corruption and the Environmental Kuznets Curve: Em-
pirical Evidence for Sulfur. Ecological Economics, 69(11):21912201.
Li, H., Xu, L. C., and Zou, H.-f. (2000). Corruption, Income distribution,
and Growth. Economics and Politics, 12(2):155182.
Ligthart, J. E. and van der Ploeg, F. (1994). Pollution, the Cost of Public
Funds and Endogenous Growth. Economics Letters, 46(4):339349.
Lipfert, F. (2004). Air Pollution and Poverty: Does the Sword Cut Both
Ways? Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 58(1):23.
Lippe, M. (1999). Corruption and Environment at the Local Level. Trans-
parency International Working Paper. Retrieved March 31, 2014, from
UCL website: http://ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/drivers_urb_change/
urb_governance/pdf_trans_corrupt/TI_Lippe_1999_Corruption_
Environment_Local.pdf.
158
López and, R. and Mitra, S. (2000). Corruption, Pollution, and the Kuznets
Environment Curve. Journal of Environmental Economics and Manage-
ment, 40(2):137150.
Lui, F. T. (1985). An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery. The journal
of political economy, pages 760781.
Macchiavello, R. (2008). Public Sector Motivation and Development Failures.
Journal of Development Economics, 86(1):201213.
Magnani, E. (2000). The Environmental Kuznets Curve, Environmental Pro-
tection Policy and Income Distribution. Ecological Economics, 32(3):431
443.
Magnani, E. (2001). The Environmental Kuznets Curve: Development Path
or Policy Result? Environmental Modelling & Software, 16(2):157165.
Makri, A. and Stilianakis, N. I. (2008). Vulnerability to Air Pollution Health
E¤ects. International Journal of Hygiene and Environmental Health,
211(3):326336.
Manuel, T. (2006). Envisioning the Possibilities for a Good Life: Explor-
ing the Public Policy Implications of Intersectionality Theory. Journal of
Women, Politics & Policy, 28(3-4):173203.
Marshall, J. D. (2008). Environmental Inequality: Air Pollution Expo-
sures in Californias South Coast Air Basin. Atmospheric Environment,
42(21):54995503.
Matland, R. E. (2006). Electoral Quotas: Frequency and E¤ectiveness. In
Dahlerup, D., editor,Women, Quotas and Politics, chapter 13, pages 275
292. Routledge, New York.
Matland, R. E. and Studlar, D. T. (1996). The Contagion of Women Candi-
dates in Single-Member District and Proportional Representation Electoral
Systems: Canada and Norway. The Journal of Politics, 58(03):707733.
Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 110(3):681712.
Melly, B. (2005). Public-Private Sector Wage Di¤erentials in Germany: Ev-
idence from Quantile Regression. Empirical Economics, 30(2):505520.
159
Michailova, J. and Melnykovska, I. (2009). Gender, Corruption and Sus-
tainable Growth in Transition Countries. Journal of Applied Economic
Sciences, IV(3(9)):387407.
Mocan, N. (2008). What Determines Corruption? International Evidence
From Microdata. Economic Inquiry, 46(4):493510.
Mohtadi, H. (1996). Environment, Growth, and Optimal Policy Design.
Journal of Public Economics, 63(1):119140.
Moreira, M. J. (2003). A Conditional Likelihood Ratio Test for Structural
Models. Econometrica, 71(4):10271048.
Morello-Frosch, R. A. (2002). Discrimination and the Political Economy of
Environmental Inequality. Environment and Planning C: Government &
Policy, 20(4):477496.
Morse, S. (2006). Is Corruption Bad for Environmental Sustainability ? A
Cross-National Analysis. Ecology and Society, 11(1):22.
Mueller, R. E. (1998). Public-Private Sector Wage Di¤erentials in Canada:
Evidence from Quantile Regressions. Economics Letters, 60(2):229235.
Mukherjee, R. and Gokcekus, O. (2004). Gender and Corruption in the Public
Sector. In Global Corruption Report 2004, pages 337339. Transparency
International.
Narayan, S., Narayan, P. K., and Mishra, S. (2010). Investigating the Rela-
tionship between Health and Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from
a Panel of 5 Asian Countries. Journal of Asian Economics, 21(4):404411.
Nawaz, F. (2009). State of Research on Gender and Corruption.
U4 Expert Answers. Retrieved April 26, 2013, from U4 Anti-
Corruption Research Centre website: http://www.u4.no/publications/
state-of-research-on-gender-and-corruption.
Niphadkar, P. V., Rangnekar, K., Tulaskar, P., Deo, S., and Mahadik, S.
(2009). Poor Awareness and Knowledge about Indoor Air Pollution in
the Urban Population of Mumbai, India. Journal of the Association of
Physicians of India, 57:447450.
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Per-
formance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
160
Nyamu-Musembi, C. (2007). Gender and Corruption in the Administration
of Justice. InGlobal Corruption Report 2007, pages 121128. Transparency
International.
ONeill, M. S., Jerrett, M., Kawachi, I., Levy, J. I., Cohen, A. J., Gouveia,
N., Wilkinson, P., Fletcher, T., Cifuentes, L., Schwartz, J., et al. (2003).
Health, Wealth, and Air Pollution: Advancing Theory and Methods. En-
vironmental Health Perspectives, 111(16):1861.
Ones, D. and Viswesvaran, C. (1998). Gender, Age, and Race Di¤erences
on Overt Integrity Tests: Results across Four Large-Scale Job Applicant
Data Sets. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83(1):3542.
Panayotou, T. (1993). Empirical Tests and Policy Analysis of Environ-
mental Degradation at Di¤erent Stages of Economic Development. World
Employment Programme Research Working Paper. International Labour
O¢ ce, Geneva. Retrieved March 31, 2014, from ILO website: http:
//ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/1993/93B09_31_engl.pdf.
Panayotou, T. (1997). Demystifying the Environmental Kuznets Curve:
Turning a Black Box into a Policy Tool. Environment and Development
Economics, 2(4):465484.
Panizza, U. and Qiang, C. Z.-W. (2005). Public-Private Wage Di¤erential
and Gender Gap in Latin America: Spoiled Bureaucrats and Exploited
Women? The Journal of Socio-Economics, 34(6):810833.
Pellegrini, L. and Gerlagh, R. (2006). Corruption, Democracy, and Environ-
mental Policy: An Empirical Contribution to the Debate. The Journal of
Environment & Development, 15(3):332354.
Perlin, S. A., Wong, D., and Sexton, K. (2001). Residential Proximity to In-
dustrial Sources of Air Pollution: Interrelationships among Race, Poverty,
and Age. Journal of the Air & Waste Management Association, 51(3):406
421.
Political Risk Services Group (2014). ICRG Methodology. Retrieved Oc-
tober 2, 2014, from PRS Group website http://www.prsgroup.com/
wp-content/uploads/2014/08/icrgmethodology.pdf.
Quota Project (2015). Global Database of Quotas for Women. http://www.
quotaproject.org (accessed June 13, 2015).
161
Reiss, M. and Mitra, K. (1998). The E¤ects of Individual Di¤erence Fac-
tors on the Acceptability of Ethical and Unethical Workplace Behaviors.
Journal of Business Ethics, 17(14):15811593.
Reynolds, A. (1999). Women in the Legislatures and Executives of the World:
Knocking at the Highest Glass Ceiling. World Politics, 51(04):547572.
Richards, P. and Tittle, C. R. (1981). Gender and Perceived Chances of
Arrest. Social Forces, 59(4):11821199.
Rivas, M. F. (2013). An Experiment on Corruption and Gender. Bulletin of
Economic Research, 65(1):1042.
Rodríguez, V. E. (2003). Women in Contemporary Mexican Politics. Uni-
versity of Texas Press, Austin.
Sah, R. (2007). Corruption across Countries and Regions: Some Conse-
quences of Local Osmosis. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
31(8):25732598.
Samet, J. and White, R. (2004). Urban Air Pollution, Health, and Equity.
Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 58(1):35.
Samimi, A. and Hosseinmardi, H. (2011). Gender and Corruption: Evidence
from Selected Developing Countries. Middle-East Journal of Scientic
Research, 9(6):718727.
Schulze, G. and Frank, B. (2003). Deterrence versus Intrinsic Motivation:
Experimental Evidence on the Determinants of Corruptibility. Economics
of Governance, 4:143160.
Schwindt-Bayer, L. A. (2009). Making Quotas Work: The E¤ect of Gender
Quota Laws on the Election of Women. Legislative Studies Quarterly,
34(1):528.
Selden, T. M. and Song, D. (1994). Environmental Quality and Develop-
ment: Is there a Kuznets Curve for Air Pollution Emissions? Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 27(2):147162.
Shak, N. (1994). Economic Development and Environmental Quality: An
Econometric Analysis. Oxford Economic Papers, 46:757773.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1993). Corruption. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 108(3):599617.
162
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1994). Politicians and Firms. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, pages 9951025.
Smith, S. (1976). Pay Di¤erentials between Federal Government and Private
Sector Workers. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 29(2):179197.
Smulders, S. and Gradus, R. (1996). Pollution Abatement and Long-Term
Growth. European Journal of Political Economy, 12(3):505532.
Stock, J. H. and Watson, M. W. (2010). Introduction to Econometrics. Pear-
son Education Limited, 3rd edition.
Stokey, N. L. (1998). Are there Limits to Growth? International Economic
Review, 39(1):131.
Strauss, J. and Thomas, D. (1998). Health, Nutrition, and Economic Devel-
opment. Journal of Economic Literature, 36(2):766817.
Sung, H. (2003). Fairer Sex or Fairer System? Gender and Corruption
Revisited. Social Forces, 82:703723.
Swamy, A., Knack, S., Lee, Y., and Azfar, O. (2001). Gender and Corruption.
Journal of Development Economics, 64(1):2555.
Tahvonen, O. and Kuuluvainen, J. (1993). Economic Growth, Pollution, and
Renewable Resources. Journal of Environmental Economics and Manage-
ment, 24(2):101118.
Tanzi, V. and Davoodi, H. R. (1997). Corruption, Public Investment, and
Growth. Technical report, International Monetary Fund.
The Gapminder Foundation (2014). GDP per Capita by Purchas-
ing Power Parities - Version 14. http://www.gapminder.org/data/
documentation/gd001/ (accessed October 1, 2014).
Torgler, B. and Valev, N. T. (2010). Gender and Public Attitudes Toward
Corruption and Tax Evasion. Contemporary Economic Policy, 28(4):554
568.
Torras, M. and Boyce, J. K. (1998). Income, Inequality, and Pollution: A
Reassessment of the Environmental Kuznets Curve. Ecological Economics,
25(2):147160.
Treisman, D. (2007). What Have We Learned About the Causes of Cor-
ruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research? Annual
Review of Political Science, 10(1):211244.
163
Tripp, A. M. and Kang, A. (2008). The Global Impact of Quotas on the
Fast Track to Increased Female Legislative Representation. Comparative
Political Studies, 41(3):338361.
UNIFEM (2008). Progress of the Worlds Women 2008/2009: Who Answers
to Women? UNIFEM, New York.
Van Rijckeghem, C. and Weder, B. (2001). Bureaucratic Corruption and the
Rate of Temptation: Do Wages in the Civil Service A¤ect Corruption, and
by How Much? Journal of Development Economics, 65(2):307331.
Varvarigos, D. (2014). Endogenous Longevity and the Joint Dynamics of
Pollution and Capital Accumulation. Environment and Development Eco-
nomics, 19(04):393416.
Vijayalakshmi, V. (2008). Rent-Seeking and Gender in Local Governance.
Journal of Development Studies, 44(9):12621288.
Walker, G., Mitchell, G., Fairburn, J., and Smith, G. (2005). Industrial Pol-
lution and Social Deprivation: Evidence and Complexity in Evaluating and
Responding to Environmental Inequality. Local Environment, 10(4):361
377.
Wängnerud, L. (2010). Variation in Corruption between Mexican States:
Elaborating the Gender Perspective. American Political Science Associa-
tion Annual Meeting Paper. Retrieved April 25, 2013, from SSRN website:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1643992.
Wei, S.-J. (2000). How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?
Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(1):111.
Welsch, H. (2004). Corruption, Growth, and the Environment: A Cross-
Country Analysis. Environment and Development Economics, 9(5):663
693.
Williams III, R. C. (2003). Health E¤ects and Optimal Environmental Taxes.
Journal of Public Economics, 87(2):323335.
Wolfers, J. (2006). Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A
Reconciliation and New Results. American Economic Review, 96(5):1802
1820.
Wooldridge, J. (2012). Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach.
Cengage Learning, 5th edition.
164
World Bank (2012). World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and
Development. World Bank, Washington, DC.
World Health Organization (2002). Health, Economic Growth, and Poverty
Reduction: The Report of Working Group 1 of the Commission on Macro-
economics and Health. World Health Organization, Geneva.
Yang, W. and Omaye, S. T. (2009). Air Pollutants, Oxidative Stress and
Human Health. Mutation Research/Genetic Toxicology and Environmental
Mutagenesis, 674(1):4554.
You, J.-S. and Khagram, S. (2005). A Comparative Study of Inequality and
Corruption. American Sociological Review, 70(1):136157.
Zugravu, N., Millock, K., and Duchene, G. (2008). The Factors behind CO2
Emission Reduction in Transition Economies. Nota di lavoro // Fondazione
Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable Development, No. 58.2008. Leibniz Infor-
mation Centre for Economics. Retrieved March 31, 2014, from EconStor
website: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53255.
165
